The Future of Work in the ‘Sharing Economy’. Market Efficiency and Equitable Opportunities or Unfair Precarisation? by CODAGNONE CRISTIANO et al.
  
The Future of Work in the  
‘Sharing Economy’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Efficiency and Equitable 
Opportunities or Unfair 
Precarisation? 
Cristiano Codagnone 
Fabienne Abadie 
Federico Biagi 
 
 
2016  
EUR 27913 EN 
  
This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-
house science service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-making 
process.  
The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither the 
European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which 
might be made of this publication. 
 
Contact information 
Address: Edificio Expo, C/ Inca Garcilaso, 3. E-41092 Seville, Spain 
E-mail: jrc-ipts-secretariat@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +34 954488318 
Fax : +34 954488300 
 
JRC Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC101280 
 
EUR 27913 EN 
 
 
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-58262-2 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2791/431485 LF-NA-27913-EN-N 
 
 
© European Union, 2016 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
 
How to cite: Cristiano Codagnone, Fabienne Abadie, Federico Biagi; The Future of Work in the ‘Sharing 
Economy’. Market Efficiency and Equitable Opportunities or Unfair Precarisation?  Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 27913 EN, doi:10.2791/431485 
 
All images © European Union 2016 
 
Abstract 
This critical and scoping review essay analyses digital labour markets where labour-intensive services are 
traded by matching requesters (employers and/or consumers) and providers (workers). It focuses on digital 
labour markets which allow the remote delivery of electronically transmittable services (i.e. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, Upwork, Freelancers, etc.) and those where the matching and administration processes are 
digital but the delivery of the services is physical and requires direct interaction. The former broad type is 
called Online Labour Markets (OLMs) and is potentially global. The latter broad type is termed Mobile Labour 
Markets (MLMs) and is by definition localised.  
The essay defines and conceptualises these markets proposing a typology which proves to be empirically 
valid and heuristically useful. It describes their functioning and the socio-demographic profiles of the 
participants, reviews their economic and social effects, discusses the possible policy implications, and 
concludes with a research agenda to support European level policy making. It alternates the discussion of 
‘hard’ findings from experimental and quasi-experimental studies with analysis of ‘softer’ issues such as 
rhetorical discourses and media ‘hyped’ accounts. This triangulation is inspired by, and a tribute to, the 
enduring legacy of the work of Albert O. Hirschman and his view that ideas and rhetoric can become 
endogenous engines of social change, reforms, and policies. This essay tries to disentangle the rhetoric with 
available empirical evidence in order to enable a more rational debate at least in the discussion of policies, if 
not in the public arena. To do so, an in depth analysis of 39 platforms was undertaken together with a 
formal review of 70 scientific sources. These two main sources have been integrated with: a) an exploration 
of 100 media accounts (business press, newspapers, magazines, and blogs); b) 50 reports and surveys 
produced by ‘interested parties’ (industrial associations, platforms own reports and public relation materials, 
think tanks with a clear political orientation, NGOs, trade unions, etc.); and c) about 200 indirectly relevant 
scientific contributions and policy reports (used as sources to contextualise and integrate the above sources, 
and to derive theoretical and interpretative insights).  
While the evidence is limited and inconclusive with respect to various dimensions, the findings of this essay 
show, among other things, that: a) individuals engage in these activities primarily for money, for a large 
segment of them this work is their primary source of income, and most are under-employed and self-
employed and fewer are unemployed and inactive; b) matching frictions and hiring inefficiencies are 
widespread and even the OLMs are far from being globalised online meritocracies; c) a behavioural approach 
to big data exploration should be further applied because there is emerging evidence of heuristic and biases 
contributing to hiring inefficiencies.  
Title: The Future of Work in the ‘Sharing Economy’. Market Efficiency and Equitable Opportunities or Unfair 
Precarisation? 
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1  ‘The Passions and the Interest: Unpacking the Sharing Economy’ (Codagnone et al., 2016). 
2  The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) has seven research institutes, one of 
which is the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS). 
3  The reference here is, obviously, to Max Weber’s distinction between ‘value-freedom’ 
(Wertbeziehung) and ‘value-relevance’ with respect to the three phases of research: what we 
research, how we do it, and how results are interpreted (Weber, 1904). 
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Foreword  
This essay is one of two that deal with the sharing economy.  While this essay deals 
specifically with digital labour markets, the second provides a more general overview 
(see footnote 1).  Both are based on primary (analysis of platforms) and secondary 
(scientific literature, think tanks and policy reports, and media accounts) sources. They 
take an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis, combining economics, sociology, 
anthropology, legal studies, and rhetorical analysis.  
The reader will embark on what may at first sight seem a tortuous journey into different 
literatures, codes, terminologies, and narratives. Discussion of ‘hard’ findings from 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies will alternate with analysis of ‘softer’ issues 
such as rhetorical discourses and media ‘hyped’ accounts. There is a rationale, however, 
inspired by the enduring legacy of the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970, 1977, 1991)4 
and his view that ideas and rhetoric can become endogenous engines of social change, 
reforms, and policies.  
In the preface of his book The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991), Hirschman observed that 
opposing groups in liberal democracies sometimes get walled off from each other’s 
opinions and views. He argued that rhetorical discourses can explode into conflict simply 
as a result of the ‘imperative of the argument’. He explained that he found a detached 
analysis of surface rhetoric, placed historically and analytically in context, more useful 
than a head-on attack on one of the opposing factions. He also claimed that 
deconstructing rhetoric by using empirical evidence could help restore dialogue and 
communication between conflicting factions. He also showed how rhetorical discourses 
do not emerge from nowhere but are historically inspired and recurring. He compared, 
for instance, the neoconservative attacks on welfare states, such as Charles Murray’s 
Losing Ground (1984), to the reactions hundreds year earlier against the “Poor Laws”.  
He noted how ‘Any idea that has been out of view for a long time has a good chance of 
being mistaken for an original insight’ (1991, pp. 29-30). A case in point is the discourse 
about gigs workers performing tasks on digital labour markets for ‘pin money’. Here, an 
old idea first articulated in the 1950s and 1960s about the then-emerging temporary 
work agencies in the US has clearly resurfaced (Berg, 2016). More generally, the 
‘sharing economy’ is today a rhetorical field that needs unpacking. 
The ‘sharing economy’ (also given, among many others, the label ‘collaborative 
economy’), is potentially the ideal place for reconciling the ‘passions’ and the ‘interests’. 
In the last few years, however, it has become the domain of conflicting discourses, legal 
disputes, and at times violent strikes (i.e. traditional taxi drivers in Paris or Milan). It 
may seem churlish to deconstruct these discourses with empirical evidence and to 
challenge claims made by both naive disinterested and shrewd self-interested parties 
about ‘le magnifiche sorti e progressive’ (the magnificent and progressive fate5) of the 
‘sharing economy’. Alternatively, deflating the gloomy predictions of the harshest 
detractors of ‘sharing platforms’ may be considered apologetic. Yet, this is exactly what 
this essay aims to do. It will try to disentangle the rhetoric with available empirical 
evidence in order to enable a more rational debate at least in the discussion of policies, if 
not in the public arena. Analysis of the rhetoric, mapping of stakeholder positioning and 
interests, and robust empirical evidence are triangulated to inform policy making with a 
series of options. Currently, commercial ‘sharing’ platforms operate in an institutional 
vacuum and stand to some extent ‘above the law’. This makes it easy for ‘detractors’ to 
argue that they are simply thriving on ‘regulatory arbitrage’, rather than producing 
innovation. Decisions made by local governments and courts may create a very 
                                           
4  As evident also in the title of the other essay on the ‘sharing economy’ in general pitting the 
passions against the interests.  
5  This is a famous quote from a 1836 poem by Giacomo Leopardi’s (La Ginestra o Fiore del 
Deserto), where the Italian poet ironically challenged in the positivist context of the day the 
blind faith in an unlimited and extraordinary progress for all human race. 
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fragmented landscape in Europe. Regulatory and policy guidance is therefore urgently 
needed.    
The ‘sharing economy’ is a paradigmatic case of a policy-relevant issue where facts are 
uncertain, values disputed, and the stakes increasingly high. As such, it represents a test 
bed for the exercise of science to broker policy options honestly and transparently. It is a 
strategic case study in which the JRC could play a valuable role as a ‘boundary 
organisation’ between science and policy (Guimarães Pereira & Saltelli, 2014). This essay 
represents a first step in this direction. There are however some obstacles in data 
accessibility that must be overcome, as discussed briefly in the final part of this foreword.  
On 10 February 2016, Airbnb, Uber and 45 other commercial ‘sharing’ platforms sent an 
open letter to the Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union6. An 
extract is reported below: 
In its Digital Single Market Strategy, the European Commission announced the 
development of a European agenda for the collaborative economy […] We welcome 
the Strategy as an important step in realising the benefits which our platforms can 
deliver for European consumers. We also support the Commission’s efforts to seek 
and remove obstacles in the broader European internal market for goods and services. 
In view of the upcoming European Competitiveness Council, we urge Member States 
to support these objectives and continue to seek to ensure that local and national laws 
do not unnecessarily limit the development of the collaborative economy to the 
detriment of Europeans. [...] We therefore call on the Council to acknowledge in its 
Conclusions, the positive contribution of the collaborative economy in terms of 
sustainable economic growth for Europe. 
The work carried out as part of the exploratory project on the ‘sharing economy’ shows 
that evidence is emerging on both the positive and negative effects of platforms. 
However, it also unequivocally documents that the currently available evidence on costs 
and benefits is absolutely partial and not yet conclusive. There are a few exceptions 
where data on labour platforms has been made available to researchers: i.e from 
Upwork, formerly Elance-oDesk, and Freelancers. However, most of the available 
quantitative evidence based on platforms’ own data has been produced by the platforms 
themselves (Airbnb, 2015b)7, or has been commissioned to former members of the 
Obama administration (Autor et al., 2003; Hall & Krueger, 2015; Sperling, 2015) and of 
the German Monopolies Commission (Uber, 2015f, 2015g), or co-authored (but not yet 
published in peer-reviewed journals) by academics and ‘embedded researchers’ (i.e. 
researchers who are employed by platforms and have been given access to internal 
data). The datasets and methods used to produce these reports, thus, are not publicly 
accessible for third-party scrutiny. It is more than likely that the net welfare effects of 
the ‘sharing economy’ are positive for the economy, and the society as a whole, 
including consumers, employers, and possibly workers. However, it needs to be 
demonstrated by further empirical research in general and especially in Europe. This 
research should undergo the scrutiny of peer-review. Though evidence can certainly be 
gathered through qualitative interviews and case studies, surveys, and web scraping of 
data, the important data that would show economic effects are those gathered by the 
platforms, which so far have been made available only to a few selected researchers. It 
is, thus, important that European researchers also have access to platform-generated 
data. It would provide evidence on costs and benefits for different categories of 
stakeholders, from which aggregate net welfare effects could be estimated. The 
European Commission should take steps to make this possible.  
                                           
6  Available at: https://www.airbnbaction.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/NLCouncilLetterCollabEcon-Final-100216-4.pdf (retrieved 11-02-
2016). 
7  After this entry in the blog summarising the overall results, one can then access the city 
specific reports (Airbnb, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; 
Uber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g). 
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Executive Summary 
This essay analyses digital labour markets where labour-intensive services are traded by 
matching requesters (employers and/or consumers) and providers (workers). It defines 
and conceptualises these markets, describes their functioning, the socio-demographic 
profiles of the participants, and reviews their economic and social effects. This 
contribution is one of a kind because it gathers extensive primary and secondary 
evidence (a total of about 370 unique sources) and it takes an inter-disciplinary 
approach in which economics, sociology, anthropology, legal studies, and rhetorical 
analysis converge. It alternates the discussion of ‘hard’ findings from experimental and 
quasi-experimental studies with analysis of ‘softer’ issues such as rhetorical discourses 
and media ‘hyped’ accounts. This approach is inspired by, and a tribute to, the enduring 
legacy of the work of Albert O. Hirschman (1970, 1977, and 1991) and his view that 
ideas and rhetoric can become endogenous engines of social change, reforms, and 
policies. 
The digital labour markets considered in this essay include both those that allow the 
remote delivery of electronically transmittable services (i.e. Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
Upwork, Freelancers, etc.) and those where the matching and administration processes 
are digital but the delivery of the services is physical and requires direct interaction. The 
former broad type is called Online Labour Markets (OLMs), which are potentially global, 
the latter broad type is called Mobile Labour Markets (MLMs), which are by definition 
localised. Using this distinction together with that concerning the type of task traded a 
two by two typology is proposed including: (1) OLMs for micro-tasking (i.e. small pieces 
of routine cognitive work requiring low to middle levels of skills as traded for instance in 
Amazon Mechanical Turk); (2) OLMs for tasking and at times delivery of entire and self-
contained projects (i.e. tasks requiring middle to high skill levels such as in Upwork or 
Freelancers); (3) MLMs for physical services (i.e. performing low skilled manual work 
and errands such as in TaskRabbit); (4) MLMs for interactive services (i.e. interactive 
services requiring high skills such as in TakeLessons). Most transactions in (1) and (2) 
are Peer-to-Business (P2B) while in (3) and (4) they are Peer-to-Peer (P2P).  
These markets can be broadly considered as part of, and related to, wider trends such as 
globalisation of labour markets through the diffusion of outsourcing and offshoring, 
computerisation and job polarisation, the de-standardisation of work with the emergence 
of Non Standard Work (NSW). OLMs are also seen as constituting a further driver of the 
‘Flat World’ and as the advent of an online global meritocracy. Proponents see these 
markets as a means to empower individuals, allowing them to work flexibly or make 
extra money. Detractors, however, consider them as unregulated channels which lead to 
the exploitation of workers.  
This essay attempts to disentangle the rhetoric and controversy that has characterised 
the sharing economy debate.  It looks at the available empirical evidence in order to 
enable a more rational debate - at least in the discussion of policies, if not in the public 
arena. To do so, an in depth analysis of 39 platforms was undertaken together with a 
formal review of 70 scientific sources, integrated with: a) an exploration of 100 media 
accounts (business press, newspapers, magazines, and blogs); b) 50 reports and 
surveys produced by ‘interested parties’ (industrial associations, platforms own reports 
and public relation materials, think tanks with a clear political orientation, NGOs, trade 
unions, etc.); and c) about 200 indirectly-relevant scientific contributions and policy 
reports (used as sources to contextualise and integrate the above sources, as well as to 
derive theoretical and interpretative insights). 
The dimensional importance of work in digital labour markets is still debatable and 
requires more well-designed surveys, but it has been shown to be statistically non 
marginal. In countries such as the UK and the US, those working regularly for digital 
labour markets (every week) are conservatively estimated to make up between 1% and 
2% of the labour force. Globally, the 39 platforms reviewed have a total of 52.6 million 
registered contractors (a possible under-estimation since there are more platforms out 
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there). Most of the platforms reviewed are from the US, whereas there are only a few 
European platforms with 100,000 registered contractors and international coverage. 
Overall, platforms have grown exponentially over the last five years, although their size 
is still small. However, if they continue to grow at this pace, it is an empirically-
consequential hypothesis that they could encroach on traditional and long-term forms of 
employment. 
Ex ante, using theoretical hypotheses and indirectly relevant evidence by analogy, a 
number of potentially positive and negative effects can be identified for digital labour 
platforms. They can increase the pool of employers and workers by removing barriers 
and reducing transaction costs, improving matching, increasing human capital 
specialisation, with potential net welfare effects such as more efficient labour markets 
and increased employment. This may also increase productivity. However, the 
distributive effects are less clear, depending on whether there will be a long-tail or 
superstar effect, which may be different for OLM vs MLM. On the other hand, bias, 
frictions and mismatches could counter any positive effects. As they create precarious 
forms of employment, digital labour markets could also be the source of social risks and 
costs. Temporary work can lead to precarisation, blockages to social mobility, and wage 
penalties. In spite of emerging indications, the evidence for these effects is still limited 
and not conclusive. The main findings from the reviewed sources as regards workers, the 
effects and functionings of digital labour markets, and regulatory issues, are reported 
below. 
Workers 
Workers in digital labour markets tend to be younger and better educated than their 
population of reference. However, between 6% and 12% of individuals 55 and older also 
participate (depending on the OLMs and MLMs considered and on the country). Overall, 
women are either more represented than men or equally represented, although gender 
stereotypes penalise them even in anonymous contexts such as OLMs. The evidence 
gathered debunks the rhetoric about digital workers being predominantly students, as 
recent surveys find that this category accounts for no more than 10% of workers. They 
do not work for ‘pin money’ or out of boredom, as the available evidence shows that 
there are fairly large shares of individuals for whom earnings from working for digital 
labour markets represent their primary source of income and/or who engage in a 
portfolio of several activities. In the UK, for instance, according to a survey based on a 
nationally-representative sample, as many as 60% (2.9 million if projected on the 
population of reference) of those who have worked in digital labour markets at least 
once (11% or 4.9 million) work for several of them and are registered with between 2 
and 5. Even when the pay is very low, available surveys indicate that the primary 
motivation for engaging in this type of work is to earn money. The question of whether 
these forms of work are voluntary or involuntary is a thornier one and the evidence 
available does not enable us to draw any conclusions. Obviously, there is a wide range of 
situations from freely choosing independent freelancing, to doing ‘gigs’ for lack of 
alternative opportunities. On the employment status and history of those working in 
digital labour markets, much more research is needed, as the evidence reviewed is 
fragmentary and mostly indirect. According to both scientific work and the data reported 
by some of the platforms themselves, it seems that the majority of these workers are 
under-employed or self-employed, and that fewer of them are unemployed and inactive. 
On the other hand, there is fairly robust and uniform evidence to show that earnings in 
these markets range from very low to modest, with only a small minority of workers 
making above middle-level incomes. It is also fairly evident that workers have no form of 
social protection, are in a position of unfavourable information and power asymmetry, 
and that their privacy is not protected. Gender and ethnicity-based discrimination 
(voluntary or involuntarily produced by matching frictions, hiring inefficiencies, and 
cognitive biases) is not uncommon and workers have no way to protect themselves from 
it. Finally, several studies have documented the increasing diffusion of strictly automated 
control through algorithms. This has been further corroborated by the inquiries of US 
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judges in the legal cases related to Uber and Lyft. This seemingly supports the claim that 
digital labour markets bring us back to Taylor (automated control), Smith (division of 
labour into piece work), and to pre-industrial levels of work precarisation (lack of social 
protection). 
Digital labour markets’ effects and functioning 
The evidence available does not document the positive effects that could be envisaged 
ex ante but points instead to some limits to their realisation. This does not mean that 
positive effects should be ruled out or that digital markets are not producing any benefits, 
otherwise their growth could not be explained. To document these positive effects, more 
empirical research in general, and especially more studies of the effects on firms, should 
be conducted. In addition, studies that try to compare the effects of digital labour 
markets with respect to their non-digital counterparts should be carried out, in order to 
assess whether they improve production and market efficiency. Surveys commissioned 
by OLMs such as Upwork and Nubelo document high levels of satisfaction among both 
employers and contractors (though to a slightly lesser extent). Surveys designed and 
analysed by disinterested third parties are needed to corroborate these preliminary 
findings. Therefore, the main findings summarised below only reflect the quantitative 
and robust evidence that is currently available. OLMs favour international labour flows 
(especially ‘North-South’) but are not as flat and as meritocratic as expected. Various 
barriers that can be aptly summarised by the expression ‘the liability of foreignness’, 
limit the globalised trade of digital labour and the expected wage convergence. Non-
Westerners receive only a limited wage premium (compared to their domestic markets), 
However, domestic contractors earn more in absolute terms and for some tasks they are 
preferred, regardless of qualifications. This means that OLMs are less beneficial than 
expected for developing countries, and also that they exert less pressure on driving 
down wages in more developed countries.  On employment and related labour income 
effects, the available evidence is limited and inconclusive. In the reviewed studies, 
focussing on online labour market, examples of concentration of work assignments (i.e. 
‘superstar’ effects leading to job concentration and more income inequality) were found. 
No cases were documented, however, of the long tail effect (which has more equalising 
effects on both employment and income levels). The same applies to MLMs, and in one 
case, less than 10% of workers account for more than 80% of work completed. There is 
a fairly large number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies showing that 
digital labour markets are still riven with matching frictions and hiring inefficiencies. 
Little correlation is found between skills and earning levels, whereas reputational ratings 
and references seem to be the main explanation for the number of jobs and the amount 
of money contractors manage to secure. In this respect, it is important to note the 
relevance of also applying a behavioural perspective to the documented cases of gender 
and ethnic-based discrimination. These result from, in most cases, involuntary bad 
decisions based on stereotypes, like heuristics leading to judgements and decision 
making affected by confirmation biases.  
From legal disputes and regulation 
Various class actions in the US (especially those concerning Uber and Lyft) have made 
the debate on possible regulatory intervention more heated. The legal disputes focussed 
on the possible misclassification of employees as contractors. A court decision forcing 
Uber or Lyft drivers to be reclassified as employees could have radically changed the 
regulatory landscapes and the destiny of these two and other digital labour markets. In 
January (Lyft) and April (Uber) 2016, the two cases reached a settlement. However, the 
issue remains open and any governmental agency could pick it up again in the near 
future. In this domain, it has been proposed that an intermediate status between a 
contractor and an employee (dependent self-employed) be created and that digital 
labour markets should be made to pay at least a part of the traditional bundle of social 
protection provisions. This solution, however, would be difficult to implement as it is not 
easy to define in a general way the criteria that identify a dependent self-employed 
person. An alternative proposal, named ‘benefits portability’, consists of creating 
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individual security accounts to protect workers as they move from ‘gig’ to ‘gig’. Benefits 
(wage insurance, health insurance, disability and injury insurance) should be designed 
universally and not tied to specific employers. The final employers would have 
obligations similar to those that employ regular workers or they could share 
contributions with the digital labour markets, which could pay half of them. The 
enactment of some form of regulation to establish the proposed portability of benefits 
would represent a positive step forward to ensure more dignified conditions for workers 
in digital labour markets. Various analysts, however, consider it insufficient for several 
reasons: earnings are sometimes too low in the absence of any minimum wage rules, 
the flow of work is unstable, no social protection exists, there are clear information and 
power asymmetries, there is no protection against privacy violations, and various forms 
of information or reputation-based ethnic and gender discriminatory mechanisms occur 
unregulated.  
This essay raises four broad questions of interest to policy makers:  
A. What are the possible implications of these new digital labour markets for 
employment and wages? Do they create new jobs or simply crowd-out existing 
ones? Are they a source of income integration for the underemployed or are they 
instead pushing wages down? 
B. Do they justify regulatory intervention? If yes, in what areas? (i.e., taxation, 
liability, insurance, social protection).  
C. What would the costs of curbing innovation and loosing on improved labour 
market efficiency as a result of regulatory intervention be?  
D. Are there risks, in Europe, that fragmentation will emerge as a result of national 
or local interventions? And are there cases where the issue of classification (self-
employed vs. workers) will be decided by the courts in the absence of regulation? 
If growth continues at the fast pace of the last five years, these new markets could 
encroach on traditional and long-term forms of employment. Policy makers should 
acknowledge that employment in the 21st century is no longer a binary phenomenon (1= 
employed, 0= unemployed) and set a target to minimise involuntary employment and 
under-employment. They should put in place fair conditions for voluntary atypical work 
so that it does not increase inequality. In the same vein, ways should be found to 
increase protection without suddenly increasing the costs for digital platforms.  
European stakeholders should learn from the US experience and from the past. They 
should acknowledge that the dual policy approach of liberalising new forms of 
employment while retaining standard full-time employment as the benchmarking norm 
was not fully effective. It has, to some extent, exacerbated labour market dualism. 
It has also been suggested that support infrastructure be set up which would ensure a 
minimum wage, some minimal forms of social protection and health insurance, liability 
insurance, and safeguards to protect privacy and fight discrimination.  
The report concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for future research, 
identifying gaps and opportunities, and highlighting key research questions that need to 
be answered. 
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1 Introduction 
This essay analyses digital labour markets where labour-intensive services are traded by 
matching requesters (employers and/or consumers) and providers. It defines and 
conceptualises such markets, describes their functioning and the socio-demographic 
profiles of the participants, and review their economic and social effects; it also 
discusses the current policy implications and how these new and unregulated forms of 
Non Standard Work (NSW) contribute to shaping the future of work both in terms of 
potentially beneficial and detrimental effects. It is a one of a kind contribution both for 
the extensive gathering of primary and secondary evidence (a total of about 420 unique 
sources have been used) and for its inter-disciplinary scope situated at the confluence of 
economics, sociology, anthropology, legal studies, and rhetorical analysis. 
1.1 Digital labour platforms and the future of work 
As recounted by Schwartz (2015) in a piece 
tellingly titled ‘Human pretending to be 
computers pretending to be human’, in 1770 
Wolfgang von Kempelen presented in Vienna to 
Empress Maria Theresa a sort of robot (see 
picture) that could beat humans at playing chess; 
he called it the ‘Turk’. The ‘Turk’ toured Europe 
and evoked contrasting responses, as some were 
ready to admit and welcome that machines were 
surpassing humans but many opposed this view. 
Although the Turk included a ‘labyrinth of levers, 
cogs and clockwork machinery’ obviously it was 
not using any algorithm and was operated by a 
person hidden inside. The first digital platform for 
the trading of micro-tasks, Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (henceforth simply MTurk), was presented as a new technology of ‘humans-as-a-
service’ as opposed to ‘software-as-a-service’ and as a new form of ‘artificial intelligence’ 
(Irani, 2015b, p. 225). More recently engineers have brought this idea further by 
designing Soylent, ‘a word processor with a crowd inside’ that uses workers from MTurk 
to create a ‘human powered’ editor and writing assistant ‘inside’ MS Word (Bernstein et 
al., 2015). So one could wonder to what extent the future will be about robots 
supplanting humans or conversely about digital transformations turning humans into 
‘robots’. 
Past and current 
technological and (to a 
lesser extent) 
institutional trends are 
projected into various 
descriptions of the future 
of work in a crucial policy 
relevant debate. 
Computerisation and then 
robotisation as part of 
the so-called ‘second 
machine age’ 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2012; Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, 2014) is a 
pivotal hypothesis and 
narrative in this debate. 
Using the tasks taxonomy developed within the literature on the ‘routine-biased 
technical change’ hypothesis (Autor, 2013; Autor & Dorn, 2013; Autor, et al., 2003), has 
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led to estimates that in the U.S. and in Europe (see graph) the risk of job 
computerisation stands, respectively, at 47% (Frey & Osborne, 2013) and between 40% 
and 60% (Bowles, 2014) i. Between the mid-1990s and 2010 a clear job polarisation 
trend (U-shaped work force with the relative decline of middle-skilled jobs and increase 
of high and low-skilled ones) has emerged in most OECD countries: between 1995 and 
2010 routine jobs (i.e. accountants) fell 12 points (53% to 41%), while high skills 
abstract jobs (i.e. designers) increased ten points from 28% to 38% and non-routine 
manual jobs (i.e. drivers) increased three points from 18% to 21% (OECD, 2015a, p. 
29); this trend is seen as mostly produced by technological change and is expected to 
increase in the coming years. Another prominent narrative is that of the ‘Flat World’ 
whereby increasing outsourcing and off-shoring, also enabled by technology, are 
creating a globalised labour market (Freeman, 2008; Friedman, 2005). The coming 
digital wiring of labour was actually announced already in 1998 (Malone & Laubacher, 
1998), although limitations to this possibility have been presented much earlier than the 
formulation of the flat world thesis (Autor, 2001, 2008)ii. It has been observed how in 
the past three decades or so each new wave of digital innovation gave rise to contrasting 
narratives about the future of work (Baldry, 2011; Holtgrewe, 2014; Howcroft & Taylor, 
2014); such unilateral focus on technology obfuscates the importance of institutional 
changes in labour markets such as for instance the de-standardisation of work and the 
emergence of Non-Standard Work (NSW: self-employed own account workers not hiring 
other individuals, temporary or fixed term contracts, and part-time work, see more on 
this aspect in § 2.2). According to an OECD statistical analysis (2015a, pp. 147-152), the 
‘routine biased technical change’ tells only one part of the story, as job polarisation is 
clearly associated with de-standardisation of the labour contracts and there is no 
conclusive evidence demonstrating what caused what between technology and 
institutional change. What is clear from the data is that routine jobs based on standard 
contracts (i.e. accountants) have been substituted by routine jobs in NSW forms; if the 
disappearance of accounting jobs in the middle was entirely driven by technology, then 
such jobs could not have been substituted by individuals working under NSW conditions 
having the same skills of those laid off, as data show that it has actually occurred. The 
emergence of NSW is statistically associated with inequality and poverty (OECD, 2015, 
pp. 152-170) and is, thus, related to the ‘new inequality’ debate (Atkinson, 2015; 
Bernhardt, 2014; Kuttner, 2013, 2016; Standing, 2011; Summers & Balls, 2015), which 
is a key dimension in the broader discussion of the future of work. 
The emergence of digital platforms enabling the delivery of electronically transmittable 
or physical labour-intensive services is a new trend entering the debate on the future of 
work. Such platforms, especially in the media but also in academic articles and policy 
documents, go under various labels including, among others, the ‘sharing economy’, the 
‘collaborative economy’, ‘crowd-employment or crowd-working’, the ‘gig economy’, the 
‘on-demand economy’, etc. Following the more rigorous terminology adopted in the 
scientific literature, in this essay the first type (i.e. Upwork for tasks and projects or 
MTurk for micro-tasks) allowing the remote delivery of electronically transmittable 
services is referred to as Online Labour Markets or OLMs (Horton, 2010). The second 
type (i.e. TaskRabbit but to some extent also Uber and Lyft), including fully digitalised 
matching platforms where the services are delivered physically (requiring mobility and 
direct interaction between provider and requester), has been referred to in the academic 
literature as ‘Mobile Crowdsourcing Markets’ (Musthag & Ganesan, 2013), ‘Mobile 
Crowdsourcing Marketplaces’ (Thebault-Spieker et al., 2015), and ‘On Demand Mobile 
Workforce’(Teodoro et al., 2014); in this essay they are referred to as ‘Mobile Labour 
Markets’ (MLMs). In the large majority of cases both OLMs and MLMs qualify as two-
sided markets iii . While the full definition and conceptualisation of these platforms is 
presented later (see § 2.2), as regard terminology it is useful to clarify here that when 
referring in general to both types the simple expression ‘digital labour markets’ will be 
used or at times the acronym 2SOLMLMs which stands for ‘Two-Sided Online and Mobile 
Labour Markets’. The people working through these platforms have been called different 
things: ‘micro-entrepreneurs’, ‘gigs’, ‘contractors’, ‘on-demand workers’, ‘freelancers, 
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and even ‘Lumpen-cognitariat et salariat algorithmique’iv. For the sake of simplicity, they 
will be referred to simply as ‘workers’ and/or ‘contractors’.  
Regardless of their dimensional relevance, which is very controversial (see § 2.2), these 
digital labour markets are a paradigmatic and strategic case for the debate on the future 
of work and are not unrelated to the trends and hypotheses presented above. They are 
paradigmatic both for the empirical testing of key hypotheses and for the way they 
entwine rhetorical controversies, tangible conflicts, the presentation of evidence, and 
eventually regulatory and policy decisions. There are at least three ways in which digital 
labour markets can be contextualised with respects to the broader hypotheses, trends, 
and debates on the future of work.  
First, while the globalisation of labour (i.e. ‘flat world hypothesis’) with the diffusion of 
outsourcing and off-shoring is a wider trend pre-dating the emergence of OLMsv, the 
latter have been presented (Horton, 2010, p. 521) and discussed empirically (Beerepoot 
& Lambregts, 2015) as drivers accelerating the flattening of labour markets through 
virtual migration, and as potentially increasing wage convergence with its potentially 
positive (for workers in developing countries) and negative (for domestic workers in 
OECD countries) consequences; they are also seen as potentially affecting the 
international division of labour and deepening human capital specialisation at global level. 
Whether the world is flat in general and whether OLMs are really favouring convergence 
and abating all geographic barriers is an empirical matter that has yet to be resolved. 
Friedman’s thesis was heavily criticised empiricallyvi, whereas the evidence reviewed 
here suggests that flattening and wage convergence is still limited in OLMs due to a 
combination of matching frictions and employers’ cognitive heuristics and biases (see § 
3.2.1). 
Second, in both types of digital labour markets work is performed under even less 
standard forms than ‘traditional’ NSW, which makes them an object of debate from the 
perspective of inequality, precarisation, and erosion of labour rights (Berg, 2016; Cherry, 
2011, 2016; Kuttner, 2013). In OLMs work is carried out in a regulatory vacuum as the 
global nature of the platforms neutralises national labour laws and there is no 
international level agreement (Beerepoot & Lambregts, 2015, p. 246); actually, as 
candidly stated both by Horton (2010, p. 517) and by Agrawal et al. (2013a, p. 19), 
platforms perform government-like functions. Despite the fact that MLMs are localised, 
they have not been regulated yet, although they have been at the centre of lawsuits in 
the US (see Cherry, 2016). 
Third, the emergence of these digital labour markets (particularly OLMs but to some 
extent also MLMs) is at least indirectly related to computerisation/robotisation trend, the 
‘routine biased technical change’ hypothesis, and to job polarisation vii . Although 
sometimes full self-contained projects are delivered by ‘on-demand’ workers, in many 
cases OLMs trade fairly routine tasks and/or micro-tasks into which jobs have been 
broken down. As shown in the next figure, among the most traded tasks in Upwork (new 
name given to Elance-oDesk that is the result of the merge between Elance and oDesk) 
there are also fairly routine ones such as for administrative support as a category, 
accountants as a position (growth rate, respectively, 37% and 43%)viii, and the use of 
basic accounting software as a skill. A reasonable question is, then, why routine tasks 
and micro-tasks are not computerised and their online trading is fuelling the phenomenal 
growth of labour platforms (i.e., from 2008 till 2014 contractors’ earnings in Upwork 
went from 0 to 3.2 $ billion with the number of individuals performing tasks growing by 
1000%)? There are alternative answers (excessive costs of computerisation especially 
for SMEs, fluctuating demand for tasks, limits to the possibility of routinizing work, 
labour cost saving arbitrage made possible by institutional change such as work de-
standardisation and regulatory arbitrage). Discussing the available empirical evidence on 
these digital labour markets can shed light also on indirectly related future of work 
trends; clearly this preliminary observation may corroborate the OECD analysis (2015a, 
pp. 147-152), that the ‘routine biased technical change’ tells only one part of the job 
polarisation story, the other being work de-standarisation and total lack of regulation 
that make digital labour markets profitable. Furthermore, the extent to which these 
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markets trade highly skilled non routine tasks or instead low to medium skilled routine 
tasks would also contribute to shed further light on job polarisation; the growing trading 
of low skilled manual jobs through MLMs being the other side of the coin. 
Figure 1: Upwork most traded categories, positions, and skills 
 
Source: (Elance-oDesk, 2014; Upwork, 2015a, 2015b) 
1.2 Back to the future: from rhetoric to empirical questions 
As put by economist Timothy Taylor in his blog (Taylor, 2015), the use of the ‘sharing 
economy’ expression to refer to various commercial platforms is a ‘triumph of public 
relations artistry’ (he would rather use ‘the matching economy’). This consideration 
clearly applies to digital labour markets and it would suffice to observe their revenues 
and market evaluation; unlike community-based ‘time banking’ digital platforms where 
‘true’ sharing can occur, commercial initiatives such as TaskRabbit fail to cater for less 
advantaged members of the community (Thebault-Spieker, et al., 2015). The same goes 
for the ‘crowd working’ or ‘crowd employment’ labels resounding the rhetoric of 
crowdsourcing about the wisdom of crowds and their problem-solving potential, the 
generosity of cognitive surplus, and the democratising long-tail effects ix. There is no 
unequivocal evidence that these market favour a democratising ‘long tail’ of employment 
opportunities (Agrawal et al., 2013a) and there are actually a few contribution 
documenting ‘super star effects’ (Horton, 2014; Mill, 2011; Musthag & Ganesan, 2013); 
it is not the ‘generosity of cognitive surplus’ but rather monotonous work done for 
money that characterises the digital crowdsourcing of micro tasks (Martin et al., 2014). 
The terminology adopted in this essay has dispensed with rhetorically loaded labels, to 
the point that the expression ‘market’ is preferred to ‘platform’ as the latter is 
surrounded by a politically motivated rhetoric (Gillespie, 2010) matched by that on the 
objectivity of the algorithms they use (Gillespie, 2014). Nonetheless, following the 
general inspiration outlined in the ‘foreword’, a short review of conflictual discourses is 
presented below for they bring out important empirical research questions whose 
discussion in this essay can help reconciling opposing positions and better inform the 
policy-making process. 
From the review of media accounts (newspapers, magazines, blogs) performed, a brief 
characterisation of key rhetorical controversial discourses can be presented here. The 
enthusiasts see the ‘sharing economy’ as empowering millions of individuals to unlock 
the value or their time especially for those segments of human capital that escape 
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institutionalised employment (i.e. ‘flexers’ such as stay-at-home parents, retirees, 
students, etc.), for the under-employed and/or unemployed, and for independent highly 
skilled professionals. They portray digital labour platforms as helping individuals earn 
good extra-money and in some cases avoid boredom, achieve work-life balance through 
flexible and personally chosen work schedules and by working at home, be creative and 
autonomous and as enabling firms to deal with work picks without incurring unnecessary 
fixed costs and reach talents not available domestically. The rhetoric of a flat world is 
integrated with that of the advent of a global online meritocracy as heralded in the 
Elance-oDesk (then renamed Upwork) 2014 annual impact report (Elance-oDesk, 2014). 
The pessimists see digital markets as a new and unregulated channel for exploitation by 
employers and labour costs saving; they argue that the ‘gigs’ traded on these markets 
are the components of formerly full-time jobs, parcelled up and put out to tender on a 
piece-by-piece basis to increase outsourcing across the board (i.e. of both core and non-
core tasks) and reduce labour costs (Felstiner, 2011; Smith & Leberstein, 2015). Others 
see these markets as creating a new class of networked precariat with no benefits and 
social protection, contributing to the steady erosion of the ‘labour contract’ and to 
increasing inequality (Kuttner, 2013; Summers & Balls, 2015, p. 32). As the debate 
heated up, a series of investigative journalistic reports have shed light on the harsh 
conditions of work (low earnings, little flexibility, tight work schedules etc.) challenging 
the view of the enthusiasts (Brown, 2015; CEPR, 2015; Guendelsberger, 2015; Kantor, 
2014; O’Brien, 2015; Singer, 2014; Weber & Silverman, 2015; Weiner, 2015; 
Zimmermann, 2015). As lawsuits cases increased, in the US a debate also started 
between supporters and opponents of regulatory intervention. The contrasting estimates 
on the number of people working for these digital labour markets also confirm the 
heated nature of the debate in the US. These range from 600,000 (Harris & Krueger, 
2015) to over 14 million according to a recent (January 2016) survey conducted by Time 
Magazine (Steinmetz, 2016), whose results were questioned by Krueger (Stangler, 
2016); the Time Magazine estimate, according to (Cherry, 2016, pp. 1-2), has been 
criticised by economists having an interest in minimising the phenomenon in order to 
argue against the need for regulation. It is also worth noting that, while the total number 
of Uber drivers in the US disseminated by Hall and Krueger (2015) was 160,000, 
California judges dealing with the lawsuit against the ride service platform (O’Connor v. 
Uber) quantified the total class action into 400,000 drivers (reported in Cherry, 2016, p. 
4 n. 23).This brief account raises at least five key empirical questions that will be 
discussed in this essay in relation to the gathered evidence.  
The first question is linked to the flat world hypothesis seen earlier and the additional 
rhetorical element about the advent of a global meritocracy. The reviewed evidence will 
be used to assess the extent to which OLMs actually bring about a fully globalised and 
non-discriminatory market in which skills and experience are the main and only criterion 
in employers' hiring decisions. 
The second one stems from the discourse on ‘extra-money’ and concerns the motivation 
of workers taking up little pieces of routine jobs or doing errands for other people. As 
acutely observed by Berg (2016, p. 18), the claim about individuals working in digital 
labour markets for ‘pin money’ or out of boredom is a replication of the rhetoric used in 
the late 1950s and in the 1960s when the new temporary agency industry in the US was 
portrayed as employing just middle class wives killing time and earning extra-money. 
This is an emblematic case of Hirschman’s claim that rhetorical discourses of the past 
tend to resurface and it is a first instance explaining the ‘back to the future’ expression 
in the title of this section. Empirically, this entails analysing workers’ motivation and 
tackling the related question on the extent to which fragmented or part-time work is a 
voluntary or involuntary choice. Furthermore, a closely related issue comes from the 
discourse on digital labour markets being populated by ‘flexers’, which requires data on 
the employment status and histories of those performing tasks and errands through 
these digital markets. The findings of the surveys and studies reviewed in this essay 
seem to show that the reality is less rosy than the picture portrayed by the enthusiasts, 
although not as gloomy as argued by the detractors. 
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The third question, emerging from the discourse on flexibility and reach to talents for 
firms and rebuked by claims about exploitation, concerns the motivation of firms for 
using digital labour market. One possibility, as it occurs to some extent for outsourcing 
and off-shoring, is that firms use platforms only for the sake of labour arbitrage (saving 
money on labour) and because of lack of regulation (Beerepoot & Lambregts, 2015). In 
this respect, a possible hypothesis is that such markets allow SMEs to also take 
advantage of out-sourcing and off-shoring (typically ripped by big multinational 
corporations). Labour arbitrage as a main driver can create an asymmetry between 
capital and labour with questionable ethical implications (Hollinshead et al., 2011). Firms’ 
motivation in using digital labour markets and the extension of such practices remains a 
key empirical question that this essay also explores. It can be anticipated from the little 
available evidence that firms (especially SMEs) use such platforms for various reasons, 
among which savings on labour costs stands at the top. 
The fourth question is about the discourse on flexibility, autonomy, and creativity to be 
contrasted with the actual conditions of work. Indeed, working for these digital labour 
markets potentially embodies the move toward a knowledge economy based on 
knowledgeable, skilled, flexible and autonomous workers operating in a flat, networked, 
and less hierarchical world. On the other hand, automatic management by algorithms for 
the sake of control or ‘algocracy’ (Aneesh, 2009), and the breaking down of work into 
micro pieces for the sake of a more efficient division of labour is possibly another sort of 
‘back to the future’ featuring again Smith (heightened division of labour), Taylor (work 
decomposition and control), and precarisation of work to pre-industrial era levels (Cherry, 
2016, pp. 20-22). To tackle this issue empirically in this essay qualitative in-depth 
ethnographic studies on work conditions in digital labour markets are analysed. 
Finally, there is the debate on regulation and policy where some argue that excessive 
regulation runs the risk of crushing beneficial innovation (Hagiu, 2015; Hagiu & 
Biederman, 2015; Sundararajan, 2014), while others claim that these digital markets 
are thriving on lack of regulation (regulatory arbitrage) and that dispatching workers to 
provide services to consumers or businesses is no innovation, for this labour brokering 
function has been around for decades (Smith & Leberstein, 2015). This essay tackles this 
matter by reviewing regulatory and policy articles and reports.  
1.3 Aims, sources, and limitations  
This essay, thus, studies ‘Two-Sided Online and Mobile Labour Markets’ and aims to: 
In Section 2  
(1) Define and conceptualise these markets (§ 2.1); 
(2) Assess their dimensional relevance and possible future developments, 
contextualised with respect to NSW and other trends (§ 2.2);  
(3) Provide a theoretical ex-ante description of their potential positive and negative 
effects (§ 2.3), serving as a benchmark for the discussion of empirical evidence on 
such effects (presented in Section 3); 
In Section 3, paragraph 3.1: 
(4) Draw a picture of on-demand workers’ socio-demographic profile (§ 3.1.1); 
(5) Explore their motivations to participate, discuss the voluntary or involuntary nature 
of such participation and their employment status and history (§ 3.1.2);  
(6) Describe broadly defined working conditions (remuneration, access to social 
protection, extent of control exerted by the platforms) in § 3.1.3 
In Section 3, paragraph 3.2: 
(7) Assess their economic effects, including participation effects, distributional effects 
(geographic effects whether the flat world hypothesis can be confirmed for OLMs, 
income effects, and firm’s boundary contraction effects), and their overall 
aggregate welfare effects for both OLMs (§ 3.2.1) and MLMs (3.2.2); 
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(8) Analyse the matching frictions and hiring inefficiencies characterising both OLMs 
and MLMs, in order to assess the extent to which these markets are truly 
meritocratic in the way hiring decisions occur or rather present forms of distortion 
and of voluntary or involuntary discrimination (§ 3.2.3) 
In Section 3, paragraph 3.3: 
(9) Present an overview of the misclassification lawsuits in the US ( § 3.3.1)  
(10) Discuss the issue of control both with respect to empirical evidence and to current 
proposals (§ 3.3.2) 
(11) Review a number of regulatory and policy essays presenting various proposals for 
regulatory interventions.  
Finally, in Section 4 the main empirical findings are summarised and discussed in order 
to extract the main policy implications and to outline a future research agenda. 
The analysis that follows is based on a data gathering strategy combining primary and 
secondary sources of empirical evidence. A more detailed illustration of the methodology 
and process followed for the gathering of evidence and of its limitations is presented in 
the Technical Annex (paragraph 5.1).  
First, primary data come from an in-depth analysis of a selection of 39 platforms whose 
websites and blogs were scanned extensively (including annual reports and similar 
internal documents whenever they were publicly available) and whenever possible 
integrated with business press and industry analyses concerning them (a summary table 
of these platforms is presented in § 2.2). Second, an exploratory review of 100 business 
press items (newspapers and magazine articles; blogs; industry briefs etc.) was 
performed. Third, using the scoping review method (see paragraph 5.1), 70 scientific 
sources were selected using a formalised protocol and systematically reviewed (a 
synthetic and analytical accounts of these sources are presented, respectively, in 
paragraph 5.4 and 5.5). With few exceptions these sources only include studies designed 
and analysed by ‘disinterested third parties’x. Fourth, a total of 50 surveys and reports 
released by interested parties (industrial associations, platforms own reports and public 
relation materials, think tanks with a clear political orientation, NGOs, trade unions, etc.) 
have not been included in the formal review of scientific contributions but have been 
used to support the analysis of platforms and of the 70 scientific sources. Fifth, a total of 
about 200 indirectly relevant scientific contributions and policy reports have also been 
used as sources to contextualise and integrate the above sources, as well as to derive 
theoretical and interpretative insights.  
There are clear limitations in the evidence base that was cobbled together through the 
various sources listed. First, in-depth and robust scientific empirical work was found for a 
limited number of platforms (see paragraph 5.4) with a clear imbalance in favour of 
OLMs as compared to MLMs. Second, on some key issues such as firms’ motivation and 
worker employment status and history the evidence from scientific papers is limited and 
has been complemented by surveys and reports from interested parties. Third, the 
review method selected for the 70 scientific sources (see the Technical Annex, where the 
method adopted, the process for source search and selection, and the limitations are 
transparently acknowledged in more detail in paragraphs 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3) has intrinsic 
limitations in that it contains some element of discretion when including or excluding 
items. Some purposive and possibly ‘subjective’ elements of selection are therefore 
present; these may also have been due to the last sources updates made between end 
April and mid-May 2016 after the completion of the peer-review process. In this respect, 
some items included as pre-publication version may have been published in peer-
reviewed journal in the meantime and this has possibly been missed. Fourth, it is 
conceded that the predominance of contributions focussing on the US and the lack of 
sources focussing on European contexts might partly be the result of performing only an 
English language search. However, most European scholars, when they have a good 
piece of research, publish it in English in peer-reviewed journals or in pre-publication 
platforms such as SSRN and similar. It is therefore reasonable to assume that empirical 
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work on these platforms in Europe is lagging behind, otherwise at least some working 
papers would have been found, given the extensive search strategy adopted. At any rate 
lack of European contributions is a finding that informs the proposed research agenda 
and does not weaken the overall contribution and value of this essay. Though the tone of 
the public debate and the legal and regulatory implications will differ between US and 
Europe, the main empirical aspects and economic effects documented in this essay will 
apply in the same way across European contexts.  
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2 Conceptualisation, sizing, and ex ante model of effects 
2.1 Definition and typology  
Adapting an earlier definition formulated only for OLMs (Horton, 2010), this essay 
focuses on digital labour markets: (1) that work as digital marketplaces for non-standard 
and contingent work; (2) where services of various nature are produced using 
preponderantly the labour factor (as opposed to selling goods or renting property or a 
car); (3) where labour (i.e. the produced services) is exchanged for money; (4) where 
the matching is digitally mediated and administered although performance and delivery 
of labour can be electronically transmitted or be physical; (5) where the allocation of 
labour and money is determined by a collection of buyers and sellers operating within a 
price system.  
This definition clearly delimits the scope and excludes various online players. Online 
matching for traditional jobs, as performed by LinkedIn, are excluded by condition (1) 
since both OLMs and MLMs match people to new NSW and highly contingent work. A 
study by the McKinsey Global Institute estimates that digital labour market platforms 
could produce globally $2.7 trillion extra GDP growth, benefiting 540 million individuals 
by increasing labour market participation and job matching efficiency (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2015). This estimate, however, is based almost entirely on consideration of the 
effects of players such as LinkedIn, rather than the effects of 2SOMLMs. Condition (2) 
excludes services delivered using a decisive physical capital or goods component, such 
as Airbnb (renting a room or a house), RelayRides (renting a car), or eBay and Etsy 
(selling second-hands and bespoke goods), but includes Uber and Lyft as they are at the 
centre of labour related disputesxi. The exclusion of renting property or selling goods can 
be explained considering, for instance, the results of two nationally representative 
surveys conducted in 2013 and 2015 by researchers of the Boston branch of the Federal 
Reserve on individuals involved in informal activities in the US, including selling goods, 
renting properties, and selling their labour online(Bracha & Burke, 2014; Bracha et al., 
2015); whereas lessors/sellers and those selling labour earn on average the same 
amount of monthly earnings (about 200 $) the average hourly earnings of the former is 
more than double that of the latter. This shows the difference between labour-intensive 
services and activity leveraging tangible assetsxii; given the discussion in the introduction 
the exclusion of online selling of goods and renting of property is more than justified. 
Also excluded are the positive employment overspills such as those self-reported, for 
instance, by Airbnb using opaque and unreliable methodologies (Airbnb, 2015b)xiii, or 
other indirect employment effects such as those estimated for the tourism industry in 
one US city (Fang et al., 2015). Various forms of online self-defined crowd-working 
without traditional monetary remuneration are also excluded by condition (3) xiv . 
Condition (4), on the other hand, extends a definition previously formulated only for 
Online Labour Markets to also include Mobile Labour Marketsxv. The last condition (5) 
typically applies to a two-sided market. Having clarified the conditions of the proposed 
definition and how they delimit the scope of analysis, a heuristic typology is presented 
below, acknowledging the limits inherent to any conceptualisation of an emergent and 
little studied phenomenon, whose empirical manifestation is more nuanced than what 
can be captured by any typologyxvi, and whose fast and continuous evolution make it a 
moving target. 
The first and most obvious dimension of distinction is whether the labour-intensive 
services are electronically transmittable (OLMs) or require physical and localised delivery 
(MLMs). This distinction has a first very clear implication in that the former are 
potentially global markets and the latter by definition are local markets; this means, for 
instance, that certain hypotheses (i.e. flat world and salary convergence) concern only 
OLMs. A second important distinction concerns regulation, in that the global nature of 
OLMs neutralises national local labour market regulation, whereas localised MLMs could 
potentially be subject to national and local laws and regulations. This is partly reflected 
in the fact that most class action misclassification lawsuits in the US concern MLMs 
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although also a couple of OLMs have been the object of lawsuits concerning minimum 
wage. It must be noted, however, that despite their localised nature MLMs have not 
been regulated yet. As a first approximation it is also possible to associate OLMs to 
cognitive work tasks and MLMs to manual and/or interactive (i.e. teaching) work tasks. 
The distinction between OLMs and MLMs to some extent therefore overlaps with a broad 
and high-level distinction in the kind of work entailed (cognitive versus manual versus 
interactive).  
The second dimension of distinction is the extent to which the work performed is low, 
middle, or high skilled (to be intended as a continuum); this characterisation regards the 
traded tasks and not necessarily the actual skills possessed by those performing them 
(i.e. it is not uncommon that highly educated individuals perform errands in TaskRabbit 
and other similar MLMs). This distinction has regulatory relevance as the kind of skills 
involved matter when deciding whether an individual is a true self-employed contractor 
or rather a worker misclassified as self-employed (see Cherry 2016, p. 5 and Harris and 
Krueger 2015, p. 8); low-skilled work may indicate that the service provider is an 
employee, rather than self-employed, whereas high-skilled work is more likely to be 
performed by an independent contractor.  
Figure 2 Typology of digital labour markets 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
Obviously, routine micro-tasks paid a few cents per piece in MTurk require much lower 
skills than developing software at $ 16 per hour in Upwork; but Upwork also trades low 
paid routine tasks such as accounting or support to sales requiring middle level skills, 
while Crowdflower (falling in the same quadrant as MTurk) trades some micro-tasks that 
are bit more complex and require relatively more skills than the micro pieces of work 
traded in MTurk. This is rendered in the matrix through the dimension going from low-
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to-middle to middle-to-high skills. In each quadrant one example will be taken as ideal-
typical and description of its main feature and functioning provided in the corresponding 
notes placed at the end of this essay. 
Quadrant (1) or OLM micro-tasking. Electronically transmittable cognitive micro-
tasks paid per piece are traded in markets such as MTurk, Clickworker, Crowdflower, and 
many otherxvii. Typical work pieces include object classification, tagging, transcriptions, 
marketing spam, data entry, content review, editing, website feedback, etc. Micro-tasks 
are highly standardised, repetitive, and require low to middle skills levels. In these 
markets, small pieces of work are put out in high volume, with correspondingly low 
compensation levels. The individuals involved as providers could be workers who are 
misclassified as contractors. In this respect, it is worth noting that Crowdflower recently 
had to pay $500,000 in compensation to some contractors for violation of minimum 
wage legislation in the U.S (see § 3.3.1). 
Quadrant (2) or OLM tasking. Electronically transmittable tasks (and in some cases 
full self-contained projects) paid with fixed contract per deliverable (more often) or per 
hour (less often) are traded in markets such as Upwork, and Freelancersxviii. Typical 
requested work includes software development, engineering and data science, graphic 
design, clerical and secretarial work. Some tasks require middle skills level and are fairly 
routine, while others demand flexibility, creativity, generalised problem-solving, and 
complex communications (i.e. high skills level). While there is no data to substantiate it, 
it is reasonable to assume that some contractors are truly highly skilled freelancers, 
whereas others are not too dissimilar from those working for the markets of quadrants 
one and could possibly be considered as misclassified workers; yet, so far Upwork and 
similar have not been the object of any legal dispute. 
Quadrant (3) or MLM physical services. Tasks requiring physical delivery of mostly 
manual services requiring low to medium levels of skills and paid with fixed contract per 
task (more often) or per hour (less often) are traded in markets such as TaskRabbit, 
Gigwalk, and various others (several also launched and operating in Europe, see Table 1 
in next paragraph) xix. Various misclassification lawsuits (contractors vs. workers) have 
affected these MLMs in the US (see § 3.3.1). A particular case in this quadrant is 
represented by rides servicesxx such as those provided by Uber or Lyft that have been 
the centre of misclassification lawsuits.  
Quadrant (4) or MLM interactive services. This could be in principle an empty set for 
local digital markets for high skilled services requiring complex communications so far 
limited to the localised matching between students and teachers providing lessons in 
person as in the case of Takelessons. 
Two final considerations can conclude this paragraph, one concerning the requesters of 
tasks and the other the emerging trend of digital markets attempting to trade very high 
skilled, professionalised, and earlier considered non-tradable work. 
In both quadrants (1) and (2) the overwhelming majority of transactions are Peer-To-
Businesses (P2B), with own account self-employed requesting tasks also as business 
entity; the exception are academic researchers hiring contractors from OLMs in quadrant 
one to participate in surveys and/or experiments. On the other hand, the majority of 
transactions in quadrant (3) are ‘Peer-to-Peer’ (P2P) in the sense that requests come 
from individuals as consumers; in this respect, however, it must be noted that some of 
the MLMs in this quadrant do work requiring mobility (mystery shopping, inspection 
services, etc.) for businesses. A further nuance is that whereas MLMs such as TaskRabbit 
are pure labour markets for the generalised matching of requesters with suppliers for 
any kind of personal services, others are more vertically specialised in house cleaning or 
care services.  
What could be called the Uberisation of high-skilled or high-paying work has not so far 
attracted much attention, but is a new trend that is worth studying more in depth in the 
future. New start-ups are trying to bring into the on-demand economy highly skilled and 
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professionalised white-collar workers. HourlyNerd's ambitious goal is that of disrupting 
McKinsey and trade online management consulting. An earlier non-tradable professional 
activity such as architectural work is being traded in platforms (Maselli & Fabo, 2015). 
Lawyer-on-demand apps, such as Quicklegal and UpCounsel, already exist. People can 
use the Medicast app to summon a doctor to their homes or Zirtual, which specialises in 
providing administrative assistants on demand. 
2.2 Current dimensional relevance and future trend in context  
As anticipated in the introduction, the work being performed within digital labour 
markets can be seen as new forms of NSW. The emergence of NWS that can be traced 
back to the mid-1990s, thus, predates and is a much wider and consolidated trend with 
respect to new forms of work in OLMs and MLMs; the latter, obviously, cannot be seen 
as a driver of NSW.  
A brief stylised picture on NSW based on various contributions xxi  and on the data 
available online from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, however, provides a contextual 
introduction and benchmark to assess the various estimates on the current size of work 
in digital labour markets presented in this paragraph; moreover, some of the possible 
negative effects of NSW could also concern work in digital labour markets (see § 2.3).  
Figure 3: Employment status as a share of total employment EU28 (2014)  
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey 2014xxii 
From the 1990s until the start of the Great Recession in 2007-2008 in OECD26 
(excluding the USA for which data is not available, and including EU21) NSW as a whole 
(part-time work, temporary work, and self-employment) accounted for about 50% of all 
job creation and 60% extending from the crisis year until 2013. On average 33% of total 
employment in OECD countries is in the form of NSW with wide ranging differences 
among countries: as low as 20% in Eastern Europe to up to 46% in the Netherlands 
(OECD, 2015a, p. 137). 
The graph in the previous page presents the share of total employment of different NSW 
forms among the population aged 15 and older in EU28 as of 2014. Using the underlying 
absolute volumes and adding as denominator where applicable also total employees the 
following aggregate picture for EU28 emerges: 37.3 million part-time employees (17.2% 
of total employment including self-employed, or 20.4% of all employees); 25.5 million 
temporary workers (11.7% of total employment or 14% of all employees); 35.7 million 
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self-employed (16.4% of total employment). The graph below shows a further break 
down of these categories, from which summing up part-timers with temporary contracts 
(7.8 million) and part-time self-employed (7.1 million) we obtain a total of 14.9 million 
individuals (i.e. 6.9% of all employment) representing the most insecure/under-
employment segment. There are, of course, sharp differences between countries but it is 
beyond the scope of this essay to discuss these in details; it suffices to observe that 
temporary employment as a share of all employees (14% at EU28 level) ranges from 22% 
in Spain to 6% in the UK.  A category that poses conceptual and measurement 
difficulties is that of the self-employed, where one needs to distinguish between true 
freelancers and Dependent Self Employed Workers (DSEWs) xxiii . Using the OECD 
definition, in Europe the share of DSEWs out of the total number of dependent workers 
(employees plus DSEWs) varies widely. It ranges from being statistically negligible in 
Sweden to accounting for 3% of non-agricultural private sector employment in countries 
such as Italy and Greece (see OECD, 2014, Figure 4.4 at page 153). Another important 
trend is the increasing taking up of multi-activities to make up a full-time equivalent 
earning. Thus, employment is becoming fractional as ‘people are holding portfolios of 
activities, offering to their employers slivers of time’ (Atkinson, 2015, Chapter 3)xxiv. 
According to the Eurostat Labour Force Survey, in the 17 EU countries for which data is 
available, 5.5 million people were engaged in multi-activity employment in 2013xxv. 
Data on the US for NSW are not available in the same systematic fashion and, in fact, 
they have not been presented in the relevant chapter of earlier cited OECD report 
(2015a). The Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) included a module on contingent work 
(workers reporting that their job is temporary and/or that they do not expect it to last) 
and other work arrangements forms in 1995, 2001, and 2005 but since then 
discontinued it. According to the last issue (2005) of the BLS survey (see 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm)  using different estimates,  
contingent labour accounted for between 1.8% (2.5 million) and 4.1% (5.7 million) of 
total employment; other work arrangements still included in 2005: 10.3 million 
independent contractors (7.4 percent of total employment, possibly equivalent to the 
self-employed in the EU statistics), 2.5 million on-call workers (1.8 percent of total 
employment), 1.2 million temporary help agency workers (0.9 percent of total 
employment), and 813,000 workers provided by contract firms (0.6 percent of total 
employment). Adding up these figures (using the upper bound estimate for contingent 
work) the total number of workers in what can be considered NSW was 20.5 million, or 
about 14.7% of total employment, which is substantially lower than the average for 
other OECD countries. The December 2015 report of BLS indicate 15 million as the total 
number of self-employed, of which 9.6 million were unincorporated and 5.4 million 
incorporated xxvi . These official statistics are in contrast with data based on surveys 
conducted by the association of US freelancers according to which 53 million Americans 
(34% of the labour force or 36% of total employment) work in some form of contingent 
arrangement (Freelancers Union & Elance-oDesk, 2014; Freelancers Union & Upwork, 
2015). Furthermore, the two surveys conducted by researchers of the Boston branch of 
the Federal Reserve found that 44% of Americans of working age in 2013 and 52% in 
2015 were engaged in some form of paid informal activity (Bracha & Burke, 2014; 
Bracha, et al., 2015). A possible more reliable estimate comes from a new paper 
released in March 2016 that is based on a version of the Contingent Worker Survey (no 
longer produced by the BLS) that was attached to the RAND American Life Panel (ALP) in 
late 2015 (Katz & Krueger, 2016). After barely changing between 1995 and 2005, the 
share of US workers in alternative work arrangements jumped from 10.1 per cent in 
2005 to 15.8 per cent in 2015. 
Moving to the question of how many individuals employ their time and skills to deliver 
tasks under the contingent arrangements offered by digital labour market the first point 
to start from are the only two reliable sources available for Europe in the forms of two 
surveys conducted in the UK (Huws & Joyce, 2016b) and in Sweden (Huws & Joyce, 
2016a) on ‘crowd-working’.  In the UK 21% have looked for jobs (9 million), 11% have 
worked at least once (4.9 million), 4% work every month (1.8 million), and 3% every 
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week (1.3 million) through platforms. In Sweden 24% have looked for jobs (1.4 million), 
12% have worked at least once (700,000), 4% work every month (245,000), and 3% 
every week (170,000) through platforms. The number derived from these surveys 
(based on nationally representative samples using CATI interviews) depict a statistically 
not insignificant phenomenon; considering only those working every week they make up 
3% of the population of working age in both countries, which represents a dimensionally 
relevant phenomenon. 
For what concerns the US the estimates of the pool of workers in digital labour markets, 
as seen in the introduction, range from 600,000 or just 0.3% of the labour force (Harris 
& Krueger, 2015) to 14 million or 9% of the labour force (according to the Time 
Magazine survey reported in Steinmetz, 2016). The earlier cited paper on contingent 
labour estimates digital gig workers at 0.5% of all workers (Katz & Krueger, 2016). 
Another estimate from 2013 indicates that there were 2.7 millions of U.S. on-demand 
independent workers, out of which about 500,000 worked in platforms like Uber, Lyft, 
and Airbnb (MBO Partners, 2015). According to a McKinsey Global Institute report 
(2015a, p. 33), about 1% of the U.S. labour force (1.6 million) carries out contingent 
work through OLMs and MLMs. According to Intuit projections the number of on-demand 
workers in digital labour market will reach 7.6 million (or 5% of the labour force) by 
2020 (Businesswire, 2015). The earlier cited surveys by researchers of the Boston 
branch of the Federal Reserve (Bracha & Burke, 2014; Bracha, et al., 2015) report that 
about 25% of Americans of working age carry out paid informal economic activities 
through digital platforms, which multiplied by the labour force would mean 39.5 million 
people; yet, the problem with these surveys is that in the two published reports this 25% 
is not broken down between those who sell goods or rent property and those who 
provide labour-intensive services. Considering that digital labour platforms have 
originated in the US and have grown more rapidly there, and looking at the figures for 
UK and Sweden, it seems obvious that the lower bound figures advanced by Harris & 
Krueger (2015), MBO Partners (2015), and the McKinsey Global Institute (2015) clearly 
underestimate the phenomenon. In the same vein the upper bound figures (i.e. the 14 
million derived by the Time Magazine survey) overestimate it. Starting from the Intuit 
projection for 2020 (7.6 million or 5% of the labour force) and anchoring to the 3% of 
labour force indicated by the UK survey, it would reasonable to guess that currently in 
the US there could be as many as 6 million workers in digital labour platforms (about 4% 
of the labour force).  
From the next table summarising key information for the digital labour markets that 
have been reviewed xxvii , a total number of about 52.6 million registered contractors 
globally can be derived (with huge differences between platforms, ranging from a few 
thousand contractors to millions of them). It should be noted that only a few of 
European platforms have more than 100,000 registered contractors and international 
coverage. Platforms with large numbers of contractors are mostly those originated in the 
US, although the largest ones (i.e. Upwork) also have registered contractors from 
European countries. Obviously the figure of 52.6 million is either an under-estimation 
(cases not included) or an over-estimation (not all registered contractors work at any 
given time; there could also have been double or multiple counting given portfolio 
activities).  
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Table 1: Selective overview of OLMs and MLMs  
Platform Type/ Field 
Registered 
‘contractors’ 
Origin/Coverage 
Uber P2PM/ Ride Services 400,000i US/International 
Lyft P2PM / Ride Services 50,000ii US/US 
Sidecar P2PM / Ride Services 6,000iii US/ US major cities 
Handy P2PM/Generic/Home Services 5,000iv US/US 
Care.com P2PM/Generic/Home Services 6,600,000v US/International 
TaskRabbit P2PM/Generic/Generic 30,000vi US/International 
Gigwalk 
P2P2BM/Generic & Market 
Research 
10,000vii US/US 
Postmates P2P2BM/Generic/Delivery 10,000viii US/US 
Instacart P2PM/Generic/Delivery 7,000ix US/US 
Favour P2PM/Generic/Delivery 3,200x US/US 
Fieldagent P2BM/Market research 800,000xi US/ International 
Wegolook P2BM / Market Inspection 20,000xii 
US / US, Canada UK, 
Australia 
Amazon MTurk P2BO/Micro-tasking 500,000xiii US/International 
Twago P2BO/Micro-tasking 225,000xiv Spain / Latin America 
Crowdflower P2BO /Micro-tasking 5,000,000xv US/International 
Crowdguru.de P2BO /Micro-tasking 30,000xvi Germany/Germany 
Crowdsource P2BO /Micro-tasking 8,000,000xvii US/International 
Clickworker P2BO /Micro-tasking 700,000xviii Germany / International 
Lingjob P2BO /Micro-tasking 3,000xix Lithuania/Lithuania 
Topdesigner.cz P2BO /Micro-tasking 3,900xx Czech/Czech 
Upwork 
P2BO /Macro-tasking / IT & 
business  
10,000,000xxi US/International 
Freelancers 
P2BO /Macro-tasking / IT & 
business  
18,000,000xxii Australia/International 
HourlyNerd 
P2BO /Macro-Tasking/ Mgmt. 
Consulting 
17,000xxiii US/International 
eYeka P2B/Design 101,774xxiv ES/International 
Frizbiz  P2PM/Generic 65,000xxv FR/FR 
Helpy P2PM/Generic 20,000xxvi FR-ES/FR, ES 
CoContest P2PM/Design 25,000xxvii IT/International 
ListMinut P2PO 34,922xxviii BE/BE 
Doido  P2PM&P2PO/Generic 1,857xxix DE/DE 
Codeur.com P2PM/Generic 91,880xxx FR/International 
Atizo.com  P2P/P2B/Innovation  30,000xxxi CH/International 
Jovoto P2P/P2B/Innovation 82,776xxxii DE/International 
Userfarm P2P/Video 120,000xxxiii GB/International 
Hopwork P2P/P2B/Generic 20,152xxxiv FR/International 
Peopleperhour P2PO/Generic 250,000xxxv GB/International  
Testbirds P2PO/Software testing 100,000xxxvi DE/International 
Microworkers P2BO /Micro-tasking 763,000xxxvii US/International 
99designs P2PM/Design 364,571xxxviii US/International 
Zillion Designs P2PO/Design 100,000xxxix US/International 
Total number of registered contractors 52,591,032  
Legenda:O= online; M= Mobile; P2P= peer-to-peer (between individuals);P2B= peer-to-business (individual 
providing services to businesses); P2P2B = cases where the individuals may provide services both to other 
individuals and to businesses (i.e. Gigwalk).  
Sources: i. California judges dealing with the lawsuit against the ride service platform (O’Connor v. Uber) 
quantified the total class action into 400,000 drivers (reported in Cherry, 2016, p. 4 n. 23).; ii. (Aloisi, 2015); 
iii. (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015b); iv. The Economist 
(http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21637355-freelance-workers-available-moments-notice-will-
reshape-nature-companies-and ); v. Care.com investor relations (http://investors.care.com/files/First-Quarter-
2015-Results-Supplement_v001_o3d1o3.pdf); vi. Cullen & Farronato (2015); vii. http://www.gigwalk.com/;  
viii. http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/04/technology/postmates-disrupt/ ; ix. 
http://www.thelowdownblog.com/2015/06/the-reason-instacart-is-turning.html; x. 
https://favordelivery.com/press/; xi. https://fieldagent.net/; xii. https://wegolook.com/;  xiii. (Aloisi, 2015); 
xiv. http://www.twago.com/blog/press-release-twago-acquires-spanish-competitor-adtriboo/; xv. 
http://www.crowdflower.com/ ; xvi. http://www.crowdguru.de/en/company/about-us/ ; xvii. 
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http://www.crowdsource.com/; .xviii. https://www.clickworker.com/; xix. Eurofound (2015b); xx. Eurofound 
(2015b); xxi. (McKinsey Global Institute, 2015b);xxii. https://www.freelancer.com ; xxiii. (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2015b); xxiv. https://es.eyeka.com/about; xxv. https://www.frizbiz.com/fr/p/presse; xxvi. 
http://andro4all.com/2015/06/helpy-evolucion-app-colaborativa-servicios-tratojusto-nuevo-diseno-funciones; 
xxvii. https://www.cocontest.com/; xxviii. https://listminut.be/fr/about; xxix. http://getdoido.com/; xxx. 
https://www.codeur.com/; xxxi. Sundic and Leitner (2013); xxxii. https://www.jovoto.com/; xxxiii. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Userfarm; xxxiv. https://www.hopwork.fr/; xxxv. 
http://blog.peopleperhour.com/about/; xxxvi. https://www.testbirds.com/; xxxvii. https://microworkers.com/; 
xxxviii. http://99designs.com/; xxxix. http://www.zilliondesigns.com/aboutus  
It is, thus, difficult to come up with a conclusive estimate of the size of work in digital 
labour markets. Certainly, they have reached a dimension that is statistically noticeable, 
although not yet very large. Of course, the fact that these platforms have grown 
exponentially over the last few years cannot be ignored (see figure below providing as 
an example a snapshot of Upwork's phenomenal growth).  
Figure 4: Upwork growth by contractors cumulative earnings  
 
Source: (Elance-oDesk, 2014; Upwork, 2015a, 2015b) 
Such a growth rate is not unique to Upwork and can be observed also in other 
competitor OLMs (i.e. Freelancers); while the total numbers of contractors and volume of 
trade is not as high in OLMs for micro-task and for MLMs, the growth in the number of 
such digital markets is also phenomenal: taking MTurk and TaskRabbit as the first ideal-
typical example in their respective categories, it is possible to estimate from the online 
screening conducted that they have been replicated in various countries and with some 
variations by hundreds of start-ups.  
Certainly, if growth continues at this fast pace, these new markets could encroach on 
traditional and long-term forms of employment (Einav et al., 2015, p. 20). In the figure 
below, some speculative scenarios about possible future growth trajectories are 
presented. These scenarios are qualitatively extracted, based on the theory of firms with 
respect to boundary contractions (due to outsourcing) and hypotheses about the limits 
on routinisation and digital job matching (Autor, 2001, 2008; Autor, et al., 2003). With 
regard to the digitalisation of labour market matching, as anticipated in the introduction,  
information management scholars announced the future pervasiveness of the ‘e-Lance 
economy’ as early as 1998 (Malone & Laubacher, 1998). Autor (2001, 2008), however, 
expressed scepticism about this possibility as he considered that the structure of these 
digital labour markets would be riven with information asymmetry and would not be 
capable of conveying the ‘high bandwidth’ kind of information needed for a job match. 
From the combination of these theoretical insights, one could expect that outsourcing by 
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firms may be hampered by the matching inefficiency of digital labour market, or 
alternatively by intervening regulation. On the other hand, advances in computerisation 
and eventually in robotisation and their gradual cost reduction (as occurred with 
traditional ICT) may lead to more tasks being carried out by machines. In this scenario, 
firms may no longer need to outsource tasks that could be internalised by using robots. 
Figure 5: The future size of labour platforms: speculative scenarios 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
On the other hand, robotisation may advance slower than expected (in terms of 
effectiveness) or may be hindered by intervening regulation. In this case, more space 
would be left for digital labour platforms. Finally, even under high robotisation, firms 
may still outsource (for various reasons), so that digital labour platforms may retain a 
complementary role. Crossing these two dimensions (robotisation, high or low, and 
outsourcing, high or low), the four scenarios depicted above emerge.  With high 
robotisation and low outsourcing, digital labour platforms would be wiped out. At the 
opposite end of the scale, with high outsourcing and low robotisation, these platforms 
could be mainstreamed. Then we have two intermediate scenarios: i) when robotisation 
and outsourcing are both low, this may be due to the inefficiency of the platforms (i.e. 
scenario ‘Digital Matching Constrained’); and ii) when outsourcing remains high not 
withstanding full robotisation, platforms could perform a complementary role (i.e. 
scenario ‘Labour Platforms Complement’). Aside from these speculatively futuristic 
scenarios, there are other possible countervailing factors to the technology push that 
may limit the growth of these platforms. First, further growth requires that platforms 
compete with firms providing stable employment. To do this, they must offer higher 
earnings to compensate for job insecurity, which may prove to be difficult. Second, the 
most successful platforms, once they scale up, could decide to transform contractors into 
employees, as is happening in some cases already (see Evidence Box 3, p. 49). In brief, 
the future growth of these markets remains an open issue, both theoretically and 
empirically. To sum up, how large digitally-intermediated on-demand work is now, or 
may become in the future, remains the subject of debate and controversial forecasts 
(Zumbrun & Sussman, 2015). 
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2.3 Ex ante analysis of potential effects  
In this paragraph, the ex-ante potentially positive and countervailing economic effects of 
these new digital labour markets are derived from the hypotheses contained in some of 
the formally reviewed sources that focussed on these digital market from the perspective 
of economics (see synthetic and analytical summary tables in § 5.4 and 5.5 of the 
Technical Annex). It must be stated that such ex ante hypotheses mostly concern OLMs 
and can only be residually and partially applied to MLMs. On the potential social risks 
and costs from the diffusion of such new form of digitally mediated NSW little 
theoretically and empirically robust insights were found in the formally reviewed 
contributions, hence ex-ante hypotheses have been derived indirectly from a literature 
specifically focussing on the negative effects of atypical and insecure forms of work. 
Instrumental to the ex-ante analysis of economic effects is an understanding of how the 
matching process works in practice, which is summarised below for the three main 
types. 
Evidence Box 1: Functioning of different platform types 
 OLM for open-ended macro-tasks (stylised using Upwork). Registered contractors provide their CVs and 
profile pictures, that are then stored digitally and gradually integrated with their work history in the 
platform: offered bids, hours worked and feedback ratings from previous engagements. More disaggregated 
information is also available, such as per-contract feedback, hours worked and earnings. Employers create 
job posts with titles and descriptions, nature of work, the skills required (from a menu of existing 
categories) and, where foreseen, contractual form (lump sum or hourly wage). Once the post is sent, the 
platform reviews it and posts it online. Furthermore, the platform makes both job posts and contractors 
searchable by various categories to help the search on both sides. For employers, verified attributes 
(number of past jobs, average wage rate paid and so on) are also made available to the contractors. The 
process of matching can work in two ways. Contractors search for jobs and apply for the one they like, 
after which they appear to the employers in what is usually called an ‘applicant tracking system’. Employers 
then look at all the information on the applicants. Conversely, employers can search the contractor 
database and try to recruit the desired profile directly. The search functionality usually allows employers to 
search by skills and other attributes and it returns lists of contractors with relevant information about their 
work history. Employers can then send recruiting invitations to the selected contractor(s). It is possible that 
direct recruitment by employers tends to concentrate on highly positively selected contractors (these have 
more experience, higher past wages, greater earnings etc., and consequently, accept higher hourly wages 
than contractors who autonomously apply for a job). Recruited contractors have no obligation to accept a 
job, as employers have no obligation to hire a contractor that has applied autonomously. Once a match 
occurs the platform intermediates the relationship in various ways, including through tracking software that 
contractors install on their computers which functions as a digital punch clock, allowing hours worked and 
earnings to be measured essentially without error. 
 OLM for micro-tasking (Stylised using MTurk). Requesters post small tasks that cannot yet be 
computerised. Humans find it easy to tell if two different descriptions correspond to the same product, tag 
an image with descriptions of its content, or transcribe an audio snippet with high quality. However, these 
tasks, usually called Human Intelligence Task (HITs), are still hard for computers. Employers posts tasks, 
specify the range of data for processing, define the structure of the form into which the data must be input, 
create a set of instructions for workers, and assign the task a price. Computers can use a programmable 
API (Application Programme Interface) to post tasks on the marketplace, which are then fulfilled by human 
users. This API‐based interaction gives the impression that the task can be carried out automatically. 
Workers find and perform tasks on the platform, which sends the output directly to employers’ IT systems 
without human intermediation. The employer defines the criteria that candidate workers must meet to 
access the task and if these criteria are met, workers do the job without the need for a digital application 
process. These criteria include the worker’s approval rating (the percentage of tasks the worker has 
performed that employers have approved and, as a consequence, paid for), the worker’s self-reported 
country, and whether the worker has completed certain skill-specific qualification exams offered on the 
platform. This filter approach to choosing workers allows employers to request work from thousands of 
temporary workers in a matter of hours. Once a worker submits completed work, the employer can choose 
whether to pay for it or not. Workers have no access to data about the employers, neither do they know for 
what larger purpose the micro-tasks are completed. 
  MLM (stylised using TaskRabbit). Buyers post a description of the domestic task they intend to outsource 
and sellers can search through posted task by location and respond with an offer. Buyers post any possible 
kind of task (shopping and delivery, moving help, cleaning, home repairs, furniture assembly, etc.), which 
require local and short notice delivery. The matching process works in one of two ways: the buyer posts a 
task price and accepts the first offer, or asks for bids and selects from the prices offered by the sellers. 
Given that buyers and sellers must meet, there is a vetting process that is not needed in online markets. 
Identity and payment method are checked, with the screening process being more rigorous for sellers. Past 
history on the platforms and ratings are available for both sellers and buyers. 
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The figure below summarises graphically the various ex ante hypotheses about the 
potential positive and negative effects of digital labour markets that are illustrated in this 
paragraph. The positive effects concern mostly OLMs and can only in some aspects be 
applied to MLMs; on the other had the potential negative effects apply to both.  
Figure 6: The future size of labour platforms: speculative scenarios 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on the reviewed theoretical and empirical sources 
The digitalisation of workers profiles (CV, skills, experiences, reputation) and job posting 
is the starting output produced by these markets, and from there a range of first, second, 
and third order effects may follow. Though this was not possible to fully render in the 
graphic depiction above, there is a loop back from the first order effects to the increased 
pool primary output, which can feed an exponential increase in such pool.  
These markets increase the pool of employers and workers because distance barriers are 
wiped out (subject to the capacity of both sides to use English as a global language), 
while search, coordination, and transaction costs are reduced (search algorithm and 
intermediated administration and tracking system offered by platforms). All of this could 
produce more and better matches between employers and workers (more because of the 
efficiency of matching and better because availability of searchable information could 
reduce mismatches). Furthermore, as coordination costs decrease, the unbundling of 
jobs into tasks, and tasks into micro-tasks, multiply the number of possible ‘gigs’ beyond 
the number of employers. These features have in turn a number of intermediate 
outcomes and eventually some positive end outcomes. A first intermediate (i.e. second 
order) outcome is the fact that, due to more and better matches, lack of distance 
barriers and unbundling of tasks, it becomes possible to increase human capital 
specialisation at global level and greater vertical functional specialisation (division of 
labour, or Smith effects), with positive effects on labour productivity. A further 
intermediate outcome, through reduced coordination and monetary costs, is the 
increased possibility of outsourcing (especially for SMEs). As a result, better and more 
matches could produce generalised net welfare effects in the form of more efficient 
labour markets, including increased employment and, again, improved productivity 
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(third order effects). Some argue that these effects could benefit not only the 
unemployed searching for a job, but also the inactive or underutilised population (part-
time workers who would prefer to work full-time, newly retired people, stay-at-home 
parents, discouraged workers). This may apply to micro-tasking platforms and to MLMs, 
and also digital markets such as Upwork, though in the latter case skills and experiences 
may represent an entry barrier. Additional positive effects on productivity might 
originate from more stringent monitoring of workers –especially for unskilled-  and from 
better incentives –for both unskilled and skilled workers. Note that if production 
efficiency is translated into better and/or cheaper products, this may lead to a reduction 
in prices which would generate a rise in sales, with an indirectly potentially positive 
effect on employment.  
The direction of the distributive effects (who gets most jobs and earn more, prevailing of 
long tail or super start effects, possible forms of gender or ethnic based discrimination, 
etc.) is ex ante ambiguous. First, in all the reviewed digital labour markets the registered 
contractors greatly outnumber registered employers in every job category. Therefore, 
employers have a higher chance of finding the needed contractors. As for the contractors, 
a greater pool might imply less chances of being selected and lower wages. At the same 
time, since a larger pool is also associated to a great heterogeneity in terms of skills, 
experience, motivation etc., it is not unlikely that the growth of platform mediated 
employment leads to increases in inequality. The effects are ambiguous even a priori and 
depend on the characteristics of the pool of contractors on any given digital labour 
market. Second, the prevalence of either superstar effects or of long-tail effects adds to 
the ambiguity of income distributive effects. Lower search costs and global reach can 
enable employers to contract either the best workers (in absolute terms) or those who 
provide the best value for money in a global rather than a local context. This skews jobs, 
and consequently wage levels, towards a minority of the contractors registered on a 
given platform. In the case of OLMs jobs will move globally and potentially depress the 
income of workers located in the richest areas, driving up the wages of the highest-
quality workers available in the OLM. But a different mechanism is also possible: 
individuals with uncommon and less mainstream skills, who are underemployed in local 
offline markets, may benefit from more opportunities when they post their CVs on a 
global platform. This increase in the demand for their skills (compared to their local 
market of reference) could drive up their wages. In a given OLM market, superstar and 
long tail effects may coexist if the pool of employers posting jobs cover both vertical 
differentiation (quality leading to superstar effects) and horizontal differentiation (variety 
leading to long tail effects). Long tail and super star effects are also possible in MLMs 
where, however, there is not a competitive pressure from globalised labour. However, 
MLMs can rather disintermediate or disrupt local services industries (i.e. Uber with taxi 
drivers) and their net effect on total employment level in their locality can either be 
positive or negative. 
The picture, however, would not be complete without considering opposite factors that 
produce countervailing effects. As supported by the empirical evidence reported in the 
next section and predicted by Autor (2001), ‘wired labour markets’ present frictions and 
hiring inefficiency. As will be shown later, these are compounded by typical cognitive 
heuristics and biases, which affect employers’ judgement and the decision making 
process (i.e. it will be shown there is no level playing field because of gender and ethnic 
stereotypes). First, expanding the pool has the side effect of increasing the 
heterogeneity of employers, workers, tasks and skills. Second, lack of face-to-face 
interaction prevents access to softer and/or ‘high-bandwidth’ information on both 
contractors and employers. These two factors can:  
a) produce mismatches and reduce the quality of the selected workers; and  
b) produce search frictions given heterogeneity, especially when quality is difficult to 
determine.  
As a result, employers may cope with these difficulties by relying excessively on 
references and reputation and going after highly-demanded superstars (loosing time if 
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matches fall through, or money, by paying high wages), or on stereotypes selecting only 
from specific language/cultural origins or on gender based stereotypes. These 
countervailing effects reduce potential employment, productivity, and efficiency gains, 
while at the same time, they may exacerbate superstar effects and drive income 
inequality upward. 
With specific respect to MLMs, a priori economic theorising is less developed, although a 
few speculations can be made. They concern typical urban markets for personal services 
where the demand is driven by the presence of middle-aged affluent households. In 
TaskRabbit, for instance, the typical buyer is a woman between the age of 35 and 44 
with a household income between $150,000 and $175,000. The typical seller is 25-34 
years old and has a household income between $50,000 and $75,000. The average 
income of the seller is not very low and suggests that these markets increase the 
participation of underutilised individuals. Given the low skilled content of the work, one 
would expect long-tail rather than superstar effects to prevail. There are, however, limits 
in terms of physical proximity and thickness of co-presence in a given neighbourhood. 
Earning $20 easily and in a relaxing way by taking someone’s dog around is convenient, 
if the dog’s owner is within walking distance or easily reached by transportation, but it 
becomes inconvenient if one needs to drive or ride a bus for more than an hour. Not 
surprisingly, the limited evidence available points to the clear presence of superstar 
effects in MLMs, although ‘superstar’ in these circumstances does not refer to a worker’s 
skills or ratings but more probably to proximity between requesters and suppliers. 
Finally, economic theorising does not help extract ex ante social risks/costs and 
empirical evidence from related literatures is used and especially from the analysis of 
NSW presented in two OECD reports (2014, chapter 4; 2015a, chapter 4).  
First, temporary work can reduce social mobility, as precarious jobs become ‘traps’ as 
opposed to ‘bridges’ into secure work (Cahuc & Kramarz, 2005; Gash, 2008; 
International Labour Office, 1997). Statistical analysis by the OECD finds that, whereas 
working with temporary contract may increase the likelihood of getting a regular job as 
compared to staying unemployed, part-time employment and self-employment do not 
favour the transition to standard work (OECD 2015a, pp. 162-167). A large study of 
Europeans aged 20-35 shows, for instance, that temporary work is a choice among the 
younger group (20-25) but tends to become a trap for the 31-35 who cannot find better 
employment (Nunez & Livanos, 2014).  
Second, trends towards work becoming more flexible have also been associated with 
growing inequality (Atkinson, 2015; Bernhardt, 2014; Kuttner, 2013, 2016; Standing, 
2011; Summers & Balls, 2015). NSW is associated with a wage penalty compared to 
standard work (controlling for other conditions), and for the 50% of non standard 
workers who are the main bread winners there is also an increased risk of falling below 
the poverty line (OECD, 2015a, chapter 4). A study using EU-SILC data for 24 European 
countries shows that the temporarily employed have a higher poverty risk than 
permanent workers, mainly due to lower wages (Van Lancker, 2012).  
Third, there is strong evidence that insecure employment and precariousness is 
associated with psychological morbidity (Virtanen et al., 2005) and that this is not 
moderated by ‘flexicurity’ regimes (Burchell, 2009).  
Finally, fiscal costs may increase if, in the end, governments have to provide social 
protection for precarious workers and tax credits and subsidies to make up for insecurity 
of income (Adams & Deakin, 2014).  
As the digital labour platforms analysed in the essay create contingent and precarious 
employment forms, they may also be the source of some or all of the potential social 
risks/costs above, with the possible exception of true skilled freelancers who get a lot of 
work at good hourly wages from OLM for macro-tasking. 
Last but not least, all of the positive and negative effects defined above ex ante must be 
looked at from the viewpoint of the current and possible future dimensions of the 
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phenomenon. As illustrated earlier, although their growth has been phenomenal in the 
past 5 years, these digital labour currently engage a statistically non marginal pool of 
individuals but of a dimension that is still limited to produce aggregate economic and 
social effects in the short term as such; they can be added to the overall pool of NSW 
and increase the effect of this larger phenomenon. On the other hand, these effects 
should be considered and discussed in terms of possible regulatory interventions should 
these digital labour markets continue to grow in the future.  In the next section, the 
empirical evidence gathered is reported, following a structure that mirrors as far as 
possible the various effects described above. It can be anticipated, however, that for 
many of these effects the evidence is either lacking, or limited and inconclusive, or 
ambiguous. 
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3 Main empirical findings 
This section reports the evidence extracted from the 70 formally reviewed scientific 
articles and papers and is organised in three paragraph: one on the on-demand workers’ 
profiles and conditions (§ 3.1), one on the digital labour markets and their effects (§ 
3.2), and one on regulatory and policy relevant topics (§ 3.3). Presenting the results of a 
potentially self-standing scoping and critical review, this section does not report in 
details the findings of each of the reviewed items (see summary tables in § 5.4 and 5.5 
of the Annex for a transparent illustration of the sources reviewed), but rather extracts 
from them evidence that can at least preliminarily and partially address the key 
questions raised in the introduction and organise it into thematically coherent topics. 
Differently from traditional scientific scoping review, whenever needed the evidence from 
the scientific sources is integrated with information and data retrieved from sources 
produced by interested parties such as for instance surveys commissioned by the 
platforms or reports by associations, think-tank, and foundations with evident ‘political 
positions’; some information from investigative journalistic reports is also used. 
3.1 On-demand workers 
3.1.1 Socio-demographic and employment profiles  
Beyond slight differences depending on the specific OLMs or MLMs considered, workers 
tend to be younger and more highly-educated than their corresponding populations of 
reference and, in the US, ethnically similar to the rest of the population. This type of 
generalisation cannot be made on gender balance as it differs substantially depending on 
the OLM or MLM considered and by country. Evidence on the labour histories and work 
patterns of on-demand workers is limited and fragmented, yet there are signs that some 
of them had been employed especially part-time, or have another employment while 
they work for these new markets; but there are also individuals who were unemployed 
or under-employed.  
OLM micro-tasking. The first survey (2009) providing information on individuals 
working for MTurk (henceforth also Turkers’) found that 50% were from the US, 40% 
from India, and 10% from several other countries (Ipeirotis, 2010b). The same survey 
indicates that US respondents were fairly representative of the US Internet population. 
They were however younger (54% in the 21-35 age group versus 22% in the general 
Internet population) and mainly female (70% versus 50%). The survey does not contain 
information on the employment profile of respondents, but related information on the 
overall social status. US Turkers showed lower income (65% with household incomes 
less than $60K, versus 45% in the general population) and lived in smaller families (55% 
with no children, versus 40% who children). The gender split for Indian respondents was 
reversed (the majority were male). For both the US and India, Turkers’ self-reported 
educational level was higher than for the corresponding general Internet population. In 
terms of income, Turkers based in India had significantly lower incomes (55% declared 
an income of less than $10,000/year) compared to those based in the US. There is now 
a freely available web resource providing updated demographics on Turkers: 
http://demographics.mturk-tracker.com/#/countries/all). A quick review produces the 
following update: 
 Nationality: 73.3% US, 12.2% Indians, 14.4% other nationalities 
 Gender: 
o US: 60% female, 40% male; 
o Indian: 20% female; 80% male; 
 Income 
o US: 10% earn less than $15K; 70% below $60K (compared to 65% in 
2010); 
o Indian: 80% earn less than $15K;  
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A very recent study, based on a survey of workers in MTurk (only Indian and Americans) 
and in Crowdflower (including 50 or more nationalities), broadly confirms the socio-
demographic profile above and adds interesting elements on employment status (Berg, 
2016). This survey finds gender balance among Turkers based in the U.S. but with more 
males compared to previous surveys (52% male, 48% female), whereas in India Turkers 
are 69% male; on the other hand, Crowdflower’ workers are on average 73% male. With 
respect to age and education the earlier profile of Turkers is confirmed; in Crowdflower 
only 14.1% have a high school diploma or less (1.1% have less than a high school 
diploma) and most workers have at least attended some years of college (28.4%), or 
have a college (36.7%) or a post-graduate degree (16.9%). Overall, combing the two 
samples (both MTurk and Crowdflower) students are only 14.5% of respondents, which 
contradicts the myth about these markets employing mostly students and other ‘flexers’. 
The most interesting and novel findings from Berg’s study are that: a) 33% of the 
sample at the time of the survey (conducted in November-December 2015) was 
unemployed; b) 37% reported that working for such digital markets is their primary 
source of income  
OLM Tasking. Apart from a generic statement about workers registered with (at the 
time) oDesk (now Upwork) being highly-educated and skilled (Agrawal, et al., 2013a), 
there are no other scientific sources on them, and the only available information comes 
from reports based on surveys conducted by Elance-oDesk (Elance-oDesk, 2014) and by 
Nubelo (Nubelo, 2014), a digital labour market for the Spanish speaking world where 
clients and contractors come mostly from Spain (accounting for 40.6% of contractors 
and 64.5% of employers), and to a much lesser degree from Argentina, Colombia, and 
Mexico. The data for Elance-oDesk comes from two surveys of its registered contractors 
conducted in 2014 in 9 countries (for Europe including only UK and Ireland)xxviii. In terms 
of age 90% of contractors are below the age of 45 (26% 18-25; 48% 26-35; 16% 36-45) 
with only 10% above the age of 46 (6% 46-55 and 4% 55 and above). Only 23% have 
less than college education, 49% have a college degree, and 28% a graduate degree; 55% 
has been working as independent contractors for more than 5 years and 20% for less 
than 3, while for 63% working with this digital market represent the primary source of 
income (all income for 18%, most of it for 25%, more than half for 20%) and only 37% 
indicated that it accounts for less than half of their income. The contractors of Nubelo 
show similar age profiles as those seen above (57% reported as ‘Generation Y’, 27% 
reported as ‘Generation X’, and 15% reported as ‘baby boomers’) are mostly male (65% 
vs. 35%) and in 60% of cases are college graduates. On average (considering responses 
from all countries) 61% of respondents work full time for Nubelo which is for them the 
only source of income, 25% have another full-time job, and 14% another part-time job; 
the average tenure with Nubelo is two years. On the other hand, although the younger 
contractors are the most numerous, the analysis of the data shows a correlation 
between age and full-time work in Nubelo: contractors above 45 years of age work full-
time in 72% of cases, whereas this occurs in only 45% of cases for those below the age 
of 25. When considering only Spain, the percentage of those working full time and 
obtaining their entire income increases to 74% (vs. 61% in the all sample), and the 
average tenure is also higher. 
Uber (ride services). The only quantitative contribution on the socio-demographic and 
motivation of Uber drivers is the paper published by Hall & Krueger (2015) that analyses 
primary administrative data obtained by Uber and the results of a survey, also 
commissioned by Uber. In terms of socio-demographics, Uber drivers on average are 
more like the general U.S. population than the population of traditional taxi drivers: 
 Age (% in the 18-39 age group): Uber drivers 49.2%, traditional taxi drivers 
28.4%, general population 44.3%; 
 Educational level (% with college degree): Uber 36.9%, traditional taxi drivers 
14.9%, general population 25.1%; 
 Percentage white non-Hispanic: Uber 40.3%, traditional taxi drivers 26.2%, 
general population 55.8%. 
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According to data provided by Uber and analysed by Hall & Krueger a sizeable share of 
drivers works part-time alongside another job; this finding is somehow in contrast with 
what emerged from the misclassification lawsuits and from the fact that without keeping 
a high level of acceptance rate drivers are ‘terminated’ (and reaching such target seems 
fairly difficult working part-time). 
MLMs physical services. In TaskRabbit, the customers on the site are predominantly 
female (55%) and relatively affluent (Cullen & Farronato, 2015, p. 7). The modal 
customer is a woman aged 35 – 44, with a household income between $150,000 and 
$175,000. The providers are younger and not surprisingly have lower incomes. The 
modal provider is 25-34 years old and has a household income between $50,000 and 
$75,000.  A comparison of MTurk demographics with those reported in a study of Mobile 
Crowdxxix (Mushtag & Ganesan, 2013) shows that in the latter, men outnumber women 
(71% men and 29% women, whereas in MTurk women account for 60%) and, in general, 
the educational level is higher (75% with college degree vs. 55% in MTurk).  The 
‘taskers’ or ‘agents’ (to use the same expressions as in the paper) in this platform are 
young (70% are under 35 years of age). No other information was found on the profile 
of workers in this type of digital labour market. 
UK and Sweden national surveys. As anticipated in § 2.2, a few key findings from 
two surveys of crowd-working conducted using nationally representative samples in the 
UK (Huws & Joyce, 2016b) and in Sweden (Huws & Joyce, 2016a) have been released as 
short briefs, respectively, in February and March 2016. While only key highlights are 
reported, they nonetheless provide very insightful information and are the only two 
sources found for Europe. It is worth recalling that according to these two surveys 4% of 
respondents work in some kind of digital labour platform every month and 3% every 
week in both the UK (projectable, respectively to 1.8 million and 1.3 million individuals) 
and Sweden (projectable, respectively to 245,000 and 170,000 individuals); those who 
worked at least once were 11% (4.9 million) in the UK and 12% (700,000) in Sweden. 
UK. Considering the sub-sample of those who worked at least once and answered 
income related questions, in 48% of cases digital labour accounts for less than half the 
income and for over a third it represents the primary source of income. Women are more 
likely than men work in such markets (54% vs. 46%); 51% of workers are below the 
age of 35 but a sizeable 16% is older than 55, and contrary to a prevailing myth only 10% 
are students. Considering the larger sub-sample of those who looked for such kind of job 
(21% of the total sample): online work that can be done from home is sought by 88% of 
respondents, physical work through TaskRabbit and similar by 12%, while 7% are 
looking for job as drivers (more than one answer was possible). Among those who are 
working for digital labour markets more than two thirds do office work, short tasks, and 
‘click work’ in OLMs. Also interesting is that as many as 61% of those who work show a 
portfolio of activities strategy and are registered with two to five platforms (and 7% with 
more than five); for this reasons there are also sizeable share who works in MLMs or 
drive for Uber and Lyft. Online work includes also more high skilled and professional 
work (45% of those who work). In 81% of cases those who work are the main 
breadwinner and generally make a modest yearly income: from the answers it is 
estimated that 42% of those working earn less than £ 20,000 before taxes and only 7% 
make more than £ 20,000 before taxes (the remaining 51% spread between these two 
figures). 
Sweden. The picture emerging from the survey in Sweden is by and large similar to that 
of the UK with a few differences, the most notable of which is the reversed gender 
balance (54% men and 46% women working in these markets). In terms of age those 
working are divided as follows: 29% are 16-24, 29% are 25- 34, 18% belong to the 35-
44 age group, 15% to the 45-54 age group, and 10% are over 55 years; only 12% are 
students. Among those who are working for digital labour markets 70% do office work, 
short tasks, and ‘click work’ in OLMs, although given that people are registered in 
several platforms and do various activities, there are also relevant shares of individuals 
working in MLMs, driving for ride services markets, and doing more professionalised 
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work. For about 33% of the sub-sample of those working and revealing income 
information tasks performed in digital labour market is their primary source of income. 
As in the UK yearly earnings before taxes are fairly modest: 53% earn less than 300,000 
KR, 87% earn under 500,000 KR, and only 4% make more than 700,000 KR.  
3.1.2 Motivations to participate 
All scientific sources providing robust empirical data on motivations converge in that 
money is by far the primary extrinsic reason why individuals work in these digital labour 
markets, regardless of which specific case one considers. Other extrinsic motives such as 
flexibility, autonomy, and working from home are detected but are given less importance 
than money. Intrinsic motives are much less important and the discourse about working 
to kill time, for fun, or for networking purposes is mere rhetoric. Even in MTurk, where 
earnings are very low, various studies show that money is the primary motive 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011; Pilz & Gewald, 2013; Ross et al., 2010); this is further 
confirmed by longitudinal ethnomethodological studies of online communities such as 
‘Turker Nation’ and ‘Turkopticon’ (Irani & Silberman, 2013; Martin, et al., 2014; 
Silberman & Irani, 2016), although other aspects besides money also emerge but as side 
benefits. The most recent survey of MTurk and Crowdflower confirm the importance of 
money as a primary motive, but find somewhat more support for other reasons such as 
working from home.  
According to Hall & Krueger (2015), drivers appear to be attracted to the platform 
largely because of the flexibility it offers and the level of compensation. Ethnographic 
interviews with drivers of various ride services (including Uber) and with passengers 
using ride sharing platforms in the San Francisco area identified three types (Anderson, 
2014): full-time drivers (who provide the service as their primary means of income), 
part-time drivers (who supplement income from other jobs: these drivers include 
students), and incidental drivers (who provide the service only occasionally, for instance 
while commuting to and from work: this type fits to some extent with ‘sharing’ or 
‘collaborative’ images). 
Teodoro et al. (2014) conducted a qualitative study into the motivations of workers in 
TaskRabbit and Gigwalk. They found that monetary compensation and control of working 
conditions (time of day, rate of pay, the tasks they do) were primary reasons for joining 
these systems. They report that on-demand mobile workforce participants preferred to 
know background information about task requesters and the original purpose of the 
tasks. They also appreciated the non-financial incentives of new and different 
experiences that occurred as by-products of task completion. 
Whether the choice of working fragmented gigs is voluntary or involuntary was not 
tackled directly in any of the reviewed studies, although some evidence can be derived 
indirectly from various sources. The survey on MTurk and Crowdflower shows that 90% 
of the sample consider insufficient work as a main concern and would like to work more 
(Berg, 2016). Lack of steady flow of work is also among the main drawbacks cited by 26% 
of contractors working for Nubelo (Nubelo, 2014) and by 49% of American on-demand 
workers surveyed in another industry study (RFS, 2015). Other surveys by associations 
of freelancers in the US indicate that working independently (including in digital labour 
markets) is a choice in 60% and a necessity in 40% of cases. (Freelancers Union & 
Elance-oDesk, 2014; Freelancers Union & Upwork, 2015; MBO Partners, 2015). 
An indirect benchmark can be provided by data from the Eurostat Labour Force Survey 
on the share of involuntary part-time and temporary employment reported in the next 
two graphs. Part-time and temporary employment figures reflect the number of 
respondents to the survey who reported working part-time because they were unable to 
find a full-time employment and who reported working in temporary arrangements 
because they were unable to find a permanent job. Leaving aside the at times wide 
country differences, it emerges that on average in Europe 29.2% of part-time 
employment and 62.3% of temporary employment were involuntary. 
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It is, thus, not unreasonable to speculate that, alongside those working on unsteady 
flows of gigs, there are also a fairly large amount of people who would rather work more 
in these digital markets or altogether find regular full-time jobs.  
Figure 7: Share of involuntary part-time employment EU28 (2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey [lfsa_etgar] 
Figure 8: Share of involuntary temporary employment EU28 (2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey [lfsa_etgar] 
A number of experiments focussing on MTurk provide some indirectly relevant insights 
into motivation, perception, and actual behaviour. For instance, in natural experiment 
settings it is found that motivation depends not only on money, but also on whether task 
monotony is offset by disclosing why these tasks are requested. This is interpreted as 
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the importance of telling workers the meaning of the work (Chandler & Kapelner, 2013). 
Another experiment found that turkers typically did more work when paid more but did 
not deliver better results (Mason & Watts, 2010). Two experiments show that when 
turkers had to think about the responses of their peers, combined with financial 
incentives, they provided higher quality results (Shaw et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
an earlier experiment had found that workers can attempt to game the system for 
monetary reward. Younger men (under 25) were more likely to engage in gaming, while 
men over 30 and women of any age were more likely to take tasks seriously (Downs et 
al., 2010). Another experiment with MTurk shows that workers work less when the pay 
is lower, but they do not work less when the task is more time-consuming (Horton & 
Chilton, 2010). Finally, a simple experiment with turkers explored their perception of 
employers, in order to challenge the many critical articles about exploitation of turkers 
(Horton, 2011). The findings reported are that, on average, turkers perceive employers 
in MTurk to be slightly fairer and more honest than offline employers. However, the 
many limitations of this experiment hardly warrant sweeping conclusionsxxx. 
3.1.3 Working conditions  
There are various general essays and commentaries on the alleged exploitative patterns 
and unfair work conditions in ‘crowdsourcing’ and the ‘sharing economy’. However, few 
empirical studies were identified that dealt with these issues. These studies are 
complemented with various additional sources, including investigative journalistic reports. 
Besides economic conditions and social protection, some aspects of the organisational 
conditions of work (including the issue of automated control) are considered for just a 
few specific cases. 
Earnings and social protection. The evidence on the earnings of contractors in these 
digitally-mediated labour markets is limited to a few studies of a limited number of cases 
(MTurk, Crowdflower, Uber, Upwork and Nubelo, and TaskRabbit). This evidence can be 
supplemented, however, with the investigative journalistic accounts reported in Evidence 
Box 2. According to the first analysis of earning in MTurks in 2010 10% of the posted 
micro tasks in MTurk were priced at 2 cents or less, 50% above 10 cents, and only 15% 
of the HITs above $1 (Ipeirotis, 2010a). Using a stochastic simulation turkers’ potential 
average hourly wage was estimated at $5 per hour (which is lower than the US 
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour). More recently it has been confirmed that reported 
average hourly wage for both MTurk and Crowdflower is between $1 and $5.5 per hour, 
although 10% of Turkers both in the U.S. and India report hourly earnings above $10 
(Berg, 2016). According to Hall & Krueger (2015), Uber drivers earn $6 per hour more 
than drivers of traditional cabs ($19 per hour versus $13 per hour), This figure, however, 
has been seriously challenged by investigative journalism which, taking into account idle 
times and running costs, estimates a net earning per hour barely above the minimum 
wage. In Upwork, the average hourly wages are $16 in software, $8 for writing and 
translation, $4 for administrative support, and $5 for both customer support and sales 
and marketing. With TaskRabbit, the average job is $55 and now it cannot entail an 
hourly wage of less than $12.50 per hour. Journalistic reports show that contractors can 
make up to $25 per hour (or between $2,000 and $3,000 per month) by working from 
different platforms (doing errands for TaskRabbit and driving for Uber), as long as they 
work up to 12-15 hours per day. Considering that there are superstar effects (i.e., 20% 
of contractors do 80% of the jobs) on many of these digital markets, it is reasonable to 
assume that, for the majority, average earnings are limited. As shown, the earlier cited 
surveys conducted in UK and Sweden confirm based on nationally representative 
samples that earnings are very modest. 
According to the data reported in Berg (2016), the respondents from MTurk and 
Crowdflower for whom this kind of work is the primary source of income lack any form of 
social security coverage, only 8.1% of those based in the US report making regular 
payments into private pensions and only 9.4% contribute to social security. In the 1099 
Economy Workforce Report (RFS, 2015) the respondents (all self-employedxxxi) indicate 
as the most desired benefits in order of importance: health insurance; retirement 
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benefits; paid sick, holiday, and vacation days. The same report shows that: 8% of 
drivers and 16% of delivery workers are uninsured; 30% have no health insurance; 43% 
complain about insufficient pay and 49% about not finding enough work. An indirect way 
to imagine what is the social protection conditions of workers in digital labour markets is 
to look at the situation in traditional NSW where lack of any social protection and 
benefits such as unemployment benefits, eligibility for work injury benefits, as well as for 
sickness and maternity benefits is the norm (OECD, 2015, 179-190).  
Multi-activities and work-life balance. It is debatable whether these digital markets 
do in fact provide the flexibility, autonomy, and work-life balance that advocates and 
companies claim are the benefits of the gig economy. The impression given by the 
investigative journalistic reports in the box below is that on-demand work also involves 
dependent micro-earners and not only flexible and autonomous freelancers. 
Evidence Box 2: Working conditions (investigative journalistic accounts) 
 Micro-tasking platforms have been described as digital machines that turn workers into ghosts, 
(Marvit, 2014), or as horrific digital sweat shops (Uddin, 2012; Zittrain, 2009). Furthermore, 
research has shown that 90% of tasks posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk are priced at less 
than 10 cents and, on average, people only make $4.8 per hour (Ipeirotis, 2010a, 2010b); 
 Various investigative journalistic reports have shown that providing generic personal and home 
services through sharing economy platforms (i.e. TaskRabbit) provides no flexibility or work-life 
balance. Workers would have to work more than 12 hours a day in order to cobble together a 
decent income running errands and driving people around (Kantor, 2014; Shontell, 2011; 
Singer, 2014; Weber & Silverman, 2015; Zimmermann, 2015);  
 With respect to the above, a survey of on-demand workers (including those working in the 
sharing economy platforms) has found that there is no flexibility and autonomy because 
working hours are demand-dependent. Many workers are dissatisfied with both the pay and the 
work schedules (reported in Smith & Leberstein, p. 6); 
 Investigative work on Uber and Lyft drivers uncovered that: a) many are full-time taxi drivers 
with their own cars and there is little autonomy and flexibility (Rapkin, 2014); b) contrary to 
claims by Hall & Krueger that Uber drivers make about $16 per hour (2015), field work 
(including working as an undercover driver) places the net earnings at $7.20 per hour (Brown, 
2015; CEPR, 2015; Griswold, 2014; Guendelsberger, 2015; Weiner, 2015); c) documents from 
court cases on Uber and Lyft unequivocally prove that the advertised autonomy and flexibility is 
a myth, since the two platforms can terminate drivers if their dispatch acceptance rate is too 
low. These platforms also look for accounts to deactivate when there are too many drivers or 
business is slow. 
Working for MTurk. A group of broadly-defined ethnographic studies provides evidence 
on what it means to work for MTurk (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; Irani, 2015a; 
Irani, 2015b; Irani & Silberman, 2013; Martin, et al., 2014; Silberman et al., 2010a; 
Silberman et al., 2010b). Taken collectively, regardless of the method and evidence 
gatheredxxxii, they identify the following problems faced by MTurk workers concerning 
asymmetries in terms of both information and levers for action: 
 Information asymmetry in general. MTurk terms of agreement stipulate that 
the judicial rights over the task accomplished by the workers pass to the 
requesters, who can accept the output, or not. The platform tracks and maintains 
workers’ acceptance rates so that that requesters can recruit workers who have 
higher rates of task acceptance from prior requests, However, there is no equal 
mechanism for workers to filter employers. Workers only see the name the 
requester chooses to use and only receive limited information about the tasks, 
whereas firms can access the employment history of workers. 
 Employers’ moral hazard: When workers submit work to employers through 
Mechanical Turk, they have no guarantee of receiving payment for their work. 
Employers can retain the work and not pay, without having to provide any 
justification. 
 Moral valence: Mechanical Turk workers have to learn to identify illegitimate 
tasks to stay safe online. The lack of transparency raises ethical questions as 
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workers are unable to make judgments about the moral valence of their work 
(Zittrain, 2008); 
 Costs of requester and administrator errors are often borne by workers: 
When a requester posts a task with inadequate instructions, they often do not get 
the responses they want from workers and reject the work. The responsibility for 
the lack of quality does not belong to the workers but to either the requester or 
the platform administrator. 
Workers discuss these issues in online forums such as ‘Turker Nation’ (Martin et al., 
2014) and also on the activist platform ‘Turkopticon’, where they help each other by 
making public and evaluating their experiences with the employers (Irani & Silberman, 
2013).  Aside from the empirical documentation of these problems, the following authors 
draw more sweeping conclusions about MTurk (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 2014; 
Irani, 2015a; Irani, 2015b). Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft (2014) conclude that MTurk is 
not merely a passive broker but also an active organiser in a long supply chain. MTurk 
plays a fundamental role in establishing the conditions for crowd labour, because it 
makes it possible to exercise control by bypassing traditional routes and regulatory 
procedures when procuring labour supply. In the authors’ view, this is further 
corroborated by the fact that a range of intermediaries who filter work requests from 
their clients to the MTurk platform have emerged and are very actively organising work 
on the platforms. Irani (2015a; 2015b) argues that MTurk and other similar platforms 
are a source of social differentiation, within the universe of knowledge workers, between 
‘innovative workers’ and ‘menial workers’. She claims that the former maintain their 
identities as creative, highly-valued entrepreneurs, by outsourcing tedium, tinkering with 
labour, and casting their work as high-tech entrepreneurs. In addition, she also 
considers that MTurk is a controlling and organising platform, which makes cheap labour 
invisible. In other words, Irani (2015a) sees MTurk as a platform that helps ‘ameliorate 
the contradictions of intensified labour hierarchies by obscuring workers behind code and 
spreadsheets’. 
Automated workers’ control. Ethnographic (Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015) 
and quantitative (Chen et al., 2015) analyses have focussed on control and surveillance 
by algorithm in Uber. Rosenblat & Stark (2015) argue that Uber’s digitally and 
algorithmically-mediated system of flexible employment builds new forms of surveillance 
and control, which result in asymmetries around information and power for the drivers. 
Their analysis casts doubt over the claims made in the Hall & Kruger paper that the main 
reason drivers join Uber is the flexibility of schedules (2015). Their findings are 
corroborated by Lee et al. (2015) who interviewed drivers from both Uber and Lyft and 
triangulated these interviews with passenger interviews. They describe how drivers 
respond to algorithm-assigned work and how they share with each other (in online 
forums) informational support and social tactics on how to resist or game the rigid 
restrictions imposed by the algorithmic control. In addition, a quantitative study of how 
the Uber surge price algorithm works shows that this algorithm is opaque and clearly 
manipulated, does not reliably reflect the real situation of peak demand, and is resisted 
with various tactics by both drivers and passengers (Chen, et al., 2015). Based on their 
analysis, these authors conclude: ‘Our observations about Uber’s surge price algorithm 
raise important questions about the fairness and transparency of this system. The forces 
at play on markets like eBay and Airbnb are well understood: the supply of goods is 
transparent, and prices are set by competing individuals. In contrast, Uber does not 
provide data about supply and demand, and the pricing algorithm is opaque’ (Chen, et 
al., 2015, p. 13). These contributions, taken collectively, document the functioning of an 
ensemble of surveillance instruments which substitute direct managerial control and 
create power asymmetries between the platform and the drivers. The pillars of this 
system are: assignment algorithms, surge price algorithms, and semi-automated 
evaluation (i.e. drivers’ acceptance rate plus the ratings received by the passengers). 
These match three aspects typical of human resources management: work allocation (i.e. 
passenger assignment, plus predictive scheduling), information (dynamic surge pricing), 
and evaluation (semi-automated evaluation). 
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Passenger assignment, for instance seems to severely limit both the flexibility and 
autonomy of drivers for two reasons (Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). First, 
drivers are basically forced into blind acceptance of passengers since when they accept a 
call they are not shown the destination or how much they can earn on the fare. Second, 
in principle drivers can refuse a call but they risk being suspended or removed from the 
system (both in Uber and Lyft). Uber in San Francisco requires drivers to have 
cancellation rates below 5% and an acceptance rate of at least 90%. Uber uses 
predictive scheduling trying to influence drivers (i.e. there is high demand now in the 
area where you are located) to convince drivers to keep working when they attempt to 
log off (Rosenblat & Stark, 2015, pp. 8-10). Chen et al. (2015), analysing four weeks of 
Uber’s surge pricing data in downtown San Francisco and mid-town Manhattan xxxiii , 
conclude that it seems prone to manipulations, has a few bugs, and raises issues of 
fairness and transparency. These quantitative findings are corroborated by triangulating 
them with qualitative interviews (Lee et al., 2015) and analysis of online forums posts 
(Rosenblat & Stark, 2015). It seems that some drivers are not influenced by surge 
pricing, others avoid surge areas or try to game the system by colluding with 
passengers. Still others consider it to be an unfair system, because at times it leads 
them into areas where they expect higher earnings which later do not materialise. 
According to some interviews, surge-pricing changes too rapidly and unexpectedly for 
drivers to use the information strategically to boost their incomes (Lee, p. 1607). 
Though in-depth analysis of management by algorithm as the primary focus was found 
only in studies of Uber, issues of control, surveillance, and standardisation also affect 
other platforms such as Upwork (Agrawal, et al., 2013a) or MTurk (Ipeirotis & Horton, 
2011). In platforms such as Upwork digital on-demand workers can be controlled even 
by measuring their productivity in terms of keystrokes (Horton & Tambe, 2015, p. 131). 
Some platforms include virtual office applications which ensure tight control of 
contractors (i.e. with regular screen shots and activity logs). In some cases, contractors 
are incentivised to log onto these applications by a guarantee of a certain hourly wage 
(Agrawal et al., 2013a, p. 11). Standardization and control are presented as key ways of 
helping MTurk and other similar platforms scale up by increasing efficiency and reducing 
frictions (Ipeirotis & Horton, 2011).  
The practices described above fit in what has been defined as ‘algocracy’, to be a new 
form of algorithms based governance alternative to both markets and hierarchies 
(Aneesh, 2009). Algorithms can be seen as a new source of rhetoric that promises 
‘objectivity’ (Gillespie, 2014). Both in the practice of administering the matching and 
quality control processes and in its public relations campaign, Uber smartly appeals to 
the algorithm in both rationalistic and ‘affective’ ways, thus blurring analysis and 
prediction. 
3.2 Economic effects and markets functioning 
In this paragraph the main economic effects and the functioning of these digital markets 
as matching mechanisms are discussed as documented in scientific contributions mostly 
in economics that use both observational (quasi-experimental) and experimental design 
and where the gathered data are treated econometrically or statistically. In this sense 
these groups of studies provide the most quantitatively robust evidence on effects and 
functioning. The drawback is that they focus on a few markets (Upwork, Freelancers, 
Nubelo, MTurk, TaskRabbit), and in three cases on markets that are left anonymous, 
although two can be attributed to the Upwork type, and one to the TaskRabbit one; 
there is a clear unbalance with more studies concerning OLMs and fewer MLMs, and 
within the former a larger number of articles focus on Upwork (actually on their 
predecessors oDesk, Elance, and no study has yet been conducted on the new merged 
market). The section below analyses separately the evidence on OLMs and MLMs effects 
(respectively in § 3.2.1 and in § 3.2.2), and then discusses in general the observational 
and experimental evidence on matching frictions and hiring biases; obviously effects and 
frictions/biases are related and are treated separately only for the sake of organising the 
exposition in coherent themes.  
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3.2.1 Online labour markets effects 
Increased participation? None of the identified observational econometric and 
statistical analyses deal with the question of whether OLMs enable the earlier 
unemployed and inactive to find a job. Hence this question can only be partially and 
descriptively answered in light of the evidence on workers’ profiles presented earlier. 
Berg (2016), using only two small samples, reports that 33% of those working for micro-
tasking OLMs such as MTurk and Crowdflower were unemployed, whereas the remaining 
two thirds use these markets to complement part-time or full-time employment. Earlier 
cited sources (i.e. the surveys on UK and Sweden, the Upwork and Nubelo surveys) 
provide interesting information on the amount of time dedicated to digital work and 
whether it represents or not a primary source of income, but they do not include any 
information on current and previous employment or unemployment status; in this 
context a reasonable speculation is that the majority of these workers (possibly 
excluding the markets for small micro-tasks) come more from the ranks of the under-
employed and the self-employed than from those of the unemployed and inactive; this 
can be corroborated when tenure in the platforms is relatively long as shown for Upwork. 
In this respect, two qualitative studies (not included in the formal review, given their 
very exploratory nature and the use of very small samples) are worth mentioning 
(Dillahunt & Malone, 2015; Jen et al., 2014).  They suggest that individuals from the 
most socially-excluded social groups are not aware of these digital labour possibilities, 
and do not have the skills to participate in them. A separate issue concerns the 
increased participation of female based on the general hypothesis that schedule 
flexibility and the possibility working remotely offered by digital work can help women 
previously out of the labour markets to ‘opt back in’ while managing other responsibility 
such as childcare (Dettling, 2016; Rossotto et al., 2012) or to overcome some of the 
cultural barriers that may exist in traditional workplaces (Raja et al., 2013). Using US 
data and applying an instrumental variable strategy leveraging cross-state variations, 
Dettling (2016) finds that the work forms made possible by access to broad-band 
Internet increases the labour participation of highly educated married women with 
children who were earlier out of the labour force. The descriptive data found from the 
sources reviewed in the previous paragraph do not allow to draw any correlational 
analysis, but unequivocally show that in most digital labour markets women are either 
more or equally present compared to men; yet, it can anticipated that they can still 
suffer from stereotype based hiring biases (see § 3.2.3). 
Is the OLMs world really flat? Horton’s initial optimistic ‘flat world’ hypothesis was 
that online labour markets would enable global matching, unlimited ‘virtual labour 
migration’, and international human capital specialisation (2010). Although at descriptive 
level international flows of digital work seem fairly widespread and even dominant for 
Upwork, more sophisticated analyses of data suggest that in OLMs the world is not as 
flat as Horton predicted when it comes to geographical, cultural, and language 
differences (Agrawal et al., 2013b; Beerepoot & Lambregts, 2015; Galperin et al., 2015; 
Ghani et al., 2014; Hong & Pavlou, 2014; Lehdonvirta et al., 2014; Mill, 2011); as put it 
by Lehdonvirta et al. (2014), even in OLMs there is still a high ‘liability of foreignness’. 
The first descriptive analysis of oDesk international flows of labour shows that: North-
South exchange dominated this platform from 2009 until 2013 for there were 10 times 
more employers from high income countries than there were from low income ones, 
whereas there were 4.5 times as many contractors from low income countries than there 
were from high income ones. (Agrawal et al., 2013a, see the graphs and data reported 
at pp. 32-42). In some lower income countries (i.e. China, Russia, Ukraine) where 
contractors were concentrated in the best-paying tasks (i.e. software development, 
information systems, and web development), the average wages obtained in oDesk were 
above those prevailing in the respective domestic markets. With the exception of Poland, 
contractors from EU countries were much less active than non EU ones. The more recent 
data from Upwork global labour report (Upwork, 2015a, 2015b) included in the next 
table only partially confirm this earlier picture (it includes both oDesk and Elance data, 
whereas the earlier data concerned only oDesk).  
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Table 2: Upwork top employers and providers countries 
 
Source: (Upwork, 2015a, 2015b) 
The table confirms that top employers are from more developed countries and top 
providers from developing ones, although we also find the US in the latter group (at the 
top) and the UK and Canada. This suggest that there is also some level of domestic 
hiring. In this respect a study of Nubelo finds that in this market there is a clear 
preference for domestic hiring especially for Spanish employers (Galperin et al., 2015). 
Using data from Freelancers, Mill (2011) showed that when they have no experience in 
this OLM, contractors from developing countries are less likely to be hired. Another study 
on Freelancers contractors from poor, non-English speaking countries with traditional 
(religious versus secular) cultural values and a large time zone difference from 
employers’ geographical locations such North America and Europe find that they have 
more difficulty being employed (Hong & Pavlou, 2014). Agrawal et al. (2013b) present 
results for oDesk that are counterintuitive with respect to those reported above (Agrawal 
et al., 2013a). Focussing on contractors from low-income countries they find that, all 
else being equal, those with no experience have a much lower probability of being 
employed. On the other hand, when contractors from these countries have prior 
experience, then they are disproportionately at an advantage. A different but related 
finding is that members of the Indian diaspora who hire on oDesk are more likely to hire 
workers in India than other employers (Ghani, et al., 2014). Lehdonvirta et al. (2014) 
test and empirically confirms using oDesk data the hypotheses that international digital 
labour flows are hindered by (i) practical barriers (language differences and time zones) 
and (ii) the liability of foreignness (more complex work, and work involving formal 
institutions and/or communication work) and that (iii) foreign contractors are paid less 
for the same type of work relative to domestic contractors with this gap being greater in 
complex work, work that directly involves formal institutions, and communication work 
(interaction between this hypothesis and the previous one). Beerepoot & Lambregts, 
(2015), with with data from oDesk, empirically test the hypothesis of wage 
convergences due to globalised flows. They find that Western contractors earn more 
than non-Western ones, although when earnings are normalised using data reflecting the 
countries of origins economic contest a wage premium for non-Western contractor 
emerges and documents a limited level of convergence; non-Western contractors earn 
relatively more than in their domestic markets, but this does not seem to drive down the 
earnings of Western ones. Furthermore, they find that there is no correlation between 
earnings and skills/experience and that reputational mechanisms have a greater effect; 
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this suggests that the Upwork claim of being a global digital meritocracy is overstated at 
best. It is interesting to also note that Beerepoot & Lambregts (2015, p. 247) claim that 
is not uncommon to find in posts statements such as the following: 
This job is not for people from Bangladesh and Pakistan and your bid would be 
rejected automatically if you are from any one of the mentioned countries;  
Business to Business appointment setters needed: with previous calling experience 
Filipinos are preferred;  
The client has requested they want a female caller with a British or Australian or 
New Zealand accent working on the campaign. MEANING UNLESS YOU ARE 
FEMALE AND UNLESS YOU ARE A KIWI, AN AUSSIE OR BRITISH, DO NOT APPLY!!!!.  
The authors comment that such forms of discrimination thrive as a result of the 
regulatory vacuum in which such transaction take places. 
While the evidence reviewed is limited to a few platforms and more research is needed, 
from the reviewed sources it can reasonably be concluded that the world of OLMs is not 
flat and is still far from being a globalised digital meritocracy. The limits evidenced here 
are example of the matching frictions and hiring biases that are further discussed. 
Super star or long tail effects? The distributional employment and related income 
effects depend on whether ‘superstar effects’ (leading to income inequality) xxxiv or ‘long 
tail effects’ (having an equalising impact) prevail. Citing evidence from other online 
platforms (but not labour market ones), Agrawal et al (2013a, pp. 14-17) conclude that 
both results are possible and that the evidence on these effects is ambiguous and 
inconclusive. Yet, in the reviewed studies focussing on online labour markets examples 
of concentration of work assignments (if not full blown ‘superstar’ effects) are found and 
no case of long tail effect is documented (Horton, 2014; Ipeirotis, 2010a, 2010b; 
Musthag & Ganesan, 2013). In oDesk, for instance, buyers inefficiently pursue 
oversubscribed (i.e. superstars) sellers (Horton, 2014; Horton, 2015b). MTurk is a 
heavy-tailed market in terms of both ‘requesters’ and of ‘turkers’ (Ipeirotis, 2010a, 
2010b). The top 0.1% of requesters account for 30% of the dollar activity and 1% of 
them post more than 50% of the dollar‐weighted tasks, and 10% of ‘turkers’ perform 
75% of completed tasks. Such effects, moreover, can be related to the barriers to 
internationalisation seen above and to matching/frictions and hiring bias. Beerepoot & 
Lambregts (2015, p. 250), for instance, find that Filipino contractors are preferred by 
many employers for administrative support services, which makes it very difficult for 
other groups to compete for this task category. 
Why do firms hire from OLMs? This is a crucial research question because it refers to 
the theory of the firm and the possibility that OLMs may increase the contraction in firms’ 
boundaries in the same way that outsourcing has done since the 1990s.  This may 
impact future development trends in these digital markets, as discussed previously (§ 
2.2). According to the theory of the firm and to transaction costs theory, if online labour 
markets reduce transaction costs, firms should contract more workers in this fashion and 
this would produce a distributional transfer of work activity from vertically-integrated 
firms to OLMs. Unfortunately, no scientific study on this aspect is available and only a 
few descriptive data from surveys commissioned by OLMs can be reported. 
A first survey of 7,000 employers was conducted by oDesk in 2012 (few findings 
reported reported Agrawal et al., 2013a, p. 12); this survey found that 76% of them 
indicated that they hired ‘remote workers’ because they are less expensive. However, 46% 
selected the answer ‘can get work done faster’, 31% selected ‘difficult to find talent 
locally’. A more recent (2014) survey on Elance-oDesk broadly confirm the above 
findings (Elance-oDesk, 2014), although those indicating work being less expensive as a 
motivation were about 60% (so a bit less than in the previous survey). What is more 
interesting is that in both surveys between 15% (2012) and 20% (2014) of employers 
indicated that in the absence of the digital hiring possibility they would have made a 
traditional local hiring; this means that the boundaries of only one in five firms are 
affected. The survey of Nubelo employers (2014) report that cheaper labour is indicated 
as a key reason by 52% of employers, and 30% state that they would make a traditional 
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local hiring in the absence of Nubelo (i.e. firms’ boundaries seem more affected). Finally, 
it is worth noting in both these OLMs the overwhelming majority of employers are SMEs, 
which seems to suggest that OLMs makes outsourcing more available to this type of 
firms.  
Gurvich et al (2015) provide further insights into future of digital outsourcing, albeit not 
empirically but rather from formalised modelling simulation of on-demand work. They 
model a situation where firms use on-demand work with self-scheduling, meaning that 
workers are fully autonomous and decide independently how much labour to supply. 
Their model concludes that under this configuration, compared to a scenario where it is 
possible to dictate to workers when they must work, the firm has lower profits and 
customers have a higher chance of not being served. Furthermore, the modelling 
foresees that, when demand is volatile, self-scheduling results in lower service levels in 
high demand periods. This analysis clearly points to the limits of outsourcing and relates 
to the discussion above about the boundary of the firm. It can also be seen, on the other 
hand, as indirectly supporting the claim that digital labour markets must exert strong 
control over on-demand workers and possibly influence their patterns of work, if they 
are to be profitable and used by firms. 
Net Aggregate effects. The evidence available does not warrant any conclusion with 
respect to the net welfare effects that online or mobile labour markets and services have. 
The only source dealing with these aspects for OLMs is the well-reasoned and balanced 
theoretical discussion presented in Agrawal et al. (2013a, pp. 23-25). There are two 
kinds of possible aggregate welfare effects:  
i. increased efficiency in overall labour market matching (i.e. increased pool of workers 
and employers, lower transaction and search costs);  
ii. increased production efficiency due to lower coordination costs.  
For the first effect, the evidence reviewed suggests that online and mobile labour 
markets still have considerable frictions and inefficiencies, and some intangible obstacles 
hamper the full impact of breaking geographical barriers. Agrawal and colleagues 
recognise that these markets must further improve their design and two-sided strategies 
to improve matching because: 
a) OLMs reduce search costs but increase heterogeneity in the pool of workers and 
employers and, consequently, in the skills and tasks to be matched; and  
b) this may compound the potentially negative effects of the lack in OLMs of soft and/or 
high-bandwidth information about both job seekers and prospective employers 
(Autor, 2001).  
c) Lower coordination costs and lower outsourcing costs through these new labour 
markets may increase production efficiency, yet this is still speculation since no 
empirical evidence was found on this aspect. 
3.2.2 Mobile labour markets effects 
As anticipated in the introduction, evidence on MLMs is more limited than evidence on 
online labour markets.  
Increased participation. The evidence is mixed as to whether female participation is 
increased in mobile labour markets for the provision of generic services.  In TaskRabbit, 
women are overrepresented (Cullen & Farronato, 2015), but in other platforms (i.e. 
Gigwalk), men are overrepresented (Mushtag & Ganesan, 2013; Teodoro et al., 2014).  
Distributional effects. Compared to OLMs, the MLMs by definition cannot have global 
geographical effects, for they are localised. Providing personal and home services 
obviously does not have any effect on firms’ boundaries. Markets such as FieldAgent or 
Wegolook, which provide services to business, might in principle have these effects, but 
no empirical evidence was found on these types of services. Musthag & Ganesan (2013) 
show that one platform for mobile services is heavy tailed: i.e. less than 10% of workers 
account for more than 80% of the activity generated by the platform. On the other hand, 
a survey of TaskRabbit workers documents a different kind of distributional effect 
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(Thebault-Spieker, et al., 2015): low socio-economic status (SES) areas are relatively 
less serviced by TaskRabbit. They conclude that more research is needed to document 
whether or not their results can be generalised and can support the conclusion that 
lower SES groups and/or neighbourhoods have less chance of benefiting from the 
sharing economy. 
3.2.3 Matching frictions, hiring inefficiencies, and behavioural biases 
Although not included among the formally reviewed sources and used as complementary 
background, the article by Autor on ‘wired labour’ (2001) is cited by many of the authors 
discussed below; it builds on earlier labour economics studies of markets with matching 
functions and with search (Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2006; Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001). 
The evidence on matching frictions and hiring biases (or inefficiencies) is very extensive 
and solid, including also several experimental studies. It shows that these markets are 
still not as efficient as expected and that Autor (2001, 2008) had a strong point when he 
voiced scepticism about ‘wired labour’. 
Probably the most striking evidence of the existence of frictions and entry-level hiring 
inefficiencies comes from a field experiment run by Pallais (2014) using oDesk, which is 
worth giving relatively more space compared to other contribution. Adopting the 
‘Experimenter as employer’ framework, the author posted a 10-hour data entry task and 
randomly hired 952 contractors, providing them with a rating when they completed the 
task (treated group). The 2,815 contractors that applied but were not hired were used as 
the control group. Subsequently, the employment performance in oDesk of both groups 
was monitored. It was found that, considering only those contractors with no prior 
experience in oDesk, the income for the treated group was three times greater than for 
the control group during the two months following the experiment. The employment 
performance for the treated group can be attributed just to the information the author 
posted on those who were ‘fictitiously’ hired (since only contractors with no other prior 
experience were considered in the experiment). The evidence is striking considering how 
small the treatment was (a short simple job and a single score out of 5) compared to the 
size of the effect produced. This clearly suggests important frictions and hiring 
inefficiencies and biases, especially for entry-level contractors. The author concludes that 
the welfare implications are that it had been inefficient not to employ some of the 
experimental workers; she further argues that OLMs may exacerbate wage inequalities 
by further skewing work in favour of the most skilled and precluding entry by 
inexperienced workers. Another three experiments conducted on oDesk by the same 
author confirm that, all else being equal, referred workers are more likely to be hired 
than non-referred workers (Pallais & Sands, Forthcoming). It seems that referrals 
information is used by employers more than all other observable characteristics on which 
information is fully available in OLMs. 
In another observational study of oDesk, it emerges that inexperienced contractors 
affiliated with an intermediary agency (active in using oDesk to mediate between 
employers and contractors) have substantially higher job-finding probabilities (almost 
double) and wages (15% more) at the beginning of their careers, than inexperienced 
contractors not affiliated to an agency of this kind (Stanton & Thomas, 2014). This study, 
besides confirming entry level frictions, also underscores the importance of this kind of 
outsourcing agency (as many as 1,100 such firms are active in oDesk) that intermediate 
between the workers in the OLMs and potential employers. In practice, they act as re-
sellers.  In other words, for that part of the transaction intermediated by these agencies, 
oDesk (and other OLMs where this practice exists) ceases to be a two-sided market. This 
seems to confirm the prediction that these new forms of wired labour would require new 
intermediaries to reduce frictions and increase workers’ productivity (Autor, 2001). This 
paper shows that in the case of oDesk these agencies reduce information frictions in the 
market by screening workers and communicating the results to employers. A typical 
agency represents a small number of workers, often from the same region or city, who 
in many case know each other offline. It is worth noting that the presence of these 
intermediating agencies is observed not only on a similar platform (Freelancers) but also 
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on MTurk.  Here, they figure among the top requesters as they aggregate tasks on 
behalf of their clients to provide a quality assurance service, on top of MTurk’ services 
(Ipeirotis, 2010a). 
An experiment run by oDesk shows that algorithmically recommending workers to 
employers for the purposes of recruitment can substantially increase hiring (Horton, 
2015a). Employers with technical job vacancies that received recruiting 
recommendations had a 20% higher fill rate than the control. Another experiment run in 
Elance-oDesk shows that, when employers were asked for their price/quality preferences 
before posting their job openings and these preferences were then exposed to would-be 
workers, a substantial sorting by workers and better matches were achieved, compared 
to the control group (Horton & Johari, 2015). These experimental findings are confirmed 
by observational studies. Traditional ratings are not efficient to reduce frictions and may 
actually increase them (Horton & Golden, 2015). Another observational study of Elance-
oDesk shows the existence of supply constraint frictional effects: spurned invitations 
affect subsequent match formation (Horton, 2015b). The author shows that sellers are 
more likely to reject interested buyers when those sellers have more proposals to choose 
from and, using an instrumental variable identification strategy, argues that this 
relationship is likely to be causal. When a buyer is rejected by a seller, the latter’s 
chances of filling his/her request is reduced. This is possibly so because the seller may 
be pursuing a ‘superstar’ contractor. 
Market frictions also affect mobile labour markets for the delivery of physical tasks like 
TaskRabbit (Cullen & Farronato, 2015). In TaskRabbit, demand is highly variable and 
there is a wide heterogeneity in the tasks posted by the ‘requesters’ and in the skills 
offered by the sellers. The authors find that in the period considered (before the change 
in the TaskRabbit business model, see below):  
a) the natural level of efficiency of this market is very modest (although with some 
differences across different cities);  
b) there are clear frictions partly compensated for by elasticity in the supply of labour;  
c) matching success varies across cities as a function of geographic density (buyers and 
sellers living close) and of task standardisation (buyers requesting homogeneous 
tasks). Interestingly, they find that when demand exceeds supply there is no effect 
on price but rather the supply expands. In other words, contractors work more but 
the average price remains between $52 and $59 per job.  
In view of these findings, the platform has been re-designed to increase the efficiency of 
matching, moving from the original auction model to a new more controlled and 
standardised business model. In the original model, a buyer could post a task-specific 
price and then accept the first offer, or ask for bids and review the prices offered by 
sellers. This move away from the auction business model to more centralisation is part 
of a growing trend (Einav et al., 2013). After the change in its business model, 
TaskRabbit basically accepts standardised tasks that are offered at fixed pricesxxxv. So, 
whereas originally TaskRabbit was presented as the eBay for physical odd jobs, today its 
ambition is to become the ‘Uber for everything’ (Newton, 2014). Finally, Cullen & 
Farronato (2015) use their model to estimate the aggregate value of the market for 
domestic tasks in the US (considering only 18 cities) at $920 millionxxxvi in total. 
The contributions above study and interpret frictions and hiring inefficiency from a 
strictly economics and technical perspective. Studying gender hiring in one OLM (name 
not revealed) other authors find (Silberzahn et al., 2014) and discuss (Uhlmann & 
Silberzahn, 2014) discrimination that is rooted in cognitive heuristics and biases (i.e. 
conformity under uncertainty) affecting employers judgement and decision-making. The 
main empirical findings are that, controlling for other relevant parameters: a) female 
workers are less likely to be hired for stereotypically male jobs (i.e. programming), and 
more likely to get stereotypically female jobs (i.e. customer service); b) in the less likely 
cases in which women are hired for stereotypically male jobs they are more often paid 
by the hour rather than by a fixed price of the all output (whereas the reverse is true 
when women are hired for stereotypically female jobs) as a result of a risk averse choice 
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based on gender stereotypes (i.e. employers are uncertain about women doing a good 
programming job and to reduce risk by the hour rather than by the final output). In the 
comments to such findings – presented in a separate piece published in a special issue of 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences on big data and the study of collective behaviour – the 
authors first observe that OLMs in principle approach very closely a perfect market given 
the amount of information available on workers that is searchable and organised 
algorithmically, which should enable the typical employer to act as perfect Homo 
Oeconomicus (Uhlmann & Silberzahn, 2014, p. 103) and hire rationally on the basis of 
skills, merit, and value for money; the fact that this does not occur for women with 
higher skills and better price/quality ratio compared to men is interpreted as a sign of 
typical heuristic and biases in the face of information overload. When one receives 100 
CVs one hour after posting a job he/she faces the situation of assessing many options 
along many criteria, which is typical of other situations where it is common to rely on 
social convention heuristics such as stereotypes and make potentially biased decision. 
Cultural stereotypes and confirmation can thus be seen as playing a role in the observed 
‘discrimination’ concerning hiring decision and contract types for women (Uhlmann & 
Silberzahn, 2014, p. 104). The empirical findings fully confirm that stereotypes are 
inaccurate and cause distorted decisions, since the data show unequivocally that women 
applying for stereotypically male jobs  possess on average, more domain relevant skills 
than their male counterparts (Silberzahn, et al., 2014). These mechanisms reproduce 
themselves inasmuch employers who choose based on gender stereotypes and are 
satisfied with the output will never test counter stereotypical hiring, thus, reinforcing and 
confirming their own biases. 
This line of behavioural interpretation could be applied to the findings about the 
limitation to the ‘flat world hypothesis’ and further makes the claim of a new ‘global 
digital meritocracy’ which looks like public relations rhetoric. 
3.3 Legal disputes and regulatory issues 
In this final paragraphs the formally reviewed contributions focussing on legal disputes 
and regulatory and policy issues are discussed (Berg, 2016; Cheng, 2014; Cherry, 2011, 
2016; Felstiner, 2011; Sprague, 2015), complemented by various other sources 
including reports by think tanks and foundations and contributions by scholars taking 
sides on the ongoing debates (Hagiu, 2015; Hagiu & Biederman, 2015; Harris & Krueger, 
2015; Hill, 2015; Koopman et al., 2015; Smith & Leberstein, 2015; Strom & Schmitt, 
2016; Sundararajan, 2014), as well as various journalistic accounts. Before dealing with 
disputes (§ 3.3.2) and regulatory matters (§ 3.3.3), a sort of digression on two-sided 
markets and the issue of control is presented in § 3.3.1 for it is important with respect to 
misclassification lawsuits (contractors vs. employees) and potential regulation 
addressing them. 
3.3.1 Two-sided markets vs. vertical integrated firms 
In parts § 3.1.3 evidence was presented documenting that some digital labour markets 
exert a stringent form of control over their contractors. In their approach to two-sided 
markets (2SMs) and multi-sided platforms Hagiu & Wright (2013; 2015a; 2015b, 2015c) 
contrast them to Vertical Integrated (VI) firms or resellers alongside the dimension of 
the amount of control exerted. In principle VI and resellers exert more control on various 
terms of trade and on workers than 2SMs (in the case of the online markets studied here 
the notation is 2SOLMs). 
As documented earlier, intermediary agencies operate within some of the 2SOLMs to 
organise on-demand workers and perform coordination and quality control functions on 
behalf of the final employers. This is depicted in the figure overleaf. The scheme (1) in 
the figure shows how a pure 2SOLM works. In (2), the classical and traditional case of a 
vertically-integrated outsourcing firm such as Wipro is illustrated. In (3), we have the 
hybrid case of an intermediary agency using a 2SOLM to further intermediate between 
workers and employers. 
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Figure 9: The case of intermediary agencies operating inside 2SOLMs 
 
Source: own elaboration following Hagiu & Wright (2015c, fig. 1, p. 4) 
In scheme (3) is it a case of ‘input reseller’ or of ‘input supplier’? This nominalist issue is 
of little interest here - what matters is the following:  
a) this occurs because 2SOLMs are not yet fully efficient, so intermediary agencies 
arbitrage their frictions to increase control and coordination for their customers 
(employers); and  
b) these intermediary agencies exert full control over the contractors and de facto 
should be considered the same as traditional off line temp agencies. The corollary is 
that these agencies are in practice employers. Obviously, they bear the risks of 
lawsuits, and 2SOLMs are happy to let them work, for they receive the transaction 
fees without incurring any lawsuits.  
Figure 10: 2SMs Vertically-Integrated (V.I.) firms and/or resellers  
 
Source: own elaboration on Hagiu’s presentation delivered at IPTS workshopxxxvii 
The figure above takes an additional step and uses the dimension of control to position 
various players in the continuum between pure two-sided markets (2SMs) and pure V.I. 
firms or pure resellers. In the figure above, 2SMs that are not 2SOMLs are also included 
as a comparison, which explains why the counterpart pure model includes V.I. firms and 
resellers in both labour and non-labour domains. In view of the discussion on algorithm 
management and various other tightly controlled aspects, Uber and Lyft are placed 
closer to the V.I. firms/reseller pure model (very close to traditional taxi companies) and 
far from platforms exerting little control on the terms of conditions for hosts and guests 
such as Airbnb. On the other hand, in § 3.1.3 it has been shown that Upwork and MTurk 
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also exert control over contractors (Upwork more than Freelancers, as the latter does 
not have virtual offices which monitor even keystrokes) thus they are placed closer to 
Uber than to Airbnb. Intermediary agencies operating within MTurk or Upwork are placed 
towards the increased control end of the continuum, not far from Uber. When TaskRabbit 
introduced a more standardised and controlled business model in 2014, it also moved to 
the right. 
This conceptual mapping, together with evidence presented earlier, point to the fact that 
control, which is important in all two-sided strategies, is even more critical when dealing 
with labour. There are various reasons for this: typical matching frictions, the 
heterogeneity of tasks/contractors/ employers, prominence of on-demand and time-
sensitivity (i.e. Uber), and problems of co-ordination of multiple contractors. Obviously 
control is maximised in vertically-integrated firms to ensure consistency, speed, timely 
delivery, coordination and scale. However, control has a cost: it can make independent 
contractors into employees, which increases costs by between 25% and 35% (possibly 
more in a European context)xxxviii. Lower costs for the 2SOMLMs also mean less control, 
although some of these platforms seem to be striving to minimise costs and maximise 
control, almost to the level typical of a vertically-integrated firm. This, however, has 
caused them risky court cases that are discussed below. 
3.3.2 Contractors vs. employees and other legal disputes in the US 
In the U.S., a number of litigations have been brought to the courts concerning the 
possible misclassification of workers as contractors but also other violation of the ‘Fair 
Labor Standard Act’ (FLSA). The table below provides only a selective list of such cases 
(only for the most well-known platforms also listed earlier in § 2.2). 
Table 3: Selected litigation cases in the US 
Platform Object of litigation Status 
Crowdflower 
Fair Labor Standards Act  (FLSA) 
violations with respect to 
minimum wage 
Settlement reached 
(payment of $ 583,000), 
parties agreed an 
amendment denied by the 
Court 
Handy 
Misclassification class-action 
lawsuit with 
Unsuccessful mediation 
attempted, will go toward 
arbitration. 
Homejoy 
Misclassification class-action 
lawsuit  
Class claims dismissed 
(Homejoy ceased operations) 
Lyft 
Employee benefits, cost 
reimbursements 
Settlement for $12 million on 
January 27 2016; as part of 
settlement termination of 
drivers will be subject to due 
process rights 
Postmates Class-action for violation of FLSA Ongoing 
Uber 1 (v. O’Connor) 
Employee benefits, Cost 
reimbursements; Overtime under 
FSLA 
Settlement for $12 million on 
April 21 2016; as part of 
settlement termination of 
drivers will be subject to due 
process rights 
Uber 2 (v. Ehret) 
Employee benefits, cost 
reimbursements; 
Ongoing 
Uber 3 (v. Mohamed) 
Employee benefits, cost 
reimbursements; 
Ongoing 
Sources: compiled from (Cherry, 2016; DeAmicis, 2015; Kessler, 2015; Madden, 2015; Smith & 
Leberstein, 2015) 
While the cases concerning Uber and Lyft have attracted most of the media attention, 
the table shows that several other OLMs were concerned, including Crowdflower for 
violation of LFSA related to minimum wage. 
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In Lyft and Uber key cases (Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, N.D. Cal. 2015; 
and O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C–13–3826 EMC, 2015 WL 1069092, N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 11, 2015), judges pointed out that drivers possess no special skills, their input 
is essential to the businesses, they monitored and terminated if they do not comply with 
rules set by the two companies. In the Uber case where the company claimed to be just 
a software company that was deemed by the court, however, this line of defence was 
‘fatally flawed in numerous respects’ as it focused exclusively on the mechanics of the 
platform rather than on the substance of what Uber actually does (O’Connor, 2015 WL 
1069092, at *6). The plaintiff, in fact, cited the Drivers’ Handbook where it is clearly 
written that drivers should accept all ride requests and that if a driver rejects too many 
trips, he/she will be investigated and possibly terminated. Uber argued it never performs 
inspections.  
The ruling on these two cases was expected to potentially change the business of riding 
services and potentially of all other OLMs and MLMs. As shown in the table, however, a 
settlement has been recently reached in both cases and there is no court ruling as yet 
that provide employee status to drivers and could, thus, change the regulatory 
framework for the entire world of OLMs and MLMs. On the other hand, despite these 
settlements there is ‘no guarantee that the Internal Revenue Service, the NLRB, or 
another governmental regulator will not determine that these workers are employees’ 
(Cherry, 2016, p. 7); in other words, the issue of classification remains open in the US. 
It must be noted that, while not addressing employees status, both settlements provide 
that the drivers can no longer be ‘terminated’ (i.e. their account deactivated) without 
going through a grievance process heard by an arbitrator. 
There are complex multi-factor tests defined by the law and applied to decide whether a 
person is a contractor or an employee (Cherry, 2011; Harris & Krueger, 2015; Muhl, 
2002; Sprague, 2015); the Uber and Lyft cases, though not producing regulatory effects, 
have ascertained the control exerted by the Uber and Lyft drivers, highlighted the 
associated liability, and deemed their claim that they are just software companies simply 
untenable. 
It has been observed by various authors that these litigation cases might have 
influenced the emergence of a new trend with OLMs and MLMs reconsidering their 
position with regard to labour issues (Bensinger, 2015b; Cherry, 2016; Lang, 2015; 
Smith & Leberstein, 2015; Stokes et al., 2014). Several have started to redraft their 
terms of agreement and reclassify the individuals performing work. In addition, they are 
introducing some kind of minimum wage provisions. A number of markets have already 
decided to adopt fairer practices and self-regulation codes. A few example are provided 
below. 
Evidence Box 3: Changing practices by sharing platforms in the US 
 TaskRabbit, for instance, since 2015 has set a wage floor: it is not possible to earn less than 
$12.80 an hour, which is higher than any minimum wage in US states (Quittner, 2015). 
 Munchery (food preparation and delivery) hires their workers as employees (O’Donovan, 2015), 
as do the house cleaning services platforms Qii (Koso, 2015) and MyClean (Roose, 2014), the 
valet parking service Luxe (Lien, 2015), the mailing company Shyp (Alba, 2015), and food 
delivery start-up Sprig (Bensinger, 2015a). 
 Instacart has announced that it has reclassified some of its independent contractors as 
employees (Bilis, 2015). 
 Some of these platforms are doing very well economically, despite the alleged additional health 
insurance and social contribution costs of switching from contractors to employees (Roose, 
2014). 
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3.3.3 From litigation to regulation? 
Workers vs. self-employed? As the litigation cases were ongoing a few scholars have 
taken sides, some arguing from a pure free-market thinking that contractors should not 
be left as such to avoid curbing innovation and labour market efficiency (Koopman, et al., 
2015; Sundararajan, 2014), others proposing more balanced solutions (Hagiu, 2015;  
Hagiu & Biederman, 2015), as depicted in the figure below (presented before the 
reached settlements). 
Figure 11: Court or regulation-driven solutions to the contractor disputes 
 
Source: re-elaboration on (Hagiu, 2015; Hagiu & Biederman, 2015) 
 
As seen earlier, in a stylised ideal-typical situation, vertically-integrated firms have much 
greater control and also higher costs, whereas a pure 2SM platform basically has no 
fixed labour costs but less control. Platforms, however, increasingly exert control over 
on-demand workers and/or are perceived as doing so by the courts. If the courts in the 
U.S. had taken the decision that Uber and Lyft drivers had to be reclassified as 
employees, this would have moved them abruptly (left hand side of the picture) to equal 
status with vertically-integrated firms. In the U.S., it is estimated that this could 
increase costs by 25% to 35% and could actually lead to many bankruptcies (so far only 
Homejoy has suffered this fate). Without providing the nitty-gritty details of how this 
could be done, Hagiu (2015) reasonably proposed creating (with regulatory intervention) 
the intermediate position of ‘dependent contractors’ for whom platforms would cover 
some costs but not others. As seen, the settlements do not rule out the fact that the 
issue may resurface because of decisions by governmental agencies, so this proposal 
remains valid for the US and should be discussed in the EU context where so far no legal 
or regulatory developments have taken place. This proposal, however, faces the 
challenge recognised by Hagiu of how to draw the boundaries between a truly 
independent contractor, a dependent contractor, and an employee. Identifying 
Dependent Self-Employed Workers (DSEWs) is not an easy matter considering that 
regulation and law are general and cannot empirically ascertain all possible situations (as 
courts do for specific cases). There are various types of DSEWs, including highly skilled 
ones choosing such work arrangements, so caution should be exerted in creating 
statutes by law (Eichhorst et al., 2013). A recent report by the European Parliament, for 
instance, recommends not to alter labour market regulations to specifically include 
sharing economy providers and concludes that it would be best to include sharing 
economy service providers in the scope of the general rules applicable to self-
employment (European Parliament, 2016). While this recommendation appears 
reasonable at face value, it is circular to say the least for also in most EU countries 
legislation exists that if applied would force under certain circumstance the 
reclassification of self-employed into employees. 
Benefits portability. It has been shown earlier (§ 3.1.3) that all the sources reviewed 
indicate that contractors in digital labour markets are basically excluded from any form 
of social protection. A new topic in the regulatory debate emerged in 2015 around the 
proposal that goes under the name of ‘portability’ (Berg, 2016; Harris & Krueger, 2015; 
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Hill, 2015; Strom & Schmitt, 2016). As effectively summarised by Berg (2016, p. 2), in 
basic terms the proposal consists in creating ‘individual security accounts to protect the 
worker as they move from gig to gig’. Benefits (wage insurance, health insurance, 
disability and injuries insurance) should be designed universally and not being tied to 
specific employers (Strom & Schmitt, 2016, p. 14). The final employers would have 
obligations similar to those with regular workers or they may share contributions with 
the digital labour markets that could pay half of them (Harris & Krueger 2015). 
Beyond benefits portability issues. The enactment of some form of regulation to 
establish the proposed portability of benefits would already represent a positive step 
forward to ensure more dignified conditions for workers in digital labour markets; yet, 
they are blatantly not sufficient. In § 3.1 it has been shown that earnings are at times 
too low in the absence of any minimum wage rules, the flow of work is unstable and no 
employment benefits exists, there are clear information and power asymmetries, no 
protection against privacy violations, and various forms of information or reputation 
based ethnic and gender discriminatory mechanisms occur unregulated. A few authors 
have proposed wider and more comprehensive and regulatory approaches (Berg 2016; 
Sprague, 2015; Strom & Schmitt, 2016). These include minimum wage, the need to 
recognise overtime and business expenses, support to workers’ self-organisation and 
unionisation, changes in the organisation of work, and various other provisions.  
A final note on the European context. Both at EU and at MS level no noteworthy 
developments have been found concerning legal disputes and/or regulatory proposal 
specifically concerning workers in digital labour markets. On the other hand, new work 
arrangements have been introduced and regulated widely both in MS and at EU level 
with the three key Directives on part-time (1997), fixed-term (1998), and temp agency 
contracts (2008) xxxix .  As noted (Peers, 2013), the spirit of these directives was to 
protect atypical workers directly from abusive conditions of employment, and to protect 
workers with standard employment contracts indirectly from being undercut by atypical 
workers. They represent a dual approach aimed to liberalise NSW rules and remove 
barriers, while at the same time providing some protection to workers employed in these 
forms of employment (they contain provisions banning, in principle, discrimination 
against atypical workers as compared to standard workers). An appraisal of these 
measures yields mixed results (Deakin, 2014). Many exceptions have been introduced 
and the way some Member States have implemented the Directives can risk nullifying 
the protective provisions; transition is facilitated from standard work to NSW but not 
vice versa; they seem to be perpetuating labour market dualism. A comparative study of 
labour market development in the US and the EU (DiPrete, et al., 2006), for instance, 
already by the middle of the previous decade highlighted that the precarisation of work 
in Europe was a more widespread trend than in the US with growing numbers of 
insecure jobs where low-skilled workers were concentrated. Therefore, the proposal 
advanced by Hagiu is probably reasonable for the U.S. where the labour market situation 
is relatively more binary (0= contractors; 1= regular employee) compared to Europe. In 
this respect any new regulatory proposal concerning workers in digital labour markets 
should take into account this aspect and consider the differences existing compared to 
the US situation. 
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4 Discussion and conclusions 
In this final section, first the main contributions and findings of this essay are 
summarised and discussed with regard to the research questions and broader issues 
raised in the introduction. Some broad policy implications follow.  Then, the conclusions 
are in the form of a research agenda in general and with specific respect to support for 
European policy making.  
4.1 Discussion of main contributions 
Obviously a disclaimer cannot be avoided on the preliminary and non-conclusive nature 
of the reviewed evidence; various evidence gaps exist particularly for European contexts 
and inform the research agenda that concludes this essay. On the other hand, the first 
important result is having shown that robust experimental and quasi-experimental 
empirical work is emerging, which means data is available but so far it has been used 
only to study the US cases and context. In synthetically discussing the main 
contributions of this essay the structure of the previous sections is followed starting from 
the sizing and typology (section 2), and continuing with workers (§ 3.1), the markets 
effects and functioning (§ 3.2), to conclude with legal and regulatory matters (§ 3.3). 
Size and future growth 
The dimensional relevance of work in digital labour markets is still the object of 
controversy and requires more well-designed surveys, but it has been shown to be 
statistically non marginal. In countries such as the UK and the US those working 
regularly for digital labour markets (every week) can be estimated at least between 1% 
and 2% of the labour force (staying on the conservative side). Their potential growth in 
the future depends on many factors for which evidence is limited and only speculation 
about firms’ decision can be made. The limited evidence shows that firms use these 
markets especially (but not exclusively) for saving on labour costs and that only for 
between one in five and one in three this amounts to a contraction of their boundaries 
(i.e. in the absence of digital labour markets they would have made a regular hire). Most 
hiring firms are SMEs, which may suggest that such markets are making outsourcing of 
certain labour services appealing to them (possibly also as a consequence of 
Employment Protection Legislation to which SMEs are especially sensitive). On the other 
hand, the emergence of new digitalised work arrangements is not unrelated to the 
broader trend of work de-standardisation with the widespread diffusion of NSW and to 
job polarisation with the hollowing out of standard middle level jobs. Routine task 
requiring middle skills are among the most traded digitally and are performed by 
individuals with the same profile as those being laid off or not hired from firms under 
regular work forms, which means they are outsourced not just because of technology (as 
assumed in the ‘routine biased technical change’ hypothesis) but also because it is 
institutionally possible and economically more convenient. So, while currently limited, if 
digital NSW continue to grow it is an empirically consequential hypothesis that they 
could potentially encroach traditional and long-term forms of employment (Einav, et al., 
2015, p. 20). 
Types of digital labour markets 
The evidence gathered also supports the typology of digital labour markets presented in 
section two as a heuristically valid conceptual tool to both inform future research and 
warn policy-makers from taking a ‘one-size-fit all’ approach to regulation. More research 
has been conducted so far on OLMs as compared to MLMs, which represents a gap to be 
filled. From a policy perspective the broad distinction between OLMs (global) and MLMs 
(local) is fundamental considering that for the latter a national and local approach is 
possible, whereas for the former the global nature of such markets neutralise any 
national legislation and would require international agreements: for instance, employers 
from Western countries can post jobs stating ‘This job is not for people from Bangladesh 
and Pakistan and your bid would be rejected automatically if you are from any one of the 
mentioned countries’ as contractors in those and other countries have no venue where 
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to complain about such blatant form of discrimination. The further distinction concerning 
the level of skills and type of tasks, cutting across that between global and local markets, 
is also important with regard to the issue of distinguishing true independent freelancers 
from Dependent Self-Employed Workers (DSEWs). 
Workers 
Workers in digital labour markets tend to be younger and more highly educated than 
their population of reference, although there are also between 6% and 12% of 
individuals 55 and older (depending on the OLMs and MLMs considered and on the 
country); overall, with the exception of a couple of MLMs and excluding non-Western 
countries, women are either more represented than men or equally represented. It is 
reasonable to see these markets as a channel especially for ‘stay at home’ female 
parents to ‘opt back in’ the labour force, although gender stereotypes penalise them 
even in anonymous contexts such as OLMs (see more infra). The gathered evidence 
debunks the rhetoric about students being predominant among digital workers, as recent 
surveys find this category to account for around no more than 10% of workers. The high 
proportion of highly educated individuals performing small pieces of work at 10 cents per 
piece in OLMs such as MTurk or running errands at around minimum hourly wage may 
be seen as a signal of the over-supply of college graduates with respect to the needs of 
standard labour markets; alternatively, it could also be interpreted as the result of an 
institutionally designed ‘job polarisation’ trend. 
Another rhetorical discourse debunked is that about working for ‘pin money’, out of 
boredom and/or of the ‘generosity of cognitive surplus’; possibly the most unequivocal 
finding toward which all sources converge is that money is the primary motivation to 
perform this kind of work even when earnings are very low as in MTurk. While evidence 
is less conclusive, it seems that there are fairly large shares of individuals for whom 
earnings from working for digital labour markets represent the primary source of income 
and who engage in a portfolio of several activities; in the UK, for instance, as many as 
60% (2.9 million if projected on the population of reference) of those who have worked 
in digital labour markets at least once (11% or 4.9 million) work for several of them and 
are registered with between 2 and 5.  
The question whether these forms of work are voluntary or involuntary is a thornier one 
and the evidence available does not enable any conclusive statement. At the opposite 
extreme some claim that from the fast pace of growth in the number of contractors and 
their profile it can be derived that working in OLMs is a free choice Agrawal et al (2013a), 
whereas others using qualitative in-depth ethnography conclude that is not a totally 
uncoerced choice (Irani, 2015b, p. 227). In a few surveys respondent complain about 
low pay and not sufficient and steady flow of work. Obviously, there is a wide array of 
situations that range from freely choosing independent freelancing and to doing gigs for 
lack of alternative opportunities. As a contextual term of comparison, data from the 
Eurostat Labour Force Survey have been presented in which the percentage of 
involuntary part-time and fixed-term employment is, respectively, around 30% and 60% 
on average in EU28. 
On the employment status and history of those working in digital labour markets much 
more research is urgently needed and the evidence reviewed is fragmentary and mostly 
indirect. Berg (2016), for instance, using only two small samples reports that 33% of 
those working for micro-tasking OLMs such as MTurk and Crowdflower were unemployed, 
whereas the remaining two thirds use these markets to complement part-time or full-
time employment. The nationally representative surveys for UK and Sweden and two 
surveys commissioned by two OLMs (Upwork and Nubelo) provide some information on 
the amount of time dedicated to digital work, whether it represents a primary sources of 
income, and on duration of tenure, but include no information on current and previous 
employment or unemployment status.  On the grounds of the available information it 
can only be speculated that the majority of these workers come more from the ranks of 
the under-employed and the self-employed than from those of the unemployed and 
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inactive, although this may be more the case for OLMs trading tasks as opposed to those 
trading micro-tasks and to MLMs. 
The evidence is also fairly uniform in attesting that earnings in such markets range from 
very low to modest with only a small minority of workers making above middle level 
incomes and that workers have no form of social protection, are in a position of 
unfavourable information and power asymmetry, and that their privacy is not protected. 
Gender and ethnicity-based discrimination (voluntary or involuntarily produced by 
matching frictions, hiring inefficiencies, and cognitive biases) is not uncommon and 
workers have no way to protect themselves from it. In the US, leaving aside Uber and 
Lyft, several markets (mostly MLMs but also one case of OLMs - Crowdflower) have 
faced or are facing class action for violations of the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA) 
regarding minimum wage and other provisions. Using by analogy consolidated evidence 
on the negative effects and social costs of traditional NSW, it is possible to identify the 
following risks for workers in OLMs and MLMs: a) becoming traps rather than stepping 
stones toward regular employment; b) structural wage penalty with increasing income 
inequality and risk of poverty; c) increased psychological morbidity.  
Finally, several studies have documented the increasing diffusion of strictly automated 
control through algorithms, which has been further corroborated by the inquiries of US 
judges in the legal cases around Uber and Lyft. This seemingly support Cherry’s claim 
(2016) that digital labour markets brings us back to Taylor (automated control), Smith 
(division of labour in pieces), and to pre-industrial levels of work precarisation (lack of 
social protection). 
Digital labour markets effects and functioning 
From an ex ante theoretical perspective digital labour markets can be expected to 
produce a number of positive effects such as increased employment and productivity, as 
well as aggregate increases in market and production efficiency, as a result of lowering 
search, transaction, and coordination costs, by producing more and better matches. The 
evidence available does not document such positive effects and rather focuses on some 
limits to their realisation. This does not mean that they should be ruled out and that 
digital markets are not producing any benefits, otherwise their growth could not be 
explained. To document such positive effects more empirical research is needed in 
general, and especially more studies of effects on firms should be conducted, as well as 
studies that try to compare the effects of digital labour markets with respect to their 
non-digital counterparts so as to assess efficiency effects on production and on markets. 
Surveys commissioned by OLMs such as Upwork and Nubelo document high levels of 
satisfaction among both employers and contractors (though slightly to a lesser extent). 
Surveys designed and analysed by disinterested third parties are needed to corroborate 
such preliminary findings. Therefore, the main findings summarised below only reflect 
the quantitative and robust evidence that is currently available. 
OLMs favour international labour flows (especially ‘North-South’) but are not as flat and 
as meritocratic as expected. Various barriers that can be aptly summarised by the 
expression ‘the liability of foreignness’ (Lehdonvirta, et al., 2014) limit the globalised 
trade of digital labour and the expected wage convergence; non-Westerners receive only 
a limited wage premium (compared to their domestic markets) but domestic contractors 
earn more in absolute terms and for some tasks are preferred regardless of qualifications. 
This means that OLMs are less beneficial than expected for developing countries, but 
also that they exert less pressure in driving down wages in more developed countries.  
On the distributional employment and related income effects the available evidence is 
limited and inconclusive. In the reviewed studies focussing on online labour markets 
examples of concentration of work assignments (i.e. ‘superstar’ effects leading to job 
concentration and more income inequality) are found and no case of long tail effect 
(having more equalising effects on both employment and income level) is documented. 
The same applies to MLMs where in one case less than 10% of workers account for more 
than 80% of work completed.  
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There is a fairly large number of experimental and quasi-experimental studies showing 
that digital labour markets are still ridden with matching frictions and hiring inefficiencies, 
which confirm the earlier prediction by Autor (2001). Little correlation is found between 
skills and earning levels, whereas reputational ratings and references seem to be the 
main explanation for the amount of jobs and money contractors manage to secure. It 
seems that referrals information is used by employers more than all other observable 
characteristics on which information is fully available in OLMs. There is a risk that such 
frictions and hiring inefficiencies may exacerbate wage inequalities by further skewing 
work in favour of the most skilled and precluding entry by inexperienced workers. In this 
respect, it is important to note the relevance of also applying a behavioural perspective 
to the documented cases of gender and ethnic-based discrimination resulting from, in 
most cases, involuntary bad decision based on stereotypes as heuristics leading to 
judgements and decision making affected by confirmation biases.  
From legal disputes and regulation 
Various class actions in the US (especially those concerning Uber and Lyft) have heated 
the debate on possible regulatory intervention. The legal disputes focussed on the 
possible misclassification of employees as contractors. A court decision forcing Uber or 
Lyft drivers to be reclassified as employees could have radically changed the regulatory 
landscapes and the destiny of these two and other digital labour markets. In January 
(Lyft) and April (Uber) 2016 the two cases reached a settlement; yet, the issue remains 
open as any governmental agency could still pick it up again in the near future. In this 
domain a proposal is to create by regulation an intermediate status (dependent self-
employed) between contractors and employees and impose that digital labour markets 
pay at least a part of the traditional bundle of social protection provisions. This solution, 
however, is difficult to implement as it is not easy to define in a general way the criteria 
that identify a dependent self-employed. 
An alternative proposal going under the name of ‘benefits portability’ consists in creating 
individual security accounts to protect the workers as they move from gig to gig’. 
Benefits (wage insurance, health insurance, disability and injuries insurance) should be 
designed universally and not being tied to specific employers. The final employers would 
have obligations similar to those with regular workers or they may share contributions 
with the digital labour markets that could pay half of them. 
The enactment of some form of regulation to establish the proposed portability of 
benefits would already represent a positive step forward to ensure more dignified 
conditions for workers in digital labour markets; various analysts, however, consider it 
insufficient in view of the facts that earnings are at times too low in the absence of any 
minimum wage rules, the flow of work is unstable and no employment benefits exists, 
there are clear information and power asymmetries, no protection against privacy 
violations, and various forms of information or reputation-based ethnic and gender 
discriminatory mechanisms occur unregulated.  
4.2 Policy implications 
There are four broad questions to which policy makers would certainly like to have firm 
answers backed by robust evidence: 
A. What are the possible implications of these new digital labour markets for 
employment and wages? Do they create new jobs or simply crowd-out existing ones? 
Are they a source of income integration for the underemployed or are they rather 
contributing to downward pressure on wages? 
B. Do they justify a regulatory intervention? If yes, in what areas (i.e., taxation, liability, 
insurance, social protection)?  
C. What would be the costs of curbing innovation and loosing on improved labour 
market efficiency as a result of regulatory intervention?  
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D. Are there risks, in Europe, that fragmentation will emerge as a result of national or 
local interventions, or in cases where the issue of classification (self-employed vs. 
workers) will be decided by the courts in the absence of regulation? 
Obviously the evidence collated in this essay can provide only tentative and partial 
answers and it is only by filling in the gaps already outlined and further discussed in the 
concluding paragraph that firmer answers will be possible. 
First of all, more surveys and data are needed to better assess the dimensional 
relevance of this phenomenon and its possible development paths because this will 
determine the extent to which the questions above are really policy relevant. Certainly, if 
growth continues at the fast pace of the last five years, these new markets could 
encroach on traditional and long-term forms of employment. Currently, however, the 
size of these new markets is limited. Economic theory suggests that there will be both 
further growth (reduction of search, coordination, and transaction costs) and 
countervailing effects (frictions cost of quality control, etc.).  
With regard to question (A) the evidence is inconclusive and lends itself to different 
interpretations in terms of potential impacts on labour market dualism, employment 
polarisation, and income inequality. In other words, there is still ambiguity on the 
direction of the effects and, especially, about how these effects will be distributed both 
within and between countries. It has been suggested that digital labour markets can be 
together with more general form of NSW the other side of the job polarisation story told 
by the ‘routine biased technical change’ literature. This said, the evidence reviewed is 
absolutely insufficient to conclude that this is the case and discern whether these 
markets increase the dualism of the labour markets or generate a polarisation between 
these new forms of flexible work and regular employment (full-time, but also standard 
part-time and fixed-term employment). Lack of evidence also prevents us from 
assessing the extent to which firms outsource non-core or core tasks to these markets, 
which is key to understand the main direction of future development. On the other hand, 
question (B) is relatively easier to answer. The evidence shows that the amount of 
money workers can make on these platforms varies widely from very little to just above 
the minimum wage and that work-life balance, and working conditions are far from ideal 
(no social protection, asymmetries, surveillance, lack of privacy protection, etc.). While 
caution must be exerted especially on the classification issue (need to avoid treating 
truly independent freelancers as dependent self-employed), there is enough evidence 
and several reasonable proposals for regulatory intervention. In this respect, it is fairly 
clear that platform liability should be better defined, both in general and with specific 
regard to third party damages and to accidents workers may have as they perform tasks 
(this mostly concerns mobile labour markets). The answer to question (C) on what 
society stands to lose if regulation curbs labour market innovation finds the same 
limitation as question (A) due to lack of conclusive evidence on key effects. Answering 
this question would require a cost-benefit analysis weighing in the positive and negative 
effects, but empirically the evidence is not conclusive for either. Positive effects 
identified as ex-ante (production efficiency, aggregate welfare effects from more efficient 
labour markets, productivity and indirect employment gains, increased participation of 
the inactive and the unemployed) are not empirically confirmed yet but should not be 
discarded. Finally, on question (D), it should be recalled that this essay did not perform 
a review of regulatory developments in EU28 and that this undertaking could be an 
important complement to the evidence presented here. On the other hand, it is fairly 
clear that, if in Europe things develop as they have done in the U.S. and arising issues 
are defined by court decisions, this will cause fragmentation. It is, thus, urgent that 
some EU-level guidance be provided so that Member States can introduce some form of 
regulation to reduce any potential fragmentation. 
More generally, policy makers should acknowledge that employment in the 21st century 
is no longer a binary phenomenon (1= employed, 0= unemployed) and set a target to 
minimise involuntary employment and under-employment (Atkinson, 2015, chapter 5), 
while letting open the opportunity for flexible and small pieces of jobs to be performed 
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by those freely choosing to do so. They should put in place fair conditions for voluntary 
atypical work so that it does not increase inequality. In the same vein, it has been 
argued that a regulatory approach should not be 1=employees and 0=contractors, but 
ways should be found to increase protection without suddenly increasing the costs for 
digital platforms.  
The second wave of digital transformation could be beneficial as long as researchers, 
policy makers, trade unions, and industry find innovative institutional ways of helping to 
exploit the opportunities, without neglecting the social challenges (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 
2014; Brynjolfsson et al., 2015). The recent ‘Open Letter on the Digital Economy’ 
(Brynjolfsson, et al., 2015) calls companies to ‘develop new organizational models and 
approaches that not only enhance productivity and generate wealth but also create 
broad-based opportunity’. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in a 
draft opinion stresses that new policy measures and new agreements on the 
organisation of work are needed to avoid a situation where digitalisation further 
increases inequality, reduces job quality, and worsens working conditions. As shown, 
industry leaders and foundations have followed up with the proposal to make social 
benefit portable across gigs; although not yet sufficient (see infra), this would already 
represent a step ahead. 
Digital labour platforms are also relevant from a fairness perspective. Fairness prescribes 
that all individuals should:  
 be provided with equal chances to make the best of the powers they possess 
(Tawney, 1931);  
 have the right to dignity (being the first of the six values comprising the European 
Charter of Rights);  
 and perceive in practice a link between efforts and rewards (Roemer, 1998).  
While platforms might help in providing more and better job opportunities for some 
workers (hence improving fairness), they also fuel the growth of non-standard forms of 
employment that, in many cases and if unregulated, imply worse working arrangements 
and conditions compared to those experienced by workers with standard employment 
contracts (with a negative effect on fairness). The coexistence of positive and negative 
effects is confirmed when one looks at the relationship between the development of 
labour platforms and inequality of wages: while for some aspects –mostly related to the 
efficiency-enhancing aspects of labour platforms- they might lead to a reduction of wage 
inequality, for others (such as the superstar effect)  they are likely to increase it, so that 
the response can only be provided on an empirical level (while in the case of fairness, 
the policy response can be offered just with an ex-ante analysis of the differential 
treatments under standard and non-standard working arrangements). Notice also that 
fairness and equality are tightly linked as ex-ante input and ex-post outcomes and 
should be both tackled through policy and regulation, since the inequality outcomes of 
today will become the unfair starting conditions of tomorrow (Atkinson, 2015, Chapter 1).  
People deserve to keep a reasonable portion of what they earn through increased hours 
or taking increased responsibility for a second job. Principles of social justice require that 
individuals have access to primary goods such as rights, powers, and income (Rawls, 
1971), not forgetting that people also have very different capacities of converting 
primary goods into a good living (Sen, 2009). Ex-ante opportunities are better linked to 
ex-post outcomes by expanding the relevant dimensions in terms of capacity and 
functionings (Sen, 1999). Labour markets are social institutions since there is something 
special about labour as a commodity, including the fact that participants on both sides 
hold well-developed notions and norms about what is fair and what is not (Solow, 1990). 
Social norms and the notion of fairness actually remove indeterminacy since individual 
incentives are not sufficient to reach a unique equilibrium in the market (MacLeod & 
Malcomson, 1998). Social norms and values can be consistent with agent rationality and 
shape economic behaviour because, for instance, of their implications for the reputation 
and public legitimacy of workers and employers (Solow, 1990). 
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In view of the above considerations and the empirical evidence reviewed, it is not 
unreasonable to expect policy makers, regulators, and social partners in Europe to meet 
and define a consensual roadmap toward the establishment of a Fair and Dignified 
Support Infrastructure (FDSI) for on-demand workers that does not jeopardize 
innovation. As a relative late comer to the ongoing disputes and conflicts erupting in the 
U.S., Europe could learn from this experience and avoid issues ending up in court and 
becoming radicalised. European stakeholders should also learn from the past and 
acknowledge that the dual policy approach of liberalising new forms of employment while 
retaining standard full-time employment as the benchmarking norm was not fully 
effective and has to some extent exacerbated labour market dualism. An FDSI should 
ease convergence and transition between digitally-mediated on-demand work and other 
forms of employment, limiting as far as possible the exemptions and exceptions that 
have undermined the effectiveness of previous Directives and social partner agreements. 
This support infrastructure should include the following pillars:  
a) a minimum wage should be defined together with limits to the maximum number of 
hours worked per day (acceptance rates should not be used by platforms to 
deactivate or terminate workers’ contracts);  
b) some minimal forms of social protection and health insurance should be 
introduced;  
c) liability insurance for damage to third parties should be considered, and some 
forms of health-safety measures;  
d) the kind and frequency of technological forms of control and the use of workers’ data 
should be regulated to ensure the protection of privacy;  
e) it should be ensured that, in maximising volumes for the platforms, algorithmically-
automated matching and reputational ratings do not produce discrimination with 
respect to gender, ethnicity, race, and age. 
More generally, this FDSI should facilitate individuals’ access to the standard forms of 
employment at certain points during their lives and then to more flexible forms of work 
at other points. Individuals should not be penalised for these transitions by the loss of 
seniority rights and occupational benefits. So far in Europe existing settings facilitate the 
transition from standard to non-standard forms of employment, but not vice versa. 
Though it is difficult to identify and measure involuntary atypical digitally-mediated work, 
policies should minimise this type of work, while at the same time allowing voluntary 
adhesion to flourish under conditions of fairness and dignity. 
4.3 Toward a research agenda 
This essay concludes with a brief discussion of the implications for future research, both 
in general and with specific regard to a European policy-relevant research agenda. There 
are gaps and opportunities, and this concluding section starts with the latter. 
The first result is that robust empirical studies are emerging meaning that data is 
potentially available. The evidence reviewed reveals that there are ‘big data’ research 
opportunities, either in accessing data provided by the platforms or web scraping some 
parts of it. Economists have started to use big data (Einav & Levin, 2014; Taylor et al., 
2014) and more recently a research agenda for ‘big data labour economics’ has been 
proposed (Horton & Tambe, 2015). Big data can be used to study, for instance, the 
geographic composition of the pool of contractors and further analyse the effects of 
language, culture, genders and other possible barriers on matching.  
There is, however, a possible drawback to the ‘ big data opportunity’ represented by the 
rise of what have been called ‘embedded researchers’ (Ruths & Pfeffer, 2014). These are 
researchers with special relationships with platforms and access to their data, which 
creates a divide in the research community and little possibility of validating/replicating 
59 
their results. This problem, which seriously affects research on the ‘sharing economy’, 
should be urgently remedied. 
There are evidence gaps in most of the topics discussed and there is still much to be 
done to sharpen our understanding of these new labour markets and their implications. 
There is a huge lack of evidence on European contexts compared to the US, which is 
taken into account in the following considerations. 
First, the kind of experimental and observational analysis based on platforms data that 
have been reviewed should be replicated across different types of digital labour markets 
and across different locations, especially for what concerns localised MLMs. Studies on 
OLMs should be conducted with a more granular and extensive focus on the country of 
origins of both employers and contractors, and with differentiation by categories of tasks 
traded, and by firms sectors and size.  
Big data alone, however, would not fill all evidence gaps, and needs to be integrated 
with more traditional survey data, as well as with in depth qualitative studies. One 
evident gap, for instance, concerns the measurement and quantification of the 
phenomenon. In this respect more surveys based on nationally representative samples 
are needed, and should be complemented with a collation of descriptive data on more 
platforms than those for which data have been found and reported in this essay. 
A second gap regards ‘workers’ socio-demographic profiles, employment status and 
histories, earnings, motivations, how they consider the choice between gig and other 
forms of work and how they assess the experience of working for digital labour markets. 
This kind of information can be gathered triangulating traditional surveys, surveys on 
specific digital labour markets, and qualitative case studies on the latter. 
Third, the evidence on distributional effects on employment and income is emerging but 
still limited and inconclusive; it is of clear importance and policy relevance to ascertain 
whether ‘super star’ or ‘long tail’ effects are prevalent; studies on such effects should be 
replicated and expanded with a triangulation between administrative data from digital 
labour markets and surveys/in-depth interviews with their contractors. Information is 
needed on the country of residence and socio-demographic profile of contractors where 
super star effects emerge, as well as on which type of firms (size and sectors) are more 
active in sourcing tasks to platforms; whether the outsourced tasks are part of the core 
business, or rather non-core tasks. 
The issue of control, algorithm management, and working conditions need to be further 
documented through qualitative in-depth studies complemented with other studies that 
look more specifically at regulations and labour law for these new forms of employment. 
More granular overviews are needed on: a) how different digital labour markets deal 
with liability and insurance issues; b) differences in European countries in the criteria 
applied to distinguish self-employed and workers; and c) whether new legal approaches 
are emerging on the latter issue with specific regard to sharing economy platforms. 
The matching process with its frictions is well documented, but studies should be 
replicated for more platforms and different locations. Finally, aggregate welfare effects 
are certainly important but are probably the object of a more long-term agenda. 
As a first step toward a European research agenda in support of policy-making, the 
following key research questions need to be answered:  
A. What is the direct employment effect of labour market platforms: i.e. how 
many workers are actually involved in the functioning of labour market 
platforms? 
B. Who are the service providers (i.e. the supply side)? What are their 
demographics, education, location, and motivation and how do they judge the 
experience? This will also help us to answer questions about the substitution 
of regular labour contracts with labour supplied through platforms, from the 
perspective of those supplying the labour. It will also provide a better 
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understanding of their opinions on the conditions of employment in the 
sharing economy (hours of work, wages, quality of work etc.)  
C. From the user’s perspective (i.e. the demand side): what kinds of tasks are 
outsourced? Are outsourced tasks mostly related to non-core activities and/or 
standardized activities (where the "buy" option dominates over the "make" 
one)? Are those tasks mostly cognitive, manual or interactive? Are they 
routine or non-routine tasks? What are the main drivers for firms to use 
labour market platforms? 
A specifically delimited and short-medium term research project could include the 
following steps:  
(1) Select one of the types identified in the matrix presented in paragraph 2.1 (possibly 
based on clearly identified policy priorities);  
(2) Conduct a more focussed review of the literature on this type, striving as far as 
possible to capture non-English language papers and grey literature focussing on 
European settings;  
(3) Perform a wide ranging web-based review of the digital labour markets belonging to 
chosen type and active in Europe;  
(4) Based on the previous steps, make a preliminary identification of those that seem to 
have achieved some scale and, through short telephone interviews, obtain more data 
to validate the selection. In spite of the fact that these markets could be international 
or global, data on the labour platforms should be collected locally, i.e. based on their 
prevalence in given country (we would hence have about 20 country-specific markets, 
covering five major European countries such as UK, Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain) ;  
(5) Depending on time and budget, select ten of these digital labour markets (2 per 
country) for more in-depth analysis, based on:  
(5a) in-depth, thick qualitative case studies in the field (interviewing representatives 
of the digital labour markets, and a few contractors and employers),  
(5b) online surveys of contractors and employers to be administered through digital 
labour markets,  
(5c) if possible, econometric analysis of primary data obtained by such markets 
(replicating some of the studies reviewed in Section 3), and  
(5d) design and realise field experiments (replicating some of the studies reviewed in 
Section 3).  
(6) In parallel to the above steps, launch a survey in the five major EU countries based 
on nationally representative samples to measure the ‘prevalence’ of employment in 
digital labour markets and to obtain data on workers’ socio-demographic profiles, 
employment status and histories, earnings, motivations, how they consider the 
choice between gig and other forms of work and how they assess the experience of 
working for digital labour markets 
Triangulating the various methods/sources of such project  will lead to a first set of 
policy relevant findings that will inform a wider and longer term research programme. 
.  
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5 Technical annex 
5.1 Method for the formal review of the scientific literature 
The ‘scoping review method’ was adopted to identify and subsequently formally analyse 
70 sources. Recently two ‘reviews of reviews’ have conceptually mapped the field and, if 
used jointly, identified as many as 17 different review methods (Grant & Booth, 2009; 
Paré et al., 2015); from these two sources the differences between a systematic and a 
scoping review have been extracted in the table below.  
Table 4: Scoping reviews vis-à-vis systematic reviews 
Parameters Systematic Scoping 
Scope of question 
Narrow  
(Longitudinal) 
Broad  
(Cross-sectional) 
Search strategy Comprehensive Comprehensive 
Nature of sources Empirical only Empirical and conceptual 
Explicit inclusion 
criteria  
Yes 
(strict, protocol-based) 
Yes,  
(Yes, but not rigid) 
Quality 
assessment 
Yes Not essential 
Reporting 
Statistical method plus 
narrative reporting 
 narrative 
(content/thematic), possibly 
tabular synthesis 
Source: adapted from (Grant & Booth, 2009; Paré, et al., 2015) 
First of all, a possible terminological misunderstanding must be avoided in that a scoping 
review is performed as systematically as a ‘systematic review’, since the connotation of 
the latter as systematic concerns the type of coverage and the rigidity of the criteria for 
inclusion of items in the analysis.  
Scoping reviews attempt to provide an initial indication of the potential size and nature 
of the available literature (Paré et al., 2015, p. 186), and are useful to inform 
policymakers as to whether a full systematic review is needed and over which topics 
(Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 101); they tend to privilege breadth and relevance over depth 
of coverage (Paré et al., 2015, p. 187), but they strive to be as comprehensive and 
transparent as the systematic reviews (Grant & Booth, 2009, p. 102). Inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are usually established in scoping reviews to eliminate studies that do 
not address the initial research questions, but usually this does not involve exclusion 
based on quality assessment (as in systematic reviews) but rather based on the criteria 
of relevance. More concretely, whereas systematic review may include only experimental 
or quantitative observational studies, scoping reviews tend to also include qualitative 
empirical analysis, as well as non-empirical work that henceforth will be indicated with 
the general labels ‘other’ or ‘conceptual’ (although they may be theoretical essays, 
review essays, or legal and regulatory essays).  
5.2 Process and sources 
The first step was a comprehensive but unstructured free text search of newspapers, 
magazines, and other non-academic online sources (i.e. blogs) using the Lexis Nexis 
dataset. Expressions such as ‘sharing economy and labour/employment/ contractor’, 
‘collaborative economy and labour/employment/ contractor’, ‘crowdsourcing 
labour/employment/ contractor’, ‘gig economy and labour/employment/ contractor’, ‘on 
demand workers’, ‘crowds employment’, were used. The about 40 items of this kind 
cited in this essay are just a very arbitrary selection out of a wide pool of sources thus 
identified. This first step, however, was only instrumental and enabled to identify: a) 
most debated topics; b) a comprehensive list of platforms representing 2SOMLMs as 
defined in § 2.1; c) a few more frequently cited academic contributions. The results of 
this first step informed the search performed on key electronic datasets including: 
Scopus (Elsevier); JSTOR Archival Journals; Taylor & Francis Online – Journals; SciVerse 
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ScienceDirect (Elsevier); SpringerLink; Wiley Online Library; Emerald Journals (Emerald 
Group Publishing); IEEE Conference Publications; ACM Digital Library; SSRN; NBER; 
Google Scholars. The following search string with Boolean operators was used:  
(Sharing economy OR collaborative economy OR gig economy, Or crowdsourcing OR 
crowds employment) AND (on-demand workers, OR contractors, OR micro-
entrepreneurs, OR Drivers, OR Turkers) AND (motivation, OR socio-demographic, OR 
agency, OR incentives) AND (work conditions OR control OR salary, OR surveillance, OR 
privacy, OR moral hazard, OR moral valence) AND (employment effects, OR inequality, 
OR social welfare, OR disadvantaged groups, OR unemployed), AND (regulatory status, 
Or regulation, OR Labour laws, OR labour policy, OR legal disputes, OR court decisions) 
This general string was then applied for several specific platforms (i.e. MTurk, Uber, 
Elance-oDesk, and many more replaced the items in the first parenthesis). The criteria 
used for inclusion of items in the formal review were that:  
a) they discussed either platforms in general or (better) specifically platforms that meet 
the criteria for inclusion in the definition of OMLMs used in this essay;  
b) they presented empirical evidence (although a few non-empirical contributions were 
also included);  
c) they were published preferably after 2013 (40 out of 70 formally reviewed items 
meet this criterion); the criteria were applied with some flexibility.  
The search, selection, retrieval, and analysis of the sources took place between October 
20 2015 and November 30, 2015. Selective updates were performed in January 2016,  
and between April 18 and May 9 2016. 
5.3 Limitations 
The main limitations are intrinsic to the scoping review and stem from the application of 
some discretion in using the dimension of relevance when including or excluding items 
with respect to the three criteria illustrated above. This is why there may be some 
purposive and possibly ‘subjective’ elements of selection. As this is a scoping review, the 
sources cut across several disciplinary fields and methods and are based on different 
underlying conceptual and theoretical apparatus, as well as different academic traditions 
(i.e. labour economics versus Computer Human Interaction and Computer Supported 
Cooperative Works or anthropology, or sociology, or legal studies). The search, by 
combining two broad fields (broadly speaking ‘crowdsourcing’ and ‘sharing economy') 
returned a very large number of items whose review would have exceeded the time and 
space available for this essay; this means that a fairly large amount of contributions was 
excluded as a combination of the three criteria listed above and of relevance. For 
instance, MTurk has been used by the academic communities to conduct surveys, 
behavioural experiments, and user studies; as a result there is a growing body of 
research discussing the reliability and validity of this platform for research purposes 
(Grysman, 2015; Kittur et al., 2008; Layman & Sigurdsson, 2013; Paolacci & Chandler, 
2014; Rand, 2012; Rouse, 2015; Schmidt, 2015) xl . Although such studies present 
indirectly relevant insights, their focus is methodological and only one contribution of 
this kind was reviewed based on a relevance judgement (Downs, et al., 2010) xli  On 
reputational ratings in OMLMs only a few contributions were included (Horton & Golden, 
2015; Kokkodis & Ipeirotis, 2015; Mill, 2011), out of body of literature that is also vast 
and burgeoning; such literature, however, deserves a more focussed self-standing 
review. Finally, there is a vast body of engineering and design-oriented literature that is 
mostly excluded with a few illustrative exceptions (Bernstein, et al., 2015; Kittur et al., 
2013; Kittur et al., 2011; Satzger, et al., 2013). Last but not least, all the items included 
in the formal review are either general or focussed on US empirical realities. This may be 
the result of performing only an English language search and there may be other 
contributions focussing on European contexts that have been published in other 
languages. Possibly a multi-language review of the literature to capture contributions in 
languages other than English could be part of the next research step; though most 
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European scholars when they have a good piece of research publish it in English in peer-
reviewed journals or in pre-publication platforms such as SSRN and similar. 
5.4 Summary overview of sources 
A total of 70 items were formally reviewed and an analytical summary table for each of 
them is presented in next paragraph. In the first table below the items have been re-
grouped into 5 topics; within each of the topics there are nuances that can be 
appreciated by consulting the aforementioned analytical table. 
Table 5: Reviewed sources by topic and platform of focus 
               Platform 
Topic 
Misc. 
MTurk1
type 
Upwork2 
type 
Task 
Rabbit3 
type 
Uber 
Total by 
row 
(1) Technical design 2 5    7 
(2) Motivations and 
socio-demographics 
 11  1 1 13 
(3) Economics of 
2SOMLMs 
4 3 21 3 1 32 
(4) Workers conditions 
& surveillance in 
2SOMLMs 
2 8   3 13 
(5) Legal and 
regulatory aspects 
4 1    5 
Total by column 12 28 21 4 5 70 
1. Out of 28 entries, 21 focussed on MTurk and only one on another similar platform, one 
entry analyses comparatively MTurk and Crowdflower; 
2. 17 entries focusing on Upwork and 4 on Freelancers; 
3. Two entries just on TaskRabbit, one just on Gigwalk, and one on both. 
As can be appreciated from the table above, the largest group of contributions (32/70) is 
about the economics of OMLMs, followed by studies focussing on motivations and/or the 
socio-demographic characteristics of on-demand workers (13/70), and by analyses of 
various aspects of the conditions of work (13/70). Studies dealing with technical design 
or with regulatory and legal aspects are less numerous. It is also noticeable that as 
many as 58 studies were identified that reported data on MTurk or similar (28), Upwork 
(21) or similar, TaskRabbit or similar (4), and Uber (5). This suggests that some of these 
platforms are willing to let researchers use their primary administrative data or perform 
experiments on their platform; this does not, however, apply to Uber for which primary 
data are used only in one paper with a Uber researcher as co-author (Hall & Krueger, 
2015); the others are based on either qualitative research (Anderson, 2014; Lee, et al., 
2015; Rosenblat & Stark, 2015) or web-scraped data (Chen, et al., 2015). 
In terms of method/sources, there are as many as 57 empirical contributions while 13 
comprise non-empirical essays of varied nature. There are 40 quantitative empirical 
studies, 14 qualitative studies and three modelling simulations. 
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Table 6: Reviewed sources by topic and method/sources 
               Method 
Platform 
Other Qual. Stat. Obs.  Exp. Mod. 
Total 
by 
row 
(1) Technical design 3 1     2 6 
(2) Motivations and 
socio-demographics 
 4 5  4  13 
(3) Economics of 
2SOMLMs 
3  3 18 
 
8 
1 33 
(4) Workers conditions 
& surveillance in 
2SOMLMs 
2 9 1 1   13 
(5) Legal and 
regulatory aspects 
5      5 
Total by column 13 14 9 19 12 3 70 
1. Other= Various studies of non-empirical nature such as reviews (some reporting empirical 
data), theoretical, conceptual, and prescriptive/futuristic essays; 
2. Qual. = Empirical qualitative studies (interviews, ethnographies, focus groups, etc.); 
3. Stat. = Empirical quantitative studies providing descriptive and multivariate statistics of 
survey results and of administrative data; 
4. Obs. = Empirical quantitative studies using econometric methods to recover causal 
parameters or to model the data 
5. Exp. = Empirical quantitative studies based on natural experiments or online experiments 
6. Mod. = Modelling simulations 
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5.5 Analytical tabulated summary of reviewed sources 
The following two abbreviations are used to classify the primary field from which the contribution originates: HCI (Human Computer 
Interaction) and CSCW (Computer Supported Cooperative Work). Please note that the field classification for the sake of space and brevity 
only indicates the primary one, although some contributions are truly multidisciplinary (two fields have been added in a few cases only). 
Table 7: Analytical Summary of formally reviewed sources 
Source Topic /field Type/Method & Sources (if applicable) Platform/ other 
1. (Agrawal, et al., 2013a) 
 Digitization and contract labour market 
 Economics  
 Empirically informed review essay 
 Secondary sources and primary data 
from platform 
 oDesk 
2. (Agrawal, et al., 2013b) 
 Geographical distribution effects and 
experience information effects in online 
labour platform 
 Economics  
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
3. (Aloisi, 2015) 
 On demand work in online platform 
 Economics 
 Mixed method  
 Case studies using secondary sources 
and statistics 
 Several (AMT, Uber, 
Lyft, TaskRabbit, 
etc.) 
4. (Anderson, 2014) 
 Ride sharing drivers motivation and 
strategy 
 Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 Ethnographic interviews 
 Uber and Lyft 
5. (Banker & Iny, 2008) 
 Effects of measures of past performance 
in affecting buyer’s decisions in online 
labour platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Elance 
6. (Bederson & Quinn, 2011) 
 Ethical issues on working condition in 
online labour 
 CHI/CSCW 
 Review essay 
 Secondary sources 
 Online labour in 
general 
7. (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 
2014) 
 Commodification of labour 
 Social Informatics 
 Empirical informed critical essay 
 Secondary sources plus materials from 
the MTurk website 
 MTurk 
8. (Beerepoot & Lambregts, 
2015) 
 International wage differentials in online 
labour markets 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
9. (Berg, 2016) 
 Survey of crowdworkers 
 Labour studies 
 Quantitative study 
 Statistical analysis of survey results 
 MTurk and 
Crowflower 
66 
10. (Bernstein, et al., 2015) 
 Design of a word processor with a crowd 
inside 
 Computer Science 
 Computer architecture design 
description 
 Soylent 
11. (Chan & Wang, 2015) 
 Female hiring bias in online labour 
markets 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
12. (Chandler & Kapelner, 
2013) 
 Motivation in crowdsourced work 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Natural experiment 
 MTurk 
13. (Chen, et al., 2015) 
 Algorithm management and control 
 Computer Science 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (web scraped data) 
 Uber 
14. (Cheng, 2014) 
 Worker conditions in the sharing 
economy 
 Media studies 
 Non empirical essay of regulatory and 
prescriptive nature 
 Sharing economy 
platforms in general 
15. (Cherry, 2011) 
 Legal analysis of different form of digital 
work 
 Law 
 Legal analytical essay 
 Secondary sources 
 Online and mobile 
labour markets in 
general 
16. (Cherry, 2016) 
 Misclassification issues (employees vs. 
contractors) 
 Law 
 Legal analytical essay 
 Secondary sources 
 Online and mobile 
labour markets in 
general 
17. (Cullen & Farronato, 2015) 
 Microstructure of matching mechanism 
in online labour platform 
 Economics 
  
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 
 
 TaskRabbit 
18. (Dettling, 2016) 
 Impact of digitized work on female 
labour force participation 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (instrumental variable 
strategy using official statistics) 
 Home digitized work 
in general 
19. (Downs, et al., 2010) 
 Motivation and gaming in MTurk 
 Social-psychology/ Information studies 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of MTurk based on 
convenience sample) 
 MTurk 
20. (Felstiner, 2011) 
 Legal analysis of digital crowds 
employment 
 Law 
 Legal analytical essay 
 Secondary sources 
 Crowdsourcing in 
general with focus 
on MTurk 
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21. (Fish & Srinivasan, 2012) 
 Agency and motivation in crowdsourced 
work 
 Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 2 case studies based on ethnographic 
work 
 MTurk 
22. (Gandini et al., 
Forthcoming) 
 Reputation and trust in online labour 
markets 
 Labour studies 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Elance 
23. (Ghani, et al., 2014) 
 Geographical distribution effects in 
online labour platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
24. (Gonen et al., 2014) 
 Pricing efficient algorithms 
 Engineering 
 Modelling presentation of a pricing 
algorithm  
 MTurk 
25. (Gurvich et al., 2015) 
 Modelling the operation of on demand 
economy with self-scheduling 
 Economics 
 Theoretical essay 
 On demand labour 
in general 
26. (Hall & Krueger, 2015) 
 Socio-demographics and earnings of 
Uber drivers 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Descriptive statistical analysis (primary 
data from platform)  
 Uber 
27. (Hong & Pavlou, 2014) 
 Effects of cultural differences in affecting 
buyer’s decisions in online labour 
platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Freelancers 
28. (Hong, et al., 2014) 
 Open versus sealed bid auctions in 
online labour platforms 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Freelancers 
29. (Horton, 2010) 
 Online labour markets in general 
 Economics 
 Theoretical essays 
 Online labour 
markets In general 
(with data on MTurk 
and oDesk) 
30. (Horton, 2011) 
 MTurk perception of their employers 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Online field experiment 
 
 MTurk 
31. (Horton et al., 2011) 
 Using platforms for online experiment  
 Research methodology 
 Online experiment 
 Natural field experiment 
 MTurk 
32. (Horton, 2014) 
 Misdirected search effort in an online 
matching labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
33. (Horton, 2015a) 
 Frictions in online labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Online field experiment 
  
 Elance-oDesk 
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34. (Horton, 2015b) 
 Supply constraints and congestion in an 
online labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Elance-oDesk 
35. (Horton & Chilton, 2010) 
 Labour economics of crowdsourced work 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 MTurk 
36. (Horton & Golden, 2015) 
 Reputational ratings effects in an online 
labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Elance-oDesk 
37. (Horton & Johari, 2015) 
 Market design mechanisms in an online 
labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 Elance-oDesk 
38. (Ipeirotis, 2010a) 
 Analysis of requests and prices in MTurk 
 Information Science / Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 MTurk 
39. (Ipeirotis, 2010b) 
 Analysis of ‘turkers’ motivations and 
socio-demographics 
 Information Science / Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of MTurk based on 
convenience sample) 
 MTurk 
40. (Ipeirotis & Horton, 2011) 
 Standardization of crowdsourced work 
 Economics/ CHI 
 Theoretical/ prescriptive essay  MTurk 
41. (Irani, 2015a) 
 Digital micro-work as source of social 
differentiation 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 Four years of participant-observation 
within MTurk communities 
 MTurk 
42. (Irani, 2015b) 
 Computational labour relations in MTurk 
as example of new forms of digital work 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Theoretical essays reflecting on four 
years of participant-observation within 
MTurk communities 
 MTurk 
43. (Irani & Silberman, 2013) 
 MTurk, as a site of technically mediated 
worker-employer relations 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 participant-observation within MTurk 
communities 
 
 
 MTurk and 
Turkopticon 
 
 
44. (Kaufmann, et al., 2011) 
 Workers motivation in MTurk 
 Social psychology/ HCI/CSCW 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of MTurk based on 
convenience sample) 
 MTurk 
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45. (Kittur, et al., 2011) 
 General framework for digital 
crowdsourced work 
 HCI/CSCW, Organisational Behaviour 
 Theoretical essay 
 Crowdsourced paid 
work in general 
46. (Kittur, et al., 2013) 
 Future of digital crowdsourced work 
 HCI/CSCW, Organisational Behaviour 
 Theoretical essay 
 Crowdsourced paid 
work in general 
47. (Kokkodis & Ipeirotis, 
2015) 
 Reputation in online labour markets 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 oDesk 
48. (Kushner, 2013) 
 online freelance translation 
marketplaces; 
 Media and communication 
 Theoretical essay 
 Online translation 
and algorithms in 
general  
49. (Lee, et al., 2015) 
 Algorithm as management and control 
tool 
 HCI/CSCW 
 Qualitative study 
 Interviews with drivers and passengers 
triangulated with analysis of posts in 
drivers online forums  
 Uber and Lyft 
50. (Martin, et al., 2014) 
 In depth analysis of working and acting 
within MTurk 
 HCI/CSCW 
 Qualitative study 
 Ethno-methodological analysis of the 
online forum Turker Nation 
 MTurk 
51. (Mason & Watts, 2010) 
 Financial incentives and crowd workers 
performance 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Two online field experiments 
 MTurk 
52. (Mill, 2011) 
 Geographical distribution effects in 
online labour platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Freelancers 
53. (Musthag & Ganesan, 
2013) 
 Labour dynamics in mobile micro-task 
market 
 Computer Science / Economics 
 Quantitative data 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Gigwalk 
54. (Pallais, 2014) 
 Entry level inefficient hiring in online 
labour market 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 oDesk 
 
 
 
 
55. (Pallais & Sands, 
Forthcoming) 
 Effects of referrals in affecting buyer’s 
decisions in online labour platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 oDesk 
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56. (Pilz & Gewald, 2013) 
 Motivational factors in paid and not for 
profit crowdsourced work 
 Information Management 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of participants in not for profit 
platform) 
 MobileWork 
57. (Rosenblat & Stark, 2015) 
 Algorithm as a management and control 
tool 
 Data and Society 
 Qualitative study 
 Data collection and observation from 
five online forums used by Uber’s 
drives, plus 15 semi-structured 
interviews 
 Uber 
58. (Ross, et al., 2010) 
 MTurk demographics 
 Informatics 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of MTurk based on 
convenience sample) 
 MTurk 
59. (Satzger, et al., 2013) 
 Auction based crowdsourced work and 
skill management 
 Information Systems 
 Modelling simulation  Modelled platform 
60. (Shaw, et al., 2011) 
 Incentive design in crowdsourced 
employment 
 Sociology/Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Experiment 
 MTurk 
61. (Silberman & Irani, 2016) 
 Workers’ power and conditions in MTurk 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 Participant-observation within MTurk 
communities 
 MTurk, Turkopticon  
62. (Silberzahn, et al., 2014) 
 Gender stereotyping in online labour 
markets hiring 
 Behavioural sciences 
 Quantitative study 
 Study 1 experiment; Study 2 
Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Elance 
63. (Silberman, et al., 2010a) 
 MTurk, as a site of technically mediated 
worker-employer relations 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 Participant-observation within  MTurk 
communities 
 MTurk 
64. (Silberman, et al., 2010b) 
 Problems encountered by workers in 
MTurk 
 Communication studies/Anthropology 
 Qualitative study 
 Four years of participant-observation 
within MTurk communities 
 MTurk 
65. (Sprague, 2015) 
 Regulatory and legal aspects of work in 
the sharing economy 
 Law 
 Legal essay 
 Secondary sources 
 Sharing platforms in 
general 
66. (Stanton & Thomas, 2014) 
 Effects of intermediary agencies on 
matching 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 oDesk 
67. (Teodoro, et al., 2014) 
 Motivation in online labour markets 
 Communication studies / CSCW 
 Qualitative study 
 In depth interview 
 TaskRabbit and 
Gigwalk 
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68. (Thebault-Spieker, et al., 
2015) 
 Geography of mobile crowdsourced work 
 CSCW / Urban studies 
 Quantitative study 
 Multivariate and descriptive statistics 
(survey of TaskRabbit ‘taskers’ based 
on convenience sample) 
 TaskRabbit 
69. (Vakharia & Lease, 2015) 
 Cross-platform content analysis of seven 
crowd work platforms 
 Computer science 
 Qualitative study 
 Cross-platform analysis 
 Clickworker 
 CloudFactory, 
 CrowdComputing 
Systems 
 CrowdFlower 
 Crowdsource 
 MobileWorks 
 oDesk  
70. (Yoganarasimhan, 2013) 
 Effects of measures of past performance 
and reputation in affecting buyer’s 
decisions in online labour platform 
 Economics 
 Quantitative study 
 Observational (primary data from 
platform) 
 Freelancers 
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Notes 
                                           
i  It must be noted, however, that limits to the automated computerisations have been pointed 
out and include the need for creative intelligence, social intelligence and perception and 
manipulation tasks that some jobs require (Autor, et al., 2003).  
ii  According to Autor the wiring of labour would be limited by information asymmetry and would 
not be capable of conveying the ‘high bandwidth’ kind of information needed of a job match. 
iii  Since 2002, a growing body of mostly conceptual-theoretical economic literature has 
analysed situations where one economic operator (originally referred to as an intermediary 
and later increasingly as a platform) brings together at least two different groups of users as 
instances of ‘two-sided’ or ‘multisided’ (when there are more than two groups) markets. 
Though they did not use the expression ‘two-sided markets’, the first to look at firms serving 
two different types of customers and facing the ‘chicken and egg problem’ were Gawer & 
Cusumano (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) and Caillaud & Julien (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003). These 
authors referred to ‘intermediary markets’ serving two distinct groups of customers. The 
expression ‘two-sided market’ was first introduced by Rochet & Tirole (Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 
2006) and was used later by Wright (Wright, 2004) and Armstrong (Armstrong, 2006) In 
parallel, Evans used the expression ‘two-sided platforms’ (Evans, 2003a, 2003b) and was one 
of the first to systematically apply this perspective to what he called the web economy (Evans, 
2008a, 2008b, 2009). On the other hand, Parker & Van Alstyne (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2000; 
Parker & Alstyne, 2005) were converging on ‘two-sidedness’ coming from network and 
information theory, and with Eisenmann were the first to talk about two-sided ‘strategies’ 
rather than ‘markets’ (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Rysman (Rysman, 2009) also used the 
expression ‘two-sided strategies’ to convey the idea that there are choices made by agents 
rather than an imposed endogenous industry structure. Hagiu & Wright also look at 
multisided platforms as a matter of firms' strategic choices. Building on the theory of the firm, 
they frame these choices as a trade-off between 'being a MSP or a vertical integrated firm ' 
(Hagiu & Wright, 2015c), or between 'controlling versus enabling' (Hagiu & Wright, 2015a). 
Initially, the main focus of this perspective was made up of payment systems, auctions, 
operating systems, and media markets. Lately, however, it has been increasingly applied to 
digital platforms under the slightly different heading of Multi-sided Platforms (henceforth 
MSPs). In particular, digital platforms, including some commonly considered as examples of 
the 'sharing economy', are discussed in the most recent work by Hagiu & Wright (2013, 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Some digital platforms are also the object of controversy over 
whether or not they can be considered two-sided (Li, 2015; Luchetta, 2014). 
iv  This expression is used in one of the articles (Ertzscheid, 2016) contained in a recent dossier 
on digital labour published by the French magazine Numerique.  
v  Outsourcing is the decision of a firm to buy from another company part of a work process or a 
product previously produced internally, whereas off-shoring occurs when a company in one 
country purchases a service or product from a company in another country regardless of 
whether the latter is a subsidiary or a third party provider (Massini & Miozzo, 2012). Since the 
1980s outsourcing and off-shoring have grown remarkably extending beyond software coding 
and call centres; in particular outsourcing is growing very rapidly not just because of 
technology but also as a result of ‘innovative’ contractual forms including, according to 
Ruckelshaus et al.(2014) multi-layered contracting, use of staffing or temp firms, franchising, 
misclassifying employees as independent contractors. 
vi  A thesis already challenged empirically in 2007 by Pankaj Ghemawat (2007) by showing, 
amongst others, that 90% of the world's phone calls, Web traffic, and investments are local. 
According to the Wikipedia entry ‘Indian development journalist P. Sainath, Rural Affairs 
Editor for The Hindu, says "it's not the ‘world’ that is flat, but Thomas Friedman’s ‘brain’ is 
flat’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Is_Flat ). More recently, the globalization 
index produced by Pankaj Ghemawat and Steven Altman for DHL confirms that the world is 
still not flat at all (Fox, 2014). 
vii   According to the Routine Based Technological Change (RBTC) approach (proposed by Autor, 
Levy and Murnane 2003 and refined by Acemoglu and Autor 2011), the production process 
can be defined in terms of tasks (as opposed to simply human or physical capital) and such 
tasks can be allocated to workers or to capital ("machines") depending on the degree to which 
they are automatable, separable from other tasks, and on the relative costs of using 
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"machines" vs. human beings, where "machines" should be intended as a hardware, software 
and combinations of the two (such as robots).  From the RBTC hypothesis it is also possible to 
derive some relevant consequences for wage and job polarization. Workers employed in jobs 
that are highly routinized and standardized (and hence more substitutable) tend to have an 
intermediate level of education, while workers who are employed in highly cognitive and non-
substitutable tasks typically have higher education. As for workers with lower education, some 
of them are employed in tasks that can be easily taken up by machines (e.g. tasks that 
involve manual and routine tasks) and the ICT revolution is going to affect them negatively. 
However, other workers with lower education are involved in tasks that – in spite of being 
manual- machines cannot easily perform (such as those related to people care and 
education). Moreover, the demand for such non-routine tasks appears to be growing (partly 
due to population ageing and partly due to the increased demand for personal services from 
the richer part of the population). The implication of this is that the ICT revolution can 
increase the demand for workers with higher and lower education, while reducing the demand 
for workers with intermediate levels of education, which is consistent with the job polarization 
hypothesis (but not necessarily with wage polarization).  
viii  Notice that these measures of growth are calculated using contractors’ earnings; but another 
source reports that in 2012 the average hourly wage for administrative support was one 
fourth of that obtained for software development ($4 vs. $ 16) and lower than other growing 
categories (Agrawal et al., 2013a). Hence, though data on volumes of requests are not 
publicly available, it can be reasonable deduced that the number of requests and of people 
performing such tasks would score even higher in terms of growth rates measures in number 
of matched requests. 
ix  The hype on crowdsourcing originated with the popularization of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ 
narrative (Surowiecki, 2004) by Howe (2006, 2008). As noted (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 
2014, pp. 213-214; Fish & Srinivasan, 2012, pp. 139-140), the divide in the broader debate 
on crowdsourcing (reflecting on MTurk and similar platforms) is between seeing it as a 
liberating and democratising phenomenon and a source of efficiency, and considering it 
instead as a new and heightened form of exploitation and encroachment of labour. On the 
celebratory side one finds the democratising effect of the ‘long tail’(Anderson, 2006), the 
generosity stemming from ‘cognitive surplus’ (Shirky, 2010), the celebration of crowdsourcing 
as a model for problem solving (Brabham, 2013; Brabham, 2008; Gehl, 2011), the 
philosophical praise of its virtues (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006), and the promise of increased 
efficiency (Chandler & Kapelner, 2013; Djelassi & Decoopman, 2013; Satzger et al., 2013). 
According to a business blogger (Worstall, 2013), for instance, MTurk is a pure stripped down 
market where 500,000 individuals accomplish tasks at pay rate they are happy with so that 
the market clears (reaches equilibrium), while bad workers and employers are gradually left 
out as they actions become visible. On the opposite side, MTurk and other crowdsourcing 
platforms have been defined as the new sweatshops (Uddin, 2012; Zittrain, 2009), and 
analysed as new forms of encroachment and exploitation of labour (Carr, 2008; Deuze, 2007), 
underpaid free work (Kleemann et al., 2008; Scholz, 2013), and of new digitally enabled 
surveillance (Aneesh, 2009); the debate includes some contributions clearly inspired by the 
application of Marxian perspectives (Fuchs, 2014; Scholz, 2013), with commentaries and 
academic articles with titles such as, respectively, ‘Marx and Mechanical Turk’ (Bradford 
Delong, 2014) or ‘Web workers unite! Addressing challenges of online laborers’ (Bederson & 
Quinn, 2011). 
x  For instance, the paper by Hall & Krueger (2015) was included for it is the only source based 
on internal administrative data from Uber; although it is obviously not conducted by a 
disinterested third party given that one of the author is an employee of the platform. 
xi  One could reasonably argue that the inclusion of ride services contradicts condition (2) of the 
definition for using the car is as equally important in the production of the services as 
devoting time. Yet, at least three reasons can justify the inclusion. First, as mentioned, both 
Uber and Lyft have been the main sources of labour related litigation and debate on the 
distinction between being self-employed and being workers; this is a clear indication that this 
activity is about labour. Second, there is some qualitative evidence that some drivers do not 
possess the car but borrow it from family and friends to be able to work as drivers; Third, the 
main and patent differences with someone making the same amount of money renting his/her 
apartment is the amount of time needed to make that extra income. 
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xii  To further explain this exclusion, it is useful to start from one of the many definitions of the 
sharing economy, such as the following: ‘individual with under-utilized assets connected with 
other individuals or businesses in need of those assets’ (Sprague, 2015, p. 2). The starting 
point is to make explicit what these assets can be: a house, a car, very special skills, 
networks, generic skills, or just free time. So, condition (1) excludes platforms where the 
delivery of services leverages a physical asset such as a home or a car, which excludes Airbnb 
and also RelayRides. Uber is included because, although a car is used, the predominant 
component for the delivery of the ride services is labour. On the other hand, BlaBlaCar is 
excluded because giving a ride to share the costs of a trip is an occasional and infrequent 
activity which evidently does not qualify as provision of on-demand work. 
xiii  From this entry in the blog summarising the overall results one can then proceed to access 
the city specific reports (Airbnb, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 
2015b; Uber, 2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f, 2015g). 
xiv  Disguised crowdsourcing, contest-based crowdsourcing or markets, expert networks or 
platforms where professionals collaborate in production processes as peers, charitable and 
public interest crowdsourcing (i.e. public funded platforms for innovators) are excluded. 
Disguised crowdsourcing refers to the fact that most Internet users, without knowing, 
perform small tasks when browsing, buying online, or playing games that, behind the veil of 
software, are used commercially (Cherry, 2011; Felstiner, 2011). In contest-based online 
markets such as ‘99Designs’, ‘InnoCentive’, and ‘Article One Partners’, the buyers propose a 
contest for specific objects (i.e. solutions to engineering problems in InnoCentive) and then 
select the winner among the solutions proposed by different ‘workers’ and pay for it. Not-for-
profit ‘sharing’ platforms, commercial ‘sharing’ platform focussing on the circulation of goods 
(i.e. eBay), and other ‘sharing’ platforms in the car and ride sharing domain (i.e. BlaBlaCar, 
Relay Rides) are not considered. Other ‘sharing platforms’ where the ‘asset’ component is 
predominant (i.e. Airbnb) are not the specific focus of this paper either.  
xv  It extends the definition proposed by Horton (2010, p. 516) to include labour markets such as 
Uber/Lyft and TaskRabbit / Gigwalk that have been referred to as ‘Mobile Crowdsourcing 
Markets’ (Musthag & Ganesan, 2013), ‘Mobile Crowdsourcing Marketplaces’ (Thebault-
Spieker, et al., 2015), and ‘On-Demand Mobile Workforce’(Teodoro, et al., 2014). 
xvi  A more fine grained set of distinctions, for instance, has been presented between different 
forms of OLMs (Vakharia & Lease, 2013); in this case where differences are documented for 
OLMs for micro tasks grouped together in the typology used in this essay. For the kind of 
empirical questions at hand, however, the simpler typology presented is sufficient. 
xvii  As noted (Vakharia & Lease, 2013), researchers remain fascinated with Amazon Mechanical 
Turks (MTurk) and most academic papers focus on this platform. While MTurk opened the 
field in 2006, currently a myriad of other platforms offers alternatives. Nonetheless, MTurk is 
described here as typical case. MTurk is a platform where ‘requesters’ (employers) can post 
micro-tasks (Human Intelligence Tasks, or HIT) such as object classification, tagging, 
transcriptions, marketing spam, data entry, content review, editing, website feedback, and 
much more. Individuals performing these tasks are called ‘turkers’. The 500,000 registered 
turkers make on average up to $5 per hour. The Participation Agreement, which both 
requesters and turkers must sign, is the only governing agreement (though all participants 
must have an Amazon account) and stipulates that turkers complete tasks as independent 
contractors. All juridical rights are placed with the requesters. Amazon can cancel an account 
at any time for violation of the terms of the Participation Agreement and the worker may be 
deprived of any remaining earnings. Amazon declines all responsibility related to the 
transactions between requesters and workers in terms of quality, safety or payment issues, 
and explicitly states: ‘you use the site at your own risk’. MTurk maintains an ‘acceptance rate’ 
for each worker so that requesters can recruit workers with higher rates of task acceptance 
from prior requests. Once the worker’s bid for a given HIT has been accepted, it must be 
completed within a defined timeframe. However, there is no time limit in which firms should 
evaluate the task or provide reimbursement. The ‘mandatory satisfaction’ clause gives the 
requester the authority to reject an HIT without any justification and without payment. At the 
same time, they can access the work without forfeiting ownership. The requesters typically 
include the academic community (using turkers as subjects of surveys and experiments), 
start-ups and entrepreneurs, large corporations often using intermediary (consulting) 
agencies aggregating tasks and controlling quality. 
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xviii  Upwork and Freelancers are the ideal-typical examples of the online labour market for more 
complex tasks and sometimes for working on entire projects. Elance and Guru were both 
launched in 1999, followed by oDesk in 2005 and Freelancer in 2009. In 2014, Elance and 
oDesk merged into Elance-oDesk, which today has become Upwork. While there are some 
platform-specific features, these online labour markets share several characteristics. They 
allow employers to hire short-term workers by registering with the platform and posting jobs. 
Registered contract workers then bid for the posted jobs and advertise their skills and 
experience in profiles pages. The platforms maintain a rating system and track records of the 
work completed. They earn revenues by charging a transaction fee (% of transaction) or 
membership fees (most often only to the contract workers, in some case to both employers 
and workers). oDesk is further described here as typical case. For registered employers, 
oDesk has information on company name, legal representative or owner, location and 
industry. Employers are free to post as many jobs as they need and are required to specify a 
task description, the employer’s location, and the type of contract offered. oDesk supports 
both hourly wages (where employers must specify the expected number of hours per week 
and number of weeks needed for completion) and fixed price (where they must specify 
budget and deadline). In case of hourly wages, oDesk offers strict monitoring (up to 
keystrokes) enabled by its virtual office software.  Registered contractors provide their 
names, contact details, and set up profile pages detailing their skills, education, work 
experience outside of oDesk, oDesk-administered test scores, certifications, whether or not 
they belong to an agency, and oDesk-specific work histories and feedback scores. They can 
apply for jobs by submitting cover letters and bids to job postings. Employers can interview 
and negotiate bids with applicants before hiring and can hire as many contractors as they 
like. Once hired, the contractor completes tasks remotely. Contractors submit their work to 
employers online and are paid via oDesk. Employers have the option to give contractors 
bonuses and can also reimburse expenses through oDesk. The platform charges $8.75 per 
transaction. oDesk contract workers are highly educated and come from a large number of 
countries across the world. Those from lower-level income countries are the most hired. 90% 
of the employers which request work in oDesk, according to a 2013 survey, were SMEs. The 
number of employers billing on the platform per quarter increased by over 800% between 
2009 and 2013, and the number of working contractors per quarter increased by 
approximately 1,000% over the same period. The quarterly wage bill on oDesk increased by 
approximately 900%: from $10,000,000 to almost $100,000,000 over the same period. The 
average hourly wage in software development ($16) was approximately double that of writing 
and translation ($8) and more than triple that of administrative support ($4), customer 
support ($5) and sales and marketing ($5). 
xix  A description of how TaskRabbit worked between 2009 and mid 2014 is provided here. 
Currently the platform is present in 20 US cities and in London with a pool of about 30,000 
individuals performing tasks as independent contractors and 1.2 million requesters. In the 
language of the platform, ‘posters’ outsource tasks to ‘rabbits’, who search the posted offers 
on city-specific lists. Until the change introduced in 2014 (see Section 3.3.2), posters could 
request any sort of task, even the oddest kind. The five largest categories between 2009 and 
mid 2014 were shopping and delivery (24%), moving help (12%), cleaning (9%), home 
repairs (6%), and furniture assembly (4%). It must be noted that TaskRabbit also allows 
tasks that can be delivered digitally and do not require direct interaction such as editing 
texts, carrying out usability testing of mobile apps, etc. (in the period considered, these tasks 
made up 10.4% of the total). In the original model, matching took two forms: a task was 
posted and then the posters accepted the first offer, or posters asked for bids as in an auction 
model. Posters and rabbits went through a vetting process, although the screening was more 
rigid for the latter. For the former, the platform checked the identity through social networks 
and their payment method and capacity. The latter were subject to a background check, they 
answered a digital survey (on motivations, skills, and availability), and were interviewed by 
TaskRabbit employees to assess their fit. The acceptance rate of applications by potential 
rabbits was on average 13.6% (though it varied greatly from month to month). This 
screening was, however, reduced in the spring of 2013 in an attempt to involve more rabbits. 
On average 78% of posted tasks received an offer (on average 2.8 offers); of these 63% 
were successfully completed at an average price of $57. TaskRabbit charged (to rabbits) a 
20% commission fee on successful tasks. The unit of observation is a city-month (a poster is 
active if he/she posts at least one task in a given month for a given city, and in the same way 
a rabbit is active if he/she submits at least one offer within that city-month). On average, 
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there are 708 active posters and 255 active rabbits in a city-month. Typical posters are 
predominantly female (55% of buyers) and relatively affluent. The modal poster is a woman 
between the age of 35 and 44 with a household income between $150,000 and $175,000. 
The rabbits are younger and not surprisingly have lower incomes. The modal rabbit is 25-34 
years old and has a household income between $50,000 and $75,000. Finally, it should be 
noted that TaskRabbit recently introduced a wage floor and an insurance policy. It is now not 
possible to earn less than $12.80 an hour (this is higher than any possible minimum wage in 
the US). A new insurance scheme covers both sides for possible property damage or bodily 
harm up to $1 million. 
xx  Uber and Lyft offer ride services and their business models have nothing to do with other 
models in the mobility/transportation sector domains. Indeed, in this domain a typology has 
identified three models: car sharing (Zipcar, Car2Go, Relay Rides), ride sharing (BlaBlaCar), 
and ride services such as those offered by Uber and Lyft (Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014). For 
instance, in car sharing there are business-to-consumers (Zipcar and Car2Go) and peer-to-
peer (Relay Rides) platforms. There is a clear distinction between sharing a ride in BlaBlaCar 
and using a ride service with Uber. In the former (and in other short distance equivalents), 
the drivers and passengers share the costs and the use of the service occurs less frequently 
for passengers and especially for drivers. Although some BlaBlaCar drivers charge more than 
the actual costs as recommended by the platform, they do not spend every day of the week 
riding between, for instance, Milan and Rome, as many Uber and Lyft drivers do in cities. In 
Relay Rides, car owners and car renters schedule a rental and meet, but the owner does not 
perform any work, she simply rents an idle asset. Hence, Uber and Lyft are included among 
mobile labour markets because the labour component is clearly predominant, as compared to 
leveraging an underutilised tangible asset like a car. This can be further illustrated by using 
as the source the written comment sent by Relay Rides to the public consultation launched in 
the US by the Federal Trade Commission in the run up to a workshop on the sharing economy 
held in June 2015 (available at:  
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/07/02031-96671.pdf). 
Relay Rides makes a clear case for distinguishing its business model – which defines it as a 
person-to-person car-sharing platform, connecting car owners who rent out their idle vehicles 
to travellers – from ride services business models such as Uber or Lyft.  On this basis, the 
platform asked policy makers not to take a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation (see table 
below).  
 
Car-Sharing Ride-Services 
Scheduled reservations On-demand; short-lead 
Driving for personal use Driving for commercial use 
Longer, mostly downtime Higher utilisation 
Owners & Renters Drivers & Passengers 
Source: RelayRides 
The frequency of occurrences (high in ride services and low in car sharing, but also in ride 
sharing), the timing (on demand), and the role involved clearly indicate that Uber and Lyft 
are labour-based ride services, radically different from car sharing (Relay Rides) and ride 
sharing (BlaBlaCar). 
xxi  A large and growing body of of policy reports and academic articles describe and assess the 
trend and implication of NSW (DiPrete et al., 2006; Eichhorst, 2013; Eichhorst et al., 2013; 
Eurofound, 2015a, 2015b; European Commission, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016; European 
Trade Union Institute, 2012, 2015; International Labour Office, 1997, 2015; Kahn, 2012; 
Nunez & Livanos, 2014; OECD, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Van Lancker, 2012). 
xxii  Taken from: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/images/0/0a/Labour_status_of_persons_aged_15_years_and_older%2C_EU-
28%2C_2014.png. 
xxiii  The issue of Dependent Self-Employed Workers (DSEWs) in general (with no single reference 
to the kind of platforms discussed in this essay) is discussed at length in various reports 
published by the ILO (International Labour Office, 2015), the OECD (2014), the European 
Commission (2016), and the European Parliament (Eichhorst et al., 2013). When individuals 
77 
                                                                                                                                   
without an employment contract work just for a single client they are also referred to as 
‘bogus’ self-employed (European Commission, 2016, pp. 86-87). For the purposes of 
measurement in surveys, DSEWs are defined as ‘own-account self-employed for whom at 
least two of the following conditions hold: i) they have only one employer/client; ii) they 
cannot hire employees even in the case of heavy workload; and iii) cannot autonomously take 
the most important decisions to run their business’ (OECD, 2014, p. 153). 
xxiv  Please note that the kindle version of Atkinson’s new book on inequality has been consulted 
and, thus, reference to exact pages is not possible. 
xxv  Data from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00074
&plugin=1 
xxvi  Incorporated self-employed are individuals who work for themselves in corporate entities; 
unincorporated self-employed are those who work for themselves under other legal forms. As 
seen according to the December 2015 BLS data the latter are almost double in size compared 
to the former. Incorporated self-employed, on the other hand, have yearly median earnings 
more than double those of the unincorporated ones: in 2011 $ 46,872 versus $21,630 
(http://smallbiztrends.com/2013/11/incorporated-versus-unincorporated-self-
employment.html). 
xxvii  The selection of the platforms should neither be considered exhaustive nor representative. It 
is based on what can be called ‘theoretical sampling’. The most important platforms by type 
were included alongside others that were chosen either for illustrative purposes or to provide 
at least a few examples of platforms that originated in Europe. Hence, some larger U.S. based 
platforms were not included. Another important disclaimer that should be made for the figures 
that will follow is that the total number of registered contractors is a different variable from 
the number of those who have actually worked in a given year. To find out the latter, it would 
be necessary to have access to the administrative data of the platforms. In the sources 
reviewed and presented later in Section 3, there is ample evidence of frictions and ‘superstar 
effects’ so that (i) at any given time, not all contractors are matched to an employer and/or (ii) 
some contractors are matched more frequently and intensively than others. It is also 
important to stress that individuals may be registered with many platforms. Finally, for 
platforms with global and international reach, the search performed did not enable us to 
quantify how many contractors are based in country X, Z, or Y. This kind of information may 
be retrieved through intense web scraping of data. 
xxviii  The report illustration of the survey methodology is succinct and not fully clear to say the 
least (see Elance-oDesk, 2014, pp. 81-82). The sample was extracted from 9 countries 
representing developed and non-developed countries according to the World Bank 
categorisation. 
xxix  ‘Mobile Work’ is a pseudonym the authors used to maintain the anonymity of the platforms. 
However, from the description of the tasks performed, the author believes that the data come 
from Gigwalk. 
xxx  A total of 192 subjects (convenient sample) were randomly allocated to answer one of two 
questions. One group answered a question about the fairness of other employers they had 
had; the other answered a question about the fairness of employers in MTurk.  There is an 
inherent limit to the reliability of these results due to the sample size and recruitment method. 
In addition, the results may suffer from ‘experimenter effects’: subjects may have been 
encouraged to exaggerate how honest and fair they find AMT employers. Furthermore, the 
subjects were turkers with a 95% completion rating (i.e. the best workers). 
xxxi   The ‘1099’ label refers to the kind of tax forms that these individuals file. 
xxxii  Some are digital ethnographic analyses of online forums such as ‘Turker Nation’ (Martin, et 
al., 2014) or ‘Turkopticon’ (Irani & Silberman, 2013). Others are based on both online 
ethnography and e MTurk website, and industry sources (Bergvall-Kåreborn & Howcroft, 
2014). The more in-depth and sustained analysis presented by Irani (2015a; 2015b), on the 
other hand, is based on four years of involvement in crowdsourcing by the author, both as a 
participant and an observer.  
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xxxiii  They made 43 copies of the Uber smartphone app and distributed them throughout 
downtown San Francisco (SF) and midtown Manhattan to individuals who were acting as 
drivers and/or passengers. 
xxxiv  Superstar effects should produce increased income inequality because employers choose the 
best workers based on global rather than on local search. When there is a large difference in 
wages between the global online market and the local physical one (as between higher and 
lower income countries), the superstar effect will drive the wages of high quality global online 
workers up, and as a result, those of local workers will be driven down. If information 
asymmetries are present, they may exacerbate the superstar effects. Vertical differentiation 
in quality may produce superstar effects, whereas horizontal differentiation (variety) may 
drive long-tail effects (Bar-Isaac et al., 2012). The long-tail effect, in fact, may occur for 
workers offering less common and less locally-demanded areas of expertise, wages for less 
common skills may be low because local demand is limited and digitization with access to 
many different and distant markets could greatly increase the demand for such skills 
relatively to supply and, hence, greatly increase wages. 
xxxv  It must be noted that, though focussing on a different type of market such as Freelancers, an 
analysis of a dataset containing both open auctions and sealed bid transactions, shows that 
the latter attract more bids but the former offer buyers higher surplus (Hong et al., 2014). 
xxxvi  They estimate the average value per match at $37 and the average number of tasks per 
requester at 1.23 per month. In addition, they make the assumption that 20% of US 
households in the 18 cities post requests and that platforms are able to match 80% of them. 
xxxvii  Hagiu, A. (2015), Multi-Sided Platforms, Vertical Integration and Input Suppliers. 
Presentation delivered at the workshop on platforms organised by JRC-IPTS, Brussels, 
11 November 2015. 
xxxviii  These estimates, as well as the discussion of the trade-offs between control and costs, are 
presented in Hagiu, A. (2015), Multi-Sided Platforms, Vertical Integration and Input Suppliers, 
op. cit. 
xxxix  The European Union (EU) has adopted three measures concerning ‘atypical’ workers: (1) a 
Social Partners’ Agreement on part-time work (Directive 97/81concerning the framework 
agreement on part-timework concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1998] OJ L14/9; 
extended to the UK by Directive 98/23 [1998] OJ L131/10; (2) a Social Partners’ Agreement 
on fixed-term work (Directive 1999/70 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43); (3) a Directive on temporary 
agency work known as the ‘agency work Directive’ (Directive 2008/104 [2008] OJ L327/9. 
Member States had to apply this Directive by 5 December 2011: Art 11(1)).  
xl  These sources are just some examples from a burgeoning field. 
xli  It sheds light on incentives and motivation. 
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